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ABSTRACT 
This thesis consists of three essays in monetary economics in general equiJibrium 
models. Each deals wit.h a probJem that cent.ral banks commonly face: uncertninty, 
inflation stability, and exchange rate policy. 
The first. essay examines t.he interdepenclence of the Canaclian nnd US economies 
with a view t.o common policy allalysis. The est.imatecl struct.ural vector error correc­
tion model applied to post.-war dat.n confirms t.he presence of four long-run equilibriurn 
rclationships between the t.wo economies: i) purchasing power parit.y, ii) technological 
dependence, iii) interest rate parit.y, and iv) net. foreign assets accumulation. Four com­
mon trenels are also ielentifieel between the two economies: i) technologicaL ii) interest 
rate, iii) priee, and iv) exchange l'Me relations. The rcsults highJight that exchange rat.e 
appreciation is consistent with the decrease in foreign assets in Canaclél, that Canada 
and US cycles arc correlHted. that monetary shocks have short-l'un effects on out.puts 
and permanent effects on pricp levels <Illd pxchange rates in both countries, and thnt 
t.J1P long-l'un growt.h for bot.h cconomies stems from technologicill innovat.ions. Therefore 
any expansionary monetnry po\icics in these t.\Vo count.rics should be trcatcc! cautiously 
as they might leael to inflM.ion in both cconOlllies. 
The second essi'lY derivE's the opt.imel! rate of priee inflation by adding the clement 
of long-run growt.h t.o i'I st.anelarel Ne\\' KeYllesian model with both price and wage 
rigidities. The resu\ts revive the o leI paradigm of monet.ary economics associated \Vith 
Frieell1li'ln (1969): milel deflation is the optimal policy. HoweveL in this environment, 
optimi'll defl(ltion results from growt II. The presence of l'cal gro\Vth in the stcady-state 
If'ads to a wedge between priee inflation i'lnd wage inflation. In this environl1lenL the 
st.ei1dy-stnt.e of t.he model is dlill(lcterizecl by four distortions: price dispersion. \Vi1gc 
c1ispPl'sion, <'lI1d monopoJistic mark-ups of priee a.nd of wage setters Opt.imi:\l infli:ltion is 
t.he one thM balances these distortions (lt t.be l11i:1l'gin. The welfare gilin of moving fl'Orn 
zel'O infli:1tion to optimal ckflation is 0.1 o/c: of the steady-state consumption. The c:ost of 
infléltion in th is environrnent tUl'l1S ou t to be higlJer thi:ln thilt in a mode! \\'it hout gl'Owtlt. 
This highlights the contribution of growth to the (Ost of inflation. In a stoc:bnstie 
\'crsion of t he mode!' the mean of \(1l'iables is ilft'ected by SllOCks. As groll'lll tn'(Ilt~s el 
gèlp bet\reen \vage i1nel priee inflations. the monetary policy ((111 stilbilize \Vilges when 
tilrgeting a small priee c1eflHtion rate. 
The thinl eSSilV addresses the issue of opt.il1wl cxchange rate reginws for (·'m<?rging 
ceonomies. Il tloes so t hrough t hf' de\'e[opl11ent of n small open econ0l11Y mode! of 
('nclo\\'111enl \Vith nOll1ini'll HcxibiJitv i1THI l'Cil 1 rigiclity, i.E'. int'Cl'l1eltional financ:inl In(\1'J«-'t 
segnwntntion. This kincl of l'l'al rigiclitv. beenusc it lecHls to heterogE'neit:,' among agc'uts. 
xiv 
has important. implicat.ions for t.he choice of exchange regime in these economies. The 
simulation exercises reveal that. agents who are excluded from t.he foreign exchange 
market (non-t.raders) marginally prefer flexible exchange rates, while t.hose who have 
aceess to t.he foreign exchange market (traders) are better off with fixed rates. Flexible 
rat.es yield a potent.ial Pareto improvement if t.ra.ders represent a very small fraction of 
the tot.al population. Plausible \veight.s on the two groups in a ut.iJitarian social welfare 
function give a higher level of social welfare under fixed rates. These results have 
import.ant implicat.ions for policymakers in emerging markets. An optimal monetary 
policy, in order to increase t.he average level of welfare. t·urns out t.o be distort.ionary 
t.owards t.he consumption of non-traders. 
Key words: Vector error correct.ion modeL identification, struct.ural shocks, com­
mon trends, priee inflat.ion, wage inflation, growt.h, staggered cont.racts, welfare evalua­
tion, monet.ary policy, inftat.ion t.argeting, exchange rate regimes. 
RÉSUMÉ 
Cette thèse est composée de t.rois essais sur l'économie monétaire à lïntérieur du 
modèle d'équilibre général. Chacun tr(lite d'un problème auquel les bmlques centmles 
font. souvent· face: l'incert.it.ude, l'iuflat.ion, et. les régimes de t.aux de change. 
Le premier essai examine l'interdépendance des économies canadienne et. américaine 
afin de dégager une analyse des politiques économiques conjoncturelles. Le moclèJe struc­
t.urel vectoriel des corrections d'erreurs appliqué aux données de l'après-guerre confirme 
la présence de quatre relations de long terme entre ces deux économies i) la parité 
du pouvoir d'achélt, ii) la dépendance technologique. iii) la parit.é des taux d'intérêts, 
et iv) 1'accumulat,ion net.t.e d'actifs ét.r(lngers au Canada. Qu<1t..re tendances communes 
sont également. identifiées entre les deux économies: i) technologique. (ii) de tnux 
d'intérêt. (iii) cie prix. et iv) de relat.ion de tnux de ch(lnge. Les résultats suggèrent (jlle 
l'appréciation du tnux de chnnge est. conforme à la baisse des actifs (lU Canada, que 
les cycles cles États-Unis et. du C<'lnada sont corrélés. que les chocs monétaires ont des 
effets de court terme sur les productions et des effets pcrl1l(lnent..s Sllr les niveaux de prix 
et· de taux de change dans les deux pays. et que la croissance de long terme des deux 
pays découle cie l'innovat.ion technologique. Il en résulte que toute politique monétaire 
expansionnist.e dans ces deux pays doit être gérée avec prudence car el Je pourrait mener 
n de l'inflat.ion. 
Le second essai dérive Je taux d'inflation optimal des prix en i'\joutant un élémelJt 
de croissi'\nce de long terme non nulle à un modèle néo-keynesien avec rigidité cie prix 
et de salaire. Les résultat.s raniment. le vieux pflradigme d'économie monétaire nssocié 
à Friedman (1969) : une politique légèrement défiéltionnist.e est optimale. Néartlnoins, 
ce résultat n'est pas dû à l'aspect. monét.aire du mod~~le, mi'\is plut.ôt à un aspect réel de 
lil croissilnce économique. En effet, dans cet environment, le t<lUX cl'infintion opt.inlilJ 
équilibre les clistorsions il l'état stationnflire. Ces distortions se résument ainsi: 1" 
dispersion des prix, la dispersion des sali'\ires, et les marges ajoutées des prix ct des 
sn!clires dûes ,lUX concurrences monopolistiques cli'\ns les IllMchés de biens cl' du tl'()\,<)i! 
sur les coûts margini'\ux. Le gain de bien-étre clu fait de pnsser d'une inflation zéro il 
l'inflfltion optimnle est de 0.1% cie la consolllmation à l'étM stMionnaire. En outre. 
le coùt de lïnflation dilns cet environnement avec croissance s'avère plus éle\·é.. Cilr la 
croissance économique crée un éCflrt. entre lïnf!fltion cie prix et cie salaire. Dflns une 
version stochastique du modèle, lél movenne de lïnflation est affectée par les chocs. Il 
en résultc qu'une politique monétaire qui ajuste Je taux d'int.t'rêt nominal selOlI une règle 
de TaYlor pour "t\'eindre l'objectif de cible dïnflntion de\Tait viser le tilUX de d{>Hation 
des prix. afin de Sl'abiliser le taux d'inf~fltion salarial l'rè's prociJe cie ~éro. 
XVI 
Le trolsleme essai traite de la question clu reglme de change optimal pour les 
économies émergentes. Les résultats sont dérivés à partir d'un modèle d:économie de 
dotat.ion et· OliVette, des prix flexibles et des rigidit.és réelles en termes d'accès allx 
marchés financiers. Les simulations du modèle montrent que ceux exclus des marchés 
préfèrent à la marge un régime de taux de change flexible. Dans cet environemment, 
un régime fixe augmente le bien-être social de tout le monde. Le coüt de bien-être 
d'un régime de change non-optimal dans cet. environnement. est élevé: et notamment 
plus élevé pour les participants aux marchés. Un régime de taux de chnnge flexible 
aboutit à une amélioration au sens de Pareto si les parts des part.icipants nux mClrchés 
deviennent. très faible. Ces résultats ont des implicat.ions importnntes en matière de 
polit.iques économiques dans les marchés émergents. Une politique monétnire opti­
male, afin d'augmenter le niveau moyen de bien-être socinl: doit porter ses efforts sur 
J'augmentation de la consommation du groupe d'agents exclus des mmchés financiers, 
bien que cette polit.ique soit. distortionnaire. 
~Iots clés: Modèle vectoriel à correction d'erreur: ident.ificntion. chocs structurels: 
tendances communes, inflation cles prix, croissance, contrAts échelonnés, évaluation cie 
bien être: politique monét.aire, cibles d:infiat.ion, régimes cie t<lUX cie change. 
INTRODUCTION 
A travers cette thèse je cherche à apporter des éléments de réponse il trois défis 
auxquels les banques centrales sont souvent confrontées dans un environnement monclial 
difficile: i) l'incertit.ude et. l'identification des chocs, ii) le choix cie taux d'inflation et 
iii) le régime approprié de change pour les économies émergentes. 
Les deux dernières décennies ont. été marquées par des changements majeurs 
dans la manière dont ln politique monétaire est menée. De plus en plus de banques 
centrales il travers le monde sont. désormi\is indépendantes et ont développé des systèmes 
de prévision sophistiqués. La pratique de cibles d'inflation et Je passage il un régime 
de change floUnnt font partie de ce processus. Le consensus parmi les expert.s est 
qu'un système trnnsparent cie prévision macroéconomique, un taux d'infl,ltion bas et 
st.able, et UII régime de change flottant, sont des condit.ions indispensab1rs de la st.abilité 
mi\croéconomique et cie la croissance face à la mondialisi\t.ion. Bien que les autorités 
monétaires clans les pays ind ustrialisés et en développement partagent ces mÊ'mes cieux 
premiers object.ifs. la struct.ure économique de ces différents pays les a menés il des choix 
différents en matière de régime de change. 
Le premier essili a en même temps une vocat.ion méthodologique relative au 
développement. des modèles économiques st.ructurels. et une \'ocntion normative rela­
tive au développement d'outils plus efficaces pour l'ét.ude des conjonctures économiques. 
Contrairement aux estimations des modèles empiriques, je développe le modèle d'une 
petite économie oU\ute et j 'évalue l'équilibre de long terme de ce modèle structurel sim­
ple avec les données. Le mot structurel fait ici allusion aux chocs structurels, dérivés 
et propres (lUX structures des économies d'une part. ct à la structure imposée par les 
équilibres (k long terme (i'<1Utrc pmt.. 
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Les études empiriques ont démontré que les prédictions des différents modèles 
théoriques au sujet des agrégats macroéconomiques ne sont. pa" toujours conciliables 
entre elles. Toutefois, ces résult.ats variés semblent être relativement dépendants de 
la méthodologie adoptée (Sims (1980), Johansen (1988), Blanchard et Quah (1990), 
Shapiro et Watson (1998), Gall (1999) et Pesaran, Garratt., Shin et Lee (2003)). 
Le développement. de mon travail est inspiré par les recherches de Pesaran, Gar­
l'Ml, Shill et· Lee (2003) (PGLS) en ce qui concerne la modélisat.ion structurelle, et. cie 
King, Plosser, Stock et \Vatson (1991) (KPS\iV) pour l'identification des chocs struc­
turels. L'approche de PGLS est. générale, simple. flexible et pourra s'èlppliquer afin 
de test.er les t.héories économiques, en présence de t.outes sortes de frict.ions de court, 
t.erme sur le marché, pourvu que l'existence d'un état st,at.ionnaire unique soit gRrant.i. 
Toutefois, cette mét.hodologie présente des failles en ce qui concerne la dynamique du 
système pour identifier le type cie choc économique. 
KPSW (1991) s'inspirent de la méthodologie cie la décomposition d'une variable 
en une composant.e stationnaire et. une composante non-st.Rtionnaire. Tout.efois leur 
mét.hodologie repose sur un grand nombre de restrict,ions de long t.erme, sans développer 
un modèle théorique explicite. Par rapport aux travaux précédents. je franc!lis une étape 
supplémentaire en combinant PGLS (2003) avec KPSW (1991), afin de développer une 
méthode d'analyse plus complète des modèles structurels. 
J'ut.ilise ensuit.e cette méthodologie pour étudier l'évolution de l"économie cana­
dienne en rclat.ion avec celle des États-Unis, son principal pa.rtenair<> pconomique. Tèli 
recours dans cctt.e optique à un modèle de croissè1Dce néoclassiCJue il un secteur de 
production, enrichi des sources exogènes de perturbation st.ochastique. LC' lllodèle est 
ensuite est.irné pilr la méthocle de maximum d<' vraissemblance pour 1<>$ vect.eurs de 
cointegration et avec les données cèll1adiennes et États-uniennes de 1961CJl-2008ql. Les 
résultats mettent en évidence la présence de quatre liens de Jong "("rme entre les huit 
variables d'intérêt la production, les prix, les taux <1 'in t.érêt.s , le taux <le ch..-ll1ge du 
Canadel. el l"accumulCÜ·ion c1"lCt.ifs nets. Ces relatiolls sont. : i) la pHrit{> du pouvoir 
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d'achat., ii) la dépendance t.echnoJogique mutuel1e, iii) la parité cles t.aux d'intérêt, et. iv) 
l'accumulat.ion d'actifs net.s reliée au t.aux de change. 
L'évolution cie long terme entre les cieux économies est ensuite déterminée par 
quatre chocs permanents influant. les tendances qui leurs sont communes. 'll'ois de ces 
tendflDces communes sont. de nat.ure nominales et attestent. de ce que les chocs sur ces 
variables ont. seulement un effet permanent sur les variables nominales. La dernière est. 
de nature réelle et démontre que J'évolution de long terme des deux économies dépend 
des innovations t.echnologiques. L'approche de ce papier constit.ue un out.il promet.­
teur dans la recherche d'une explication t.héorique des fluctuat.ions et de la croissance 
économique ent.re les deux pays. 
Dans le deuxième essai, je t.raite la question de l'inRat.ion optinwle qu'une oélnque 
centmJe devrait chercher ~ cibler tla.ns un régime de cible d'inflation Jorsqu'elle tient 
compt.e de la croissance de long terme de l'économie, dans un cadre standard néo­
l<eynesien avec rigidité cie prix et de salaires. 
Les résult.at.s remettent au goût du jour la règle de FriedmcJn (1969) selon laquelle 
une faible déflation est opt.imale. Dans cet. essai. la déflntion optimale résulte de la 
croissance de long t.erme et. de son impac.t. sur l'infl<-1t.ion cles prix et. de salfüre. La 
croissance élboutit il un !?célrt ent.rp. l'inflat.ion cles prix et lïnflMion salariale. L'état. 
stationnaire de ce modèle est. caract.erisé par quat.re distorsions: <Iispersion des prix et. 
des salaires, et concurrence monopolistique chez les ménages et. les firmes. Ainsi une 
banque centrale avec un object.if de cible d'inflation qui utilisp cornn1P instrument. le 
taux d'int.érêt. pnr le biais d'une règle de Taylor devrait choisir cette v<)leur d'inflation 
optimale négat.ive comme .sa cible d'inflation. COl11mp les DlO~'enn('s stochastiques des 
variables sont· affectées pi1), ks chocs de court. t.el"I11e, la nloyenne de déflation opt.imale 
s'a pprochera cie zéro. 
Cet essai est lié il un certaiu nombre d'études existi1nt.es SUl l'impact nwcro0'conomique 
dl' la dispersion des prix dans les modèles néo-keynesiens. Le choc t.l'chnologiquc per­
mancnt ct le coùt cie bien être des politiques monét,)ircs, les autres sujets traités dans 
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ce papier, ont fait l'objet de nombreux débats dans la dernière décennie. Une grande 
partie cie la littérat.ure, cependant, s:appuie sur J'idée cie rigidité cles prix pour étudier 
la question clu taux optimal d'inflation. King et \Volman (1996), par exemple. furent les 
premiers à trouver que la marge moyenne ajout,ée des prix par rapport aux coûts margin­
aux des productions varie avec le taux d'inflat,ion, S'inspirant de cette idée, \\Tolman 
(2001), sur la base d'un modèle avec contrats échelonnés des prix, a dérivé un niveau 
légèrement positif pour J'inflation optimale dans l'état stationnaire. Ascari (2005) et· 
Bakhshi, Lombart.. Khan, et Rudolf (2003) ont. attiré l'attention sur les coûts de bien­
être de la dispersion de prix. Amano: Ambler et Rebei (2007), montrent comment la 
non-linéarité peut aussi jouer un rôle important dé\l1S les modèles néo-keynésiens. 
Bien que plusieurs papiers récents discutent de l'importance des rigidités salmiales 
pour améliorer la performance des modèles néo-keynésiens. rebtivement peu d'études 
ont fait de l'analyse de bien-être en utilisant des Illodèles avec plus d'une rigidité nom­
inale. Une des rnres except.ions est. Erceg, Henderson et Levin (ci-après: EHD (2000)), 
qui furent les premiers à développer un modèle cllmulant rigidités de salaire et de prix. 
Ces derniers ont montré qu'une polit.ique optimale devrait viser une moyenne dûment 
pondérée de l'inflat.ion des prix et. de salaire. 
l\lêrne si ce papier est dans l'esprit d'EHL (2000) et. Wolmnn (2001). il s'intéresse 
uniquement il J'dficacit,é des politiques monét,aires dans un environnement de croissance 
de long terme non nulle. Je prolonge l'approche de ces auteurs pm J'ajout de rigidités 
nominales de salaire, d 'une manière conforme aux contrnt.s de Taylor (1980) pour deux 
périodes. dans un environnement de croissance positive de ln produd.ivité il long terme. 
Cene fixa tion faite en a",.)Dce apporte a ux ménages un pO\l\'oir de monopole sur leurs 
produits et services. pm nature différenciés. La concurrence monopolistique entre les 
firmes et les ménages conduit. il un écart ent.re Jf'-S prix et les snlClires qui est· dû il la 
marge ajoutèe des coÎlts marginaux de ces derniers. En outre. la dispersion des prix 
et des sa!8ires du f(lit (le 1(1 nature échelonnée des contrats représC'lltc une autre source 
dïnefficacit<'> clu marché. Dans un travi'liJ récent de ln DnllqllC' du ('"nada. All1êlno. 
?dor"n. 1\IlIl'chison ct Renisson (2007) étudient k> coftt dl' lïnHiitioll. dans un modèle 
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semblable à ce travail et t.rouvent également que la déflation est. la polit.iquE' optimille. Ils 
expliquent qu'une valeur fr1ible pour la déflat.ion minimise les dist.ort.ions dans le marché 
du travail. Puisque ces marchés sont. plus dist.ort.ionnaires, ces ilut.eurs concluent. que 
l'object.if de la polit.ique monétaire sera d'éliminer les distortions propres il ce milrché. 
Dans mon essai, j'étends l'analyse du t.aux d'inflation opt.in1ill au-delà de l'ét.at 
st,ationnaire déterminist.e. J'analyse la dynamique du modèle suit.e à cieux chocs: un 
choc t.ransitoire monét,aire cont.ractionnist.e de la règle de Taylor pour la détermination 
du taux d'int.érêt, et. un choc t.echnologique permanent,: qui est équivalent ?1 un choc 
t.ransit.oire sur la croissFlI1ce de long t.erme. L'ét.ude des comport.ements cycliques des 
v3riables et. les sentiers de réponse sont. conformes aux données. Dans cet environe­
ment. avec les chocs, lil f,lible déflation rest.e h, polit.ique optimale. car elle permet une 
stabilisation de l'inflation salariale. Si les taiJles cie chocs rHlgrnentent. ou si hl poli­
tique monétaire est. IIwins contraignilnt.e (les coefficient.s cie la règle de Taylor sont plus 
faibles), le taux de déflat.ion optimal devient. plus négatif. 
La cont,ribut.ion apportée par mon dernier essai me sit.ue en faveur d'un régime de 
change fixe pour les économies émergent.es. Ce résultélt. découle de ln struct.ure de ces 
économies dans lesquelles une part.ie de Iii püpulilt.ion est exclue des trRnsactions sur le 
mn.}'Ché cie change (marché financier). Les preuves empiriqups démontrent. a ussi que les 
crises de c:lwnge sont. fortement liées ilUX structures des l1l(1rchés finrlnciers dans ces pnys. 
notilmmcnt· à l'accès limité des ilgents ?1 ces marchés. D()ns une étude récente, Lahiri, 
Singh, et Vegh (2007) montrent (lnalytiquement comment diH'érentes sortes de frictions 
peuvent changer le choix de régime de change. Ils concluent que le type d<' friction est 
ëll1ssi important que le t.ype de choc dans la dét,erminHtion <lu régirlle optirllnJ. 
.Je m'inspire dE' leurs papiers pour If' choix de rnod6Iis(1('ion mais m'en éloigne en 
optrll1t pour une ilprroche numérique par la calibration et simulation. De filit. dilns mon 
modèle simple de dotat.ion en économie ouvertE' avec des prix flpxibles et des rigidités 
réelles en termes d'accès nux mi1rchés financiers. nvec des agent.s qui ont llne contraintf' 
cie prliement préahlbk pt qui sont confrontés ~ dps cbocs de demande cil' monnaie l'l de 
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leur dotat.ion, un régime de change fixe est. plus performant. en termes de bien-êt.re des 
agents. En effet, pour un poids raisonable de deux types d'agents dans une fonction 
de bien-être social utilitariste, le régime fixe est le régime de change optimal, même si 
pour ceux exclus des marchés financiers, le régime flexible est optimal à la marge. Les 
variations du taux de change elles-mêmes deviennent le stabilisateur économique pour 
ce groupe face aux chocs. Par contre, pour ceux part.icipant aux marchés, un régime fixe 
protège mieux les fluctuations de la consommat.ion suite aux chocs. Cela est vrai jusqu'à 
ce que la part des participants au mnrché diminue il moins cie 10% de la population. 
Dans ce cas, la fixité du taux de change sur le marché de change n'est pas possible ct. 
un régime de change Aexible donne une amélioration a u sens de Pareto. Je calibre le 
modèle avec les données disponible pour l'Argentine. Aussi simple soit-il, le moclèle 
reproduit les comportements cycliques des variables après les chocs. 
Le choix d'un régime de change optimal est un vieux paradigmE' en finance inter­
nationale. Le consensus de 1\1 undell (1961) pour le choix de ré'gime de ,hange est que 
les régimes fixes sont. optimaux lorsque l'on R R!faire il des chocs monét.aires. Ainsi. les 
régimes flexibles sont optimaux en présence des chocs réels. Hel pman et Razin (1079) 
furent. les premiers il conclure que Je choix de régime de change est JWltinent. unique­
ment lorsque les éléments de rigidit.é nominale avec chocs sont envisagés. Les avis rest·ent 
pourtRnt part8gés et une majorité des aut·eurs semble sC' prononcer en faveur ues régimes 
polaires. 
Ceux en favem des régimes flexibles (Obstfelcl et Rogoff (1095). EcJ\I'arcis et Yeyati 
(2005) et Edwards et J\lagendzo (2006)) expliquent la. supériorité' de ces régimes par leurs 
capacités d'absorpt.ion des chocs et IR croissance accrue qu "ils génè'rent. ainsi que leur 
capacité à diminuer la volatilité réelle des variRbles dRns ulle économie en régime flexible. 
Ceux défendant le recours il des régimes fixes expliquent I"Rvantage de' crédibilit.é de 
tels mécanismes (Dornbusch (2001), Calvo et ReinhRrt (2002). C1!VO (2005). ;\jendoza 
(2001), Arellano et HeRthcote (2007)). )\jes résultRt.s contribuent il cettC' littérature en 
Mtirant l'at.tention sur les protect"ions qu'un régime de change fixe garantit pour les 
part.icipRl1ts du marché. contre i<'s ê11éas auxquels les économies OU\'('l"tes font fnCt? 
CHAPTER 1 
CLüSE-EMBRACE: CANADA-US CÜMMÜN TRENDS 
Abstract 
This chapter st,udies the joint dynamics of the Canadian economy
 
wit h US economic variables. The methodology employeel is t,hat of
 
t,he st.ructural vect.or error correction model that combines ume­

strieted short-nm dynamics with long-l'un restrictions derivecl l'rom
 
grO\:vt h theOl·Y. Common trends, as weil as transitory shocks t.o these
 
t\Vo economies are identified. Quarterly c1ata l'rom 1961ql t,o 2üüSql
 
suggests four long-l'un equilibrium relationships: i) purchasing power
 
parity, ii) technological differentials, iii) interest rate parity, ancl iv)
 
net foreign asset accumulation. Four common t.rends or permanent
 
common shocks are also iclentified between the t\Vo economies: i)
 
t.echnological, ii) int.erest rate, iii) priee, and iv) exchangc rate
 
relations. The model explains that exchange rate appreciation is
 
consistent wit,h the decreilse in foreign assets in Cilnac!a, thM Canada
 
and US cycles are correlated, and that technological innovation is
 
the main driving force of long-l'un growt h for both econornies.
 





This paper provides a general model frarnework for the stuely of small open 
economies in the globaJizeel woriel. It. combines recent advances in t.he ilnilJysis of coin­
tegra ting systems with those of common trends for a small open economy faced \Vit h 
uncertainties. This strategy is then ilpplied to Canada to study its long-term relation­
ship with the US economy. The work is prompted by the empirical observation that the 
Canadian anel the US economies are hem' il)' interc!ependent. The relationship between 
t.he t\\'o seems to be the c\osest. and most extensive in the worlel econom)'. The result.ing 
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interactions are reflect.ed in t.he st.aggering volume of bilat.eral trade - t.he equivalent 
of $1.5 billion a day, as weil as investment part.nershipsI The convent.ional economic 
wisdom is t.hat. when t.he US sneezes, Canada catches a cold. 
An import.ant. recent line of macroeconomic research addresses t.he issue of int.erde-­
pendence between count.ries. Vect.or error correction models are relevant t.ools for these 
analyses, as macroeconomic variables are integrated time series, but. t.heir Iinear combi­
nRtion migbloecorne stationary. \Vhile considerable emphasis is pJaced on the idea t.hat 
the ident.ification of the cointegration vect.ors should be t.heoret.ically consist.ent., many 
of the approaches in the literature have focllsed on the statist.ical properties of t.ime 
series. without provid ing an explicit. theory 1.0 account for the equilibriul11 concept. 2 
The met.hodology here innovat.es by combining structural vector el' roI' wrrcct.ion 
est.imation in an over-ident.ified system wit.h st.ructural shocks derivecJ from the n80­
classical growt.h t.heory. Through t.his combinat.ion, it. provides a st.ruct.ural mocieJ in 
which i) t.he long-l'un is the st.eady-st.at.e solution of t.he model economy, and ii) the 
shocks me ident.ified wit.hin t.he model. \Vitb dat.a for t.he period l%lql to 2üüSql, 
the empirical results highlight four equilibrium relationships between the variables of 
interest.: domestic and foreign out.put.s, prices, int.erest. rat.es, nominal exch<\I1gc rate. 
and net. accumul,üion of foreign asset·s. These long-term relations "re as follows: i) 
purchasing power pi'lrit.y. ii) technologicéll clifferentials, iii) interest rate parity, and iv) 
net foreign asset accumulat.ion. Deviations fl'Om long-rtln relations explain how Canada 
<)lIt! US cycles are correlat.ed. \Vit.hin t he present data set. élnd wit h four cointegration 
rclationsh ips all10ng eight. varii'lbles. four commOll trenels are ident ifiecl wit hin the two 
economies. one real (the technological), anel three nominél] namely i) interest n1tl', ii) 
price.and iii) exchi'lnge rate relations. 
ISlat.istics Canada (2006) confirms that the l'.S. is Cilnilda's largest foreign in\'eslor \\'ith fil'/[ 
of lotal foreign direct inveslmenl. These in\'estmenU; are prillHlrily in Canada', nlining ilnd slllelting 
incil,O'tries. C<lI1~c1i~n in\'cst.lllcnt in lhe U.S is 1I10sll." conccntral.ecl in filli1nce ancl inourallC''''. 
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The impulse responses reveal that while permanent monetary shocks affect out­
puts only in t.he short l'un, their impact on priee levels (lnd exchange rates in bot.h 
countries are permanent.. Expansionary monet.ary policies should t.herefore be treated 
with caution as they might lead 1.0 higher priees in both eountries. The results also 
indicate t.hat exchange rate appreeiat.ion is consistent with decrease of foreign assets in 
Canada, and t.hat Jong-run growt.h stems solely from technologieal innovat.ions. 
The most cited work in t.he vector error correction Jit.erature is the art.ide by King, 
Plosser, Stock, and Wat.son ((KPSW), 1991). In that piece, I<PS\'V use US data 1.0 iden­
tifY stoch(lstic trends in the US economy. This is done by extending the structural vee­
tOI' autoregressive (SVAR) approach of Blanchard and Quah (1990) with coint.egration 
vectors. FoJlowing t.heir approach, Hercowit,z and Sampson (1991), j'dellander. Vreclin 
and Wame (1992), Vredin nnd Soderlind (1995). Crowder. Hoffman and Rasche (1909) 
examine coiut.egn-lting properties of some simple l'en] business cycle modeJs in cJosed 
and open economies. A similéH method has been llsed in Shapiro and Watson (1998) 
1.0 determine which shocks account for business cycle fr<.'C/uencies. Ogélki (1992), G<,di 
and Clarida (1994), and Ogaki and Park (1995) consider 1.1)(' implicat.ions of unit.-root 
processes for t.he est.imation of long-l'un relations in intertemporal ral"ionrd expectations 
optimizing models. Ogaki and Jang (2001) investignte t.he effeets of Cl monet c1ry poliey 
shock 1..0 the US economy through a strllct·urnJ vector eITor correction mocle!. 
Pesaran, G(lrrat. Lee, and Shin ((PGLS). 2003) propos!:' a new flexible st.ruetural 
élpproach 1.0 mode] the long-l'lm re1<üionships of the Ul( vminhles in the euro zone. 
bélsed on accounting élnd élrbitrage concJit.ions. They explniu t-hat t.heir structuréll mode! 
incorporntes the struct.ural long-l'un relill-ionship as its stendy-state solution. Although 
PGLS (2003) cleveJop a joint nnaJysis of cointegration estimatioll \\'ith impulse respollses 
la beied under generéllized impulse responses, t heir met.hodology sti Il falls short. of the 
exact. identification of shocks. 
\Vhile I11Y contribution in this chapter is closely tied 1.0 PGLS (200:1) for long-l'un 
uerival-iol1s (lml est imation met hod. il. c1ifl'crs in ternIS of 1. h(' met hodoJogv used to derive 
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long-l'un relations. PGLS (2003) derive their reliltionships l'rom arbit.rage conditions, 
whereas l derive t.hem explicit.ly from a st.andard growth mode!. l del'elop a homogenous 
agent., infinite horizon model of a sma.ll open economy interact.ing wit.h t.he rest. of the 
world. l then derive t.he long-l'un relations l'rom the first. order condit.ions of a.gents' 
maximization problems. The model economy is very flexible and t,he few assumpt.ions 
on the functionaJ fonns of t.he ut.ility and the product.ion funct.ions a.re t.hose t.hat. ensure 
that the steady-state exists, is stable. is unique, and guarantees a bi'danced growt.h p<.lth 
in t.he long-l'un. Furt.hermore, l a.dd simulation exercises of permanent shoc:ks in t.he 
spirit. of KPSW (1991). This combinat.ion provides a simple and new t.ool for policy 
analysis in the complex world of g]obi'dizecl economies. 
The chapter is organized a.s fo]lows. The moclel economy is chariict.erizecl in 
t.he next section. Section 3 describes the stat.istical framework. Sect.ion 4 reports t.he 
empiriciil results and simulation exercises, Section [) is uevoted t.o t.he conclusion. 
1.2 The Model 
The model is a standard neocliissical growth model of <.l small open economy. 
i.e. home is interacting with t.he l'est of the worlJ. An infinite]y-livecl representative 
household he"l.S preferences over consumption: Jeisure, and real balances. The necessary 
restrictions on the functional form of the utility function insure the steady-stat.e growt,h. 
The represent<ltive agent faces a Ao"" budget constrnint, in eaeh periocJ. Her cOl1lbined 
expenclit.ure on goocls and on net a('(;ul1lulat,ion of finônciiij i"l.SSets (bonds: dOHlcstic 
and foreign) must be equal 1.0 her dispos<lble incoll)('. Thcre is aJso a representativc firm 
which l11i1ximizes its profits in ci1eh pE'riocJ. Households 011"11 the firm. The i1genfs tastes 
i1re stiitic over time and me not inAuencE'c1 by exogenous stOdli1Stic shocks. There is no 
population growth. Foreign variables i\l"e dC'noted with asterisks. 
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1.2.1 The Representative Household 
The representative agent maximizes her utility given by the expected discounted 
sum of her Iifetime utility in consumpt,ion, leisure and holding of real balances: 
(1.1) 
where t is calendar time and i is planning time: Et is the expectRt.ion of future values 
of consumpt,ion C t+i , leisure L t+i : and real balances MF'" J i' based on the informat.ion L-H 
available at time t. The infinite horizon assumption simplifies the anRlysis and is just,ified 
by the presence of alt,ruist.ic links across generat.ions. The inst'ant'aneous ut.ility funchon 
is weil behaved in the sense that it satisfies the InadR conditions: it is twice continuously 
c1ifferent.iable: concave: and increasing in it.s argument.s. The subjective discount fact.or 
(3 measures the rate of t.ime preference of the economic ,.gents <1l1ci is bet\veen 0 and 1 
or (3 E (0,1). The representat.ive agent spJits her t.ime endowment between work NI. and 
leisure LI' The time constmint. in each periocl is t.hen nornHlJizcd to one: 
(1.2) 
Although no specifie funct.ional forl11 is given to t.h<, utility function. this function should 
respect. t.he balanced growth pRth conditions as explained by King. PlosseL <ind ]·tebeJo 
(1988). These authors discussed that. for b'llallc<.>d growth to b<.> optimal \\·it.h lRbor 
supply chosen by agent.s. ut.ilit.y must be such that illcome and substitution <.>ffect.s ,He 
exact])' offsetting 011 leisure 3 
3\\ïth only COnSlIlllplion and labor. King. Plos~('I'. ,ln IÎebelo (191);)) proposed llH' fol\oll'ing 
lItilily additive separable funet.ion 
L(Cr. L,) = 10g(C,) + 1'(L,) 
.. \11 l'hill is l'eqllired here is IhM "(L.) to 1)(' incr<,asing ,11HI ('(ln('<1V<,. Ir the lItilit,· i.' lJ1l1lliplicaliv(>h.­
S<'P'll'ilble. more conditions ill'e n<,<,dcd. 
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The household then maximizes her utilit,y (1.1) subject 1.0 the time constraint 
(1.2) and the sequence of budget constraints as folJows: 
where B t is a domestic real asset, and Bt is a foreign real asset in each period. These 
assets are one period risk-free indexed bonds. The domestic asset is denominated in 
home country currency with the respective net real short-term interest ra t·e ri, for the 
holding of bonds between time t and t + 1. The foreign bond is denomin<\t.ed in foreign 
currency with a short-tcrm real intcrest rate equal to rt· The cUITent real exchange rate 
et is expressed as the domestic priee of the foreign currency, i.e. P~~' \Vith St as the 
nominal exchange rat,e. The real foreign asset or Bt' is then mult,iplied in cach perioe! by 
this real exchange rat.e to give real units of dOl11estic output. fUltherl11ore, purchasing 
power parity or t.he equilibrium in the goods market.s is assul11ed t.o hale! in the long-l'un. 
This means that. absent. natural or governmentaJJy imposcd tracle barriers, a commodity 
should sell for the same price everywhere, at home or in a foreign country. when prices 
are measurecl in il common numer<1ire. The foreign bond when maturing \Vit.h its gross 
real return of (1 + Tt) is convertee! into real units of c10mestic output.. 1\10ncy Mt is 
helcl due to the ut.ility it. brings for the agent. The rt'<11 balance is the amount of money 
acljust.e(] by the priee lcvel Pt in each periocl. The real W<1ge 11'1 is the hourly amount 
of wages given to the householcl or ~. Housebold holcls the stock of c<1pital <Incl rcnts 
it to the finn. The short-term interest. rate ri is <1lso the apport unity cost of h~lcling 
capital Kt· The evolution of the stock of c<1pitcîl gives im·cstment. or Il. Th<' govcrnment 
transfers <1 lump-sum <1ll1ount of 'lI to the household in ('<1ch period. The stock of capit<1j 
Ambler, Rebei. and Dib (2004) w;t.h (llso real balances illl!Je ulili!,· fllnetion. proposed III<' following 




! ...L(;\/')·~II) () f (1 + "2)
-"-'-In (CI (I~;, +b,'t - ---.,
1 ~ 'II P, 1 + -;J 
"'here b, is" 1l1Onev dell1<lIld ,hock. 
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evolves according to: 
(1.4 ) 
where 0 E (0,1) is the depreciation rate and l/J(Jtf Kt) is the relative capital acljustment. 
cost for investment.4 This function is strictly convex; i.e. 1/J(Jtf}(l)' > 0,1/;(11/KtY' > O. 
This means that intertemporally adjust.ing t.he stock of capital is costly. This <1ssumpt.ion 
helps to 100ver substantially the variability of invest.ment and t.o produce procyclical 
investment, as confirmed by data.. However, t.he only reason t.o includc such a cosl 
function is t·o show the robustness of the long-nm economy to the short-l'un restrict.ions. 
1.2.2 The Government 
The government has a balanced budget constraint. It prints a total amount of 
money M[+ 1 - j\;lt and t.ransfers t.o the household the amount of Tt in cach period. 
1.2.3 The Representative Firm 
Labor is rented out ea.ch period to a representntive competitive firm. This finn 
also rent.s ci1pital that was accumulated in the last. period by the representative hOllSf'­
hold. There is no labor mobility i1cross borders. The firm lTIi1ximizes its profit. at cach 
point in time by producing output according t.o i1 standard consti1nt rcturn to sCelle 
neoclassical production function. The consti1nt return t.o sCille assumption le,1ds to the 
natural i1ggregi1t.ion of output by the representative firm. The produc:tion function y, 
is twice continuously clifferentiable, is strictly inc:reasing. is hOl11ogeneous of degref.' one. 
nnd is a strictl)' qUi1si-conc:ave fllnction. satisfying the Ilsui11 Innda conditions. ln this 
simple neoc:!assici11 economy, there is only one c:ommodity that can either bf.' consumed 
or invested, i.e. stored for use in production in the next periocl. The procillC'tion function 
"5c'(-' Hayashi (1982). 
14 
is writt.en as follows: 
where At is the log of the level of labor-augmenting technological progress. Given the 
assumption of constant. returns to scale and t.he competit.ive nat.ure of the economy, 
t.ot.al production is equal to factor payments. There are t.wo fact.or market.s here, one 
for labor and one for capital services. The rentaI priee of labor is 'LVI or t.he recl! wage, 
and the rentaI price of capit.al is Tt or real int.erest. rat.e. 
(1. 7) 
The levels of technologicaJ progress in the two economies are integratecl series ](1). 
following a random walk process wit.h clrift. However, productivity differentials exist. 
bet-ween the t.\Vo countries clue to init.i81 clifferences in technologies ancl enclowments 
el, ancl e2· In any period, the ê\ctual g1'Owth r8t.e will c1eviate by sorne unpredict.able 
amount of E[~ and Et'. The vector of error terms nre serially independent., normally 
distributed \Vit.h mean zero nncl vélriance (72. The relationship bct.ween technologies is: 
( ~; ) ~ ( :: ) + ( ~ - B ;0), (~;~: )+ (:~.) (18) 
"·he,, A, 'nd A! Me t.he log of home ,nd fO""gn technolog'''. ( ~ - Ô ;i) ~ '!'(i) 
is a mat.rix polynominl of coefficient of adjustment to t.he long-rull cquilibriull1. ancl (} 
is the negative speecl of adjustment to the long-nm equilibrium. The matrix i[J(ê) has 
two 1'Oot.s, i.e. À = 1 - è or l, ancl ensl.lres t.he st.ê\biJit.y of t.he syst.cm.5 
This representHtion of technologies cê\ptures t.he idea that t.he ppp theory is a 
Jong-run prop~rty of the moclel ê\ncl cleviations from this theOl'Y are only gracluê\lly over 
5Sce Hamiltoll (J'J'J·1) for a dclailcd di,ru:,,,ioll on L1le g-cllcml citanlClcrizdlioll of 111(' tüilltegrill ­
ing vector. pp. 5ï4-575. 
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time, through spilloyer of the technology shock from the foreign country to the home 
economy. In the long-l'un, domestic technological progress, is determined by the leyel of 
t.echnological progress in the l'est of t.he world, and technological progress is cointegrated 
with a cointegrat.ion vector equal to (1, -1). 
1.2.4 National Accounting 
In equilibrium, there is no holding of domestic bonds by the householù, i.e. private 
debt Bt = O. This is explained by t.he faet that the government does not issue bonds 
and that they are not. traded internat.ionally. Adcling together t.he budget. constraints 
of the householcL firm, and the government, and by assurnption th~1t householcl own 
t.he finn and ail profits are dist.ributecl by firm to the householù, t.he following resoUlce 
constraint is obtainecl: 
(1.9) 
This equation gives the econorny's current flccount. i.e. the differcncc het.ween nat.ional 
income \Vit.h aggregate consumpt.ion anù inyestment. The cUITent account is also equal 
to the change in the economy's net foreign asset position. 
1.2.5 The First Order Conditions 
Euler equat.ions. by linking the int.ertemporal decisions bet\Veen priees ancl asset 
returns in t.he economy. describe opt.imal behavior by the representative agent. l define 
Vi(t), \Vith i = CI, LI, :\/p;! as the partial derivat.ive of the lItility fllnction wit.h respect 
to its arguments: cOl1sumption. laboL and real money balances. The representative 
householù chooses the ioJJowing sequence { Ct. L,. Bt+ \. Bt+ l' I<t+l: :\1)/1 }CX; in each 
,. t=O 





The complet.e set of the first order conditions and t.he long-l'un solvency condit.ions 
is given in Appendix B.l. These equations give t.he equilibrium conditions; marginal 
ut.ilities of consumption ancllabor, the euler equations for holdings of bonds, the evolu­
tion of capital or t.he investment., t.he money demand equat.ion, t.he rent,al rate of capit.al 
and the equation for wages. 
1.2.6 Equilibrium Conditions 
Long-run relat.ions are the st.eady-st.at.e solut.ions of t.he t.heoret.ical moclel under 
consideration. The t.heoretical modeJ implies t.he existence of a few long-run relations 
between variables, at least. one for t.he equilibrium condit.ion of each market., and one 
for each of the st.eady-st.ate solutions of the model economy. Combining these first. 
order condit.ions (FOCs) provides t.he Jong-run reJat.ionships between macroeconomic 
variables that can be te~ted with uatrl (Appendix B gives a detailed c1erivat.ion of these 
equations). 
However, (lS in the tradition of PGLS (2003), only a sub-set. of the long-run 
relationships are tested with dat.a bere. The choice of t.hese relationships is b(lsed on 
the fact t.hat. no special functionaJ form Jws been given to the utility function. The 
model economy developed in this paper is t.oo st.ylized for short-nlll frictions (KPS\iV, 
(1991)), and t.he long-run equations are consistent \Vit.h the st.eacly-state solutions of a 
wide range of smaIJ open economy models. 
The 10ng-l'1Jn l'f~lationships Cire C'rltegorized in three main blocks. The first. one 
is a real bloclc combining t.echnologies in t.wo economies. The second one is nominal, 
resulting from t.he optimization behaviors of t.l)e householcl. It. eontains interest <lI1d 
exchange rate parit.ies bet,ween domestic and foreign interest. l'ale. ,md between c10rnestic 
and foreign priee levels expressed in the same eurrency. The last. black is a st.ock-flol\' 
ident.ity, describing how the representative (lgent a1Joeates wealt.h among domestic and 
fOleign bonds. 
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Then, a subset of the equilibrium condit.ions is chosen t.o be t.est.ed \Vit.h dat.a. 6 
These are t.he following relations where (u,i = 1...4, are st.ructural transitory and sta­
tionary innovations, i.e. t.he errar correction t.erms. The lower-case varinbles denot.e 
log-deviations from steady-st.ate values (see Appendix B.2). 
(u = bZ - YI rv 1(0) 
(2,1 =rl+l -r7+1 rv1(0) (1.12) 
(31 = 81 + pt - Pt rv 1(0) 
(4.1 = YI - yt rv 1(0) 
The first equat.ion gives t.he net external posit,ion of the count.ry (NFA) relat.ive t.o 
GDP, Schmit.t-Grohé Cind Uribe (2003) explCiin different conditions to ensure stat.ionarity 
of debt. in a. smaU open economy. The second equation links t,he domest.ic and foreign rcal 
interest rat.es (interest rat.e parity, IR). This equation sUites that. in t.he steady-st.ate, 
domestic and foreign bonds become perfect substitutes, nnd t.heir expected rates of 
return are equal. The neocJassicaJ nature of the economy l1('re impiies thnt, rcal interest 
rates are stationary. However, the st.ationarity of 1. he interest, rat.e is ort,en l'ejected by 
data (see Perron and j'l1oon, (2007)). The main l'easons fol' the non-stat,ionarity of the 
int.erest rate are the presence of risk premia and regime switches. Purchasing power 
parity (PPP) or the l'eturn 1.0 unique long-run real exchange rat,e is the thil'd equation. 
The PPP is a long-run relat.ionship and is based on the presence of goods market 
arbitrage. Information disparities, commercial barricl's. and transport<'lt,ion cost,s arc 
likely t.o creat·e considerable deviations from PPP in the shol't-nm. The Harrod-Balassa­
Samuelson effect, explôins ho\\' t,he priee of a basket of trCidec! and non-traded goods rises 
more l'apidly in countries \Vith higher productivitv gro\\'th in the traded sector, 'l'ben. 
in smnll open economies models whel'e home and fol'eign cconomy produce goods that. 
are imperfect, substitutes. a positive technology shock in one country. by increasing the 
6This choice is parti." lTloti\'ateù bv ùilla availability. anù thr inLerest of the NJilations for the 
study of inlerreiaLion of t\\'o open cconolllit's, 
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supply of it.s out.put., would reduce it.s relat.ive priee. The ret.urn to t.he unique long­
l'un real exchange rate woutd occur gradual!y t.hrough t.echnology spillover to the other 
country. The last equat.ion explains t.his out.put. gap, due to different. t.echnologies and 
initial endowment. gap between t.wo economies. The level of out.put. in the long-run is 
driven by t.he level of foreign technology. 
The econometric t.echnique of vector error correct.ion (VECJ\.1) applied in t.he next 
sect,jon is t,he best. choice for analyzing t,he long-l'un relat.ionships of my lIlode!. This 
t.echnique is consistent. wit,h a wide variet.y of economic mechanisms. It focuses on the 
deviations from the long-run equilibrium and gives a unified framework for studying 
long-l'un growth wit.h short-tenD fluct,uutions, and t,he interact.ions between them, 
1.3 Econometrie Method 
This sect,ion describes t.he general econometric strategy and identification method 
usee! to t.est t,he model economy with the d,üa. The vcetor errar correction model 
(VECl\'l), which forms the basis of my investigation, is as follows: 
1'-1 
L'J.zt = aZQ + az )t - OZ2(/ + L r zjL'J.Zt-j + Vzi (1.13) 
j=1 
with Zt = (11;. x;)', where YI is a vector of endogcnous and .1:1 is u vedor of exogenous 
non-st.ationary but. integr<lted ] (1) v<lri<lbles. Cl zQ = (bg) is Cl vector of fixed intercepts. 
O:zJ defines the trend coefficients in the model t,hat are rest.ricted to zero <lS will be 
explained further, 0' 2 2 is a mat,rix of RcJjust,rrwnt coefficients, (1 = /3' ZI-l is a matrix 
of long-run reduced form disturb<lnces or short-term cJeviat.ions from the long-tenD 
equilibrillm: fz] = (~~) is Cl matrix of the siJort-mn coefficients. and Uzf = c:~:) is 
R vector of disturbances, identically and inciepencJently distributed innovations \Vith 
cov<lriance m<ltrix of L 
The right choice of t,he deterministic Cümponents of the error correction specifi­
cMion (constant,s and trends) ensures that the Jong-run rcduccd form crror han~ zero 
means. One general \Vay to choose these cOl11ponents is to consic1er both in estimation 
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and to eliminate the coefficients wit.h a t-t.est statistic. However, Pesaran, Shin, ancl 
Smith (2000) demonstrate t.hat t.his eliminat.ion method might. procluce misleacling in­
ferences. They concJude that if the trend coefficient is l'lot restricted to 7,ero, the mean 
of variables will vary with the assumecl number of the cointegration relations ancl result 
in biased estimates. This is the reason why t.he trencl coefficient O'ZI is restrict.ed to zero 
in the estimation part of our VECl\l. 
The estimation procedure begins by estimat.ing the reduced form errors ((d or the 
transitor)' cleviations l'rom the long-l'un equilibrium. As explainecl by Lüt.kepohl (1991), 
when O'Z2(3' = TIz is of full rank (of rn for example), the pari'tmeters can be consistently 
estimatecl by ordinary lea.st squares (OLS). However, if TI z is rank-cleficient: its rank 
is T < m: ancl there are r cointegn'ltion vectors between variables. then ord inary least. 
squares estimation is no longer efficient,. Gonzalo (1994) compares clifferent estima­
tion met.hocls for a coint.egrat.ing syst.cm; orclinary 1cast squares by Engcl and Granger 
(1987), non-linear !east squares by Stock (1987), three-step estimation by Engel and 
Yoo (1989): principnl component.s by Stock and YVC\tson (1988). canonicnl correlntions 
by Bossaerts (1988), full information maximum Iikelihood (Fli\lL) by Johansen (1988): 
instrument variables (IV) by Hansen ancl Phillips (1990), and spectral regression (SR) 
by Phillips (1987). He conclucles that FIi\lL estimations provide coefficients estimate 
t.hat, are median unbia.sC'cI, a.symptotic<llly efficient (smallest variances for the estima­
tors), and symmetrically clistributccl. Therefore: hypothesis tests ma~; be concluct,ed 
using a standard asymptotic chi-sCJuared test.. Furthermore. tlw l\lont.(' Carlo studies 
indicate that t.he finit·e sample properties of FHdL estimat,es are consistent even when 
the errors are non-Gaussian on<l/or dyni\mics are unknown. These stl.lclies solve t.he 
problem of inferencc in cointegrnte(1 systems. 
1.3.1 Identification 
In the tradit ional iclC'nt ificatioll appro,1ches of VAR and VECi\l models. e.g. Frei­
dm<H1 and Schwi\rtz (l 963). B1c\11chard ancl \\"at.son (1986). Sims (1986): Blanchard and 
Quah (1990): Shapiro and Watson (19911). I<PS'VV (1991): Christiano. Eichcnboum (Ind 
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Evans (1998), Sims and Zha (1996), Galf (1999), and Romer and R-omer (1990, 1994). 
the dynflmics of the model are t.ightly constrained wit.h difficult. a-priori, sometimes 
subjective just.ifications: i.e. exclusion restrictions, variance-covariance rest.rict.ions, nor­
malization, et.c. 
The ident.ificat.ion strategy in t.his paper t.akes into account. an)' set of Jinear restric­
t.ions that are imposed directly on the matrix of Jong-run coefficients (3. The dynamics 
of t,he short-rull del1ned by adjusl.ll1eut. coefficiellt,s 0:'2 are Idt umest.ricted. Let \lW 
writ.e: 
Rvec(/3) = b (1.14) 
where R is an s x nn matrix \-vit.h s as the t.otal number of restrictions 1.0 be t.ested l'Incl 
is also equal 1.0 R8nk(R), ris t.he number of cointegmtion relations (coJumns of (3). and 
vec(./3) is an no. xl vector of Jong-run coefficients which stacks columns of (3 iut.o a vector. 
Three cases of interest can be distinguished. First, t.he under-iJent.ified case is when 
s < r 2 Second, the exactly or just.-identifiecl case is when s = 1'2 Finally. the over­
ident.ified case is when s > 1'2. The necessary and sufficient conditions for identification 
are then given by orcier and rank condit.ions as follows. The order condit.ion states 
t.hat. t.he number of restrictions. s, should be grei'lter than the nUl11ber of just-iclentifiecl 
rest.rict.ions: 
(115) 
The rank condition asserts that there must be at Jenst l' restrict ions pel' each of l' cointegrnt.ed 
vect.ors: 
Rank [R(Ir >? 3)] = r 2 (1.16) 
The just.-identified mode] is sensit.ive to t.he choice of restrict·ions and is t.hus non-unique. 
However. PGLS' (2003) strategy makes the moclel unique by imposing <1t most s - 1'2 
over-iclentifying restrictions on 3. The cointegrflting space is \\Tit.ten as follows: 
(1.17) 
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The number of cointegrating vectors is determined on t.he basis of two t.est.s: the 
trace t.est and the maximum eigenvalue t,est. These st.at.istics test. the nul! hypot.hesis 
of no coint.egrat.ion between the variables. The number of cointegrating vectors is equal 
t.o the (reduced) rank of the mat.rix I1 z , or r. This rank is det.ermined on t.he basis of 
t.he Johansen t.race and the maximum eigenvalue test statist.ics for the 95% and 90% 
critical val ues in Table (1.4). These st.at.ist.ics t.est. the nul! hypot.hesis of no cointegration 
between the variables. The maximum eigenvalue t.est is obtained when t.est.ing t.he nul! 
hypotJwsis of 7' cointegrating reJat.ionships against the alternat.ive of r + 1. For t.he trace 
test stéltistic, under the nuit hypot.hesis, there are 'In cointegrating relationships. How­
ever, Cheung and Lai (1993), among ot.hers, demonstrate that the maxima! eigenvalue 
statistic is less robust when higher moment.s. such as skewness and kurtosis in the error 
tenus, are present. Pit.arakis (1998) explains that these test.s perform poady in finite 
samples when compared to t heir asymptotic critical values. l\lonte Carlo simulntions 
also show that in small samples the cointegnition mnk test statistics genendly tend 
towards uncler-reject.ion. Shin (1994) proposes an OLS estim(it.ions of t.ll(' individual 
rebt.ion of interest. Uncler t.he mil 1 hypothesis. t.hen, t.he resicluals are st.ationary and 
therefore the relations are coint.egrat.ed. 
1.4 Empirica! Analysis 
The VECl\l to be estimated is written as follows: 
b7 07_1 b*I-j 
YI YI-I YI-j 
PI Pt-J Pt.-J 
6 
ri 





+ V"I (1.18) 
SI 51-1 j=l SI-j 
v7 v7-J Y7-j 
p; P7-1 p;-J 
7'''1 7"1-1 r* .1-) 
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where aZQ is a 8 x 1 vector of int.ercepts, O:Z2 is a 8 x 5 loading matrix, i.e. 
feecJback or error-correc:ting coefficients, (31 is a 5 x 8 matrix of long-l'un restrictions, r., 
is a 8 x 8 mat.rix of short-l'un coefficient.s, and Vzt is a 8 x 1 vect.or of normal indepene!ent. 
innovations. Est.imating this equation requires t.aking three steps. First., the data <tle 
chosen and are checked t.o consist of non-stationary series or 1(1). Second, the number 
of cointegrat.ing vectors is identifiecl. This gives the degree of consistency between the 
clat.a and t.he theoretical framework discussed above. Third, the lag-Iengt.h p and the 
e!et.erministic component. are chosen. This is an essent.ial requirement for the correct 
statistical inference. 
1.4.1 Data 
The data empJoyed in this paper is obtained from t.he International Financial 
St.at.istics (IFS) dè'ltabè'lse (2008) compiled by the Internntional 1\lonetary Fund. Table 
(1.1) contains a full description of the clata. Ali series are seasonally acljllstee!, quarterfy 
observation ranging from 1961:q1 (the first quarter) to 2008:q1. 
1.4.2 Unit Root Tests 
The econometric strategy for est.imnt.ing the st.ructuraJ paramet.ers (ollt.Jined in the 
previous section) is v<tlie! only if the level of variables is non-stationary or int.egrated of 
order one 1(1), but their c:ombinations bec:orne st.c.ltionary or cointegrated 1(0). For this 
reason, the order of integration of \'nriables is examined. Table (1.2) presents the results 
of the uniVélriate unit root tests for t.he above vnriables. Augrnented Dicky-Fuller (ADF) 
and Phillips-Perron (PP) (\1'(' knowli for 110t being powerful enough. meaning that one 
will not often reject the 111111 hypot.lwsis of t.he unit root, even when it is falsf'. Therefore 
some rccent tests such as DFGLS (Dic:ky-Fullcr GeneraJized Least Squares) and KPSS 
(Kwiatkowski. PhilJips, Schmidt. ancl Shin, (1992)) are also consiclere(1. These tests 
seem to have the clesirable size and power properties. The DFGLS test is a simple 
modification of the ADf t('st in \\'hich the clata is detn.>ndecl. The I<PSS (1992) uses L1\1 
sta t istics, based 'on the rcsidllals frorn the OLS regression of the dependant \"ariable on 
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t.he exogenous variables. However, unlike t.he ot.her t.est.s, KPSS assumes the st.at.ionarity 
of t.he series under t.he nul! hypot.hesis. The results for the variables in level confirm t.hat. 
the null hypothesis of unit root could not be rejected at 5% significance Jevel (Tables 
(1.2) and (1.3)). However, the firs! differences of variables are stat.ionary and confinn 
that ail variables are l (1). 
1.4.3 Cointegration Tests 
With eight endogenous variables in the system, t.here could be at most. seven 
cointegrating vectors. The cointegrating space is: 
(1.19) 
The trace and the maximum eigenvalue tests reveal at. most :3 coint.egration reJa­
tionships fIInong variélbles in 10% significant le\"cl in Table (1.4). Insofar as economie 
theory proposes four relationships between the variables: l proceeù to test the null hy­
pothesis of cointegration foHowing ::ihin (19<)4). The results are rcport.ed in Table (1.5). 
The nuH hypot.hesis of cointegrat.ion between the equations cannot. be rejected al. a 59(. 
significance leveJ. 
1.4.4 Estimation and Testing of the Model 
Befare estimation of the moclel: the lag-length of the VECi\1 shoulcl be choscn. 
This is done basecl on the llsual optimé1llag-length selection criteria in Table (1.6). Five 
criteriél are consid<'red as follo\\"s: i) t.he Akèlike infonnat ion nit<'rion (AIC) suggests 
choosing t.wo lags fOl the moclE'L the ii) Hannan ,mcl Quinn (H Q) and iii) Schwart.z 
(SC) criteria. ancl iv) the Final Prediction Error (FrE) suggest. a moclel with only one 
lag, while v) LR sequential modified test statis!ics (Likelihoocl-basccl s.yst.em reduction 
tests of LTI(p/p-l) and LR(pmax/p)) choose a thlw-Jag moclC'1 al a 5% significance 
le\'el. I<ilian (199R) argues tlwt thC' consequences of owr-estimèlting the orcier of VATI/ 
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VECNI are more serious than under-estimating it.. Following this argument, a two-lag 
mocle! is chosen for estimation. 
The order and rank conditions of identification should then be checked. The 
order condition for identification is met when t.he tota.] number of restrictions satisfies 
t.he following condit.ions: s :::- r2 ,7 where s is the total number of restriction and r is 
the number of cointegrating vect.ors. \"/ith 4 cointegration vectors al110ng 8 variables, 
the total nUl11ber of restrictions is 32. The wnk condition il11plies that the nUl11ber of 
restrictions on each vector is equal t·o the number of vectors of cointegration. This means 
that 4 restrictions should be imposed on each of the 4 cointegr<1ting vectors or each row 
of (3. The just-identified model ha.s r 2 = 16 rest.rictions. However, the just-iclentified 
system is not conclusive, as t.he exact place of the cointegration vectors can not be 
determined. The methodology é1pplied in this paper allows to test. an over-identifiecl 
syst.em \vhere t.he exact· coefficients of the cointegration vcctors l'rom the lheory arc 
tested. The tot.al number of over-ident.ified restrictions is equ<ll to 8-r2 This implies 
the total number of over-identified restrictions to be (xJuéll to 16. 
A VECM(2) is then estimated. The Jower pélrt of the Table (1.8) reports the 
main stéltist.ical properties of each time series within the cointegwtion spelCe. Unit. raot. 
tests are consistent with the assumption that é111 vélriables are 1(1). Excludability tests 
indicat.e that none of the variélbles can be excluded l'rom the cointegration space withollt 
Josing useflll information. The diagnostic t.est.s of seriaI correlation. functional forl1ls. 
and heteroscedasticity (Ife satisfactory at R 5% significélllce level. The miss])('cificat ion 
é1nd cliagnost ic tests indicate an aclequate fi t of (. his chosen orcIer specification to the 
data set. Estimated residuRJs match the muJti-normnl distribution in a snlisfactory way. 
Chow tests for pélJ<:1meter stability do not indicate the presence of signifiCéll1t instability 
at the syst.em level. The exogeneity test c:onfirms thRt t.he foreign output (1nd thl" foreign 
interest r<lte Rr(> weakly exogenous \Vith respect to home variables. 
7 for four coilllegrat.ion reJ"lioll~ bel "'cen eighl vari"ble~. IllP 10t,,1 Illlmbrr of l'est l'iCI iOf)~ s j, 
eqlJ8J t.o 8 * 4 = 32. 
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The long-run structure of t.he model is estimated as follow5, where (i.t,i = 1... 4, 
are long-run reduced form errors. 
(I;t = b; - Yt + 2.5 
136.181 
(0) 





(3.t = pt + St - Pt - 0.7009 
10.037J 
(0) 
(,u = Yt - V[ - 0.258 
10.0321 
(0) 
Standard errors are given in square brackets. The p-vnlues are given in round brnckets. 
The first. equat.ion is a proxy for t.he cUITent account or the net accul11ulat.ion of foreign 
<1ssets (NFA). The net external position then emerges as a function of domcst.ic GDP­
pel' cC1pita, denoted by Yt C1nd the net holdings of foreign debt, b[. The p-vnlue of the 
consta.nt. t.erm is equC1l to zero. This means that 1 Ci'ln reject the mil! hypot.hesis t.hM t.he 
intercept. is not. significant al. any convent.ional significance levels. The second long-l'un 
relationship is the interest. rate parity (IR). The p-value for the intercept is eqU<l] t.o 
0.38. Therefore, the nul! hypothesis of no intercept is not rejected in the ("üa. The 
third long-run relationship describes the ppp relationships or the stationi'lrity of the 
real exchange rflte between two countries. The p-value for t.esting the mdl hypothesis 
that. the int.ercept is eqUel] to zero is zero. So the null hypothesis t hat t he coefficient is 
zero is rejected here. The last equ(ltion is the technological output gilp (OG). AgailJ. 
wit.h a p-value of zero for the intercept, t!Je null hypothesis is rejected (me! tlle intercept 
is significant. 
The fnct. th(lt these t.heories c(lnnot be rejected here is (In intercst.ing contribution 
to t.he empiricC11 Iiterature thM has investigated these rel<1tionships for n long time. One 
explanntion for these resulls drfl\\'s on the work of PGLS (2003). In their vic\v. long-nm 
t hcorics flre best estilllatcd via VEC;\ 1. This is because feed brH'ks alld intt'ri1cti()ns t hM 
(\J'(' omitted frorn more parti(l\ (lnalysis are ail considered in such estirnations. 
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1.4.5 Permanent Shocks or Common Trends 
Not. only does the rnethodology in t.his paper let me identify t.he driving force 
behind fluctuations by deviating from long-l'un relationships, it also identifies the long­
l'un cornmon forces of the two economies. This is done through common trend ônalysis. 
Following Beveridge and Nelson (1981), the effect.s of structural shocks on the 
evolution of the economy can be either permanent or transitory. With this in minci, 
transitory shocks are those which give the economy its cyc!iud evo!ut.ion, or deviations 
from tbe long-run equilibrium. Permanent sbocks or common trends are those shocks 
with long-l'un impact.s on the economy. In an int.egrated worlel, the long-l'un evo!utions 
of small economies are affected by t.be l'est of the world's shocks. Tbis strategy 11('1'(' 
suggest.s t.bat ôny vector of non-stationary variclble X t wit.b (m, x 1) dimensions can be 
decornposeel into a constant term ')', a transitory terrn Xl, and a. permanent or stochastic 
t.rend count.erpart. Xi: 
(1.21) 
Engel and Granger (1987) argue tbat when tberc are T cointegration relôtions within 
a vect.or XI of m vari<'lbles, t.bere exist. ni. - l' = k common st.ochôst.ic trends betwf'en 
t.hese varia bles. Tbe cornmon trend representat.ion is as follows: 
(1.22) 
where Tl is the stochastic trend: 
Tt = JI. + TI-l + lit 
D(L) is a (m x k) matrix of lag polynomials with L as the l<'lg operatoL (, is a (111 x 1) 
veetor of seriilJ!y non-colTf'IM.ecJ, mean zero, structural tHlllsitory innovations. A is a 
loading C'of'ffici(,llt. m8trix wit.h dimension (m x m). T, is a \"('dor of comrnon trends 
\Vith the dimension of (m x k) folJowing ranelom walks \Vitb drift. and TJt is <'l v('etor of 
independent. structural permanent shocks witb covariance L ,/. It follO\vs tJlilt: 
(1.24) 
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The deviations from the Jong-run relations will disappear in the long-l'un. This translates 
into the following ort,hogonali ty cond it ions: 
,GlATI = 0 (1.2G) 
where ,G/ is defined in the last section as a matrix of long-l'un coefficients, A is a loading 
coefficient matrix for the long-l'un shocks, and Tt is a mat.rix of permanent stochast,ic 
components, 
Empirical Results 
\~Tith four cointegrat.ion vectors nmong eight variables, four common stochastic 
trends can be identified. As home is a small open economy that. shan's sho('ks \Vith 
abroad, the source of these common trends or the permanent shocks shoukl come from 
abroad. This is to say that common trends are shocks t.o foreign variables that are 
weakly exogenous t,o the home vari<lbles, These permanent. shocks. furt,henl1ore. cnn 
be real or monetary, Real shocks are the innovations 1.0 technology that directly affect 
productivity, and hence out,puts in both countries. Innovations in foreign interest rat,C'. 
foreign price, and exchange rate are the monetary permanent shocks. However, t.he 
i\t,tention is restricted 1.0 the impact of shocks on t,he Canadian variables, Structural 
impulse responses provide further informat.ion on the linkages among variables, 
Structural permanent shocks are in a (4 xl) vector of TIl, These are foreign interest 
rate shock r{ , output shock TI(~, priee shock .,{ , and nominal exchange rate shock f}," , 
The orthogonality condition implies t,hc)t. these shocks creôte short,-run deviations [ronl 
t,he 10ng-l'l1l1 equilibrium. Theil' effect.s disélppear in the long-run as 1'ollo\\'s: 
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Then, follO\ving t.he permanent. decomposit.ion of Xi: 10ng-l'lJn lcvcls of variables are 
det.ermined by t.he permanent. shocks: 
b*1 0 0 0 
0 0 0YI 
PI 0 1 0 ''11 
r' 
1 
ri 0 0 77i: (1.27) 
81 0 0 0 r{ 
Yt 0 0 0 'If' 
pZ 0 0 
r* 0 01 
The above-mentioned decomposition explains t.he effect.s of perl1l<lncn( innovilt.ions on 
Canadian and US variables in the long-fun. The key determinant of the accull1ulation 
of assets in Canada is the product.ivit.y. The higher the productivity is, the higher 
the incent.ives to invest and to accllll1ulate assets in Can"da. The long-run Jevel of 
Canadian output is determincd by technologieal innovations in the US eeonomy. Highcr 
productivity, by redueing the eosts of product.ion, reduces t.he long-run level of priees. 
As ppp hoJds in the Jong-run, the reaJ exchange nüe reverts to unity ultimat.ely and 
priees at home become E'CJual to forrign priees. The US and Cnnad<'l cycles are correli'ltecl, 
nnd their monetnry policies are cJosrJy tied to each other in t.he long-J'un. \Vit.hin nn 
integrated financiaJ market. the key poliev rilt·e of the Bank of C,'Jmda and the Fed funds 
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rat.e are positively correlatecl to each other. The exchange rate variability is resulted 
from the perturbat.ions of exchange rate markets. Foreign variables are affected by 
Foreign innovations; output by output innovations, and prices by prices and procluctivity 
innovations. \;<'Tithin a flexible exchange rat.e regime, interest rates rCOlct. to exchange rat.e 
variat.ions to guarantee the spontaneous adjustment of supply ancl demand of national 
currency versus foreign currencies on the exchange market. 
The predictive power of the model economy is then test.ecl by running a simulntion 
1'.... y" p"
exercise on the following four above-mentionecl shocks; TIL t, ''li t, ''lL t, ·'lis,. These shocks 
c1erive the com1110n cycles between two economies, as they affect both economies simul­
u\neously. As these shocks affect. the first c1ifferel1ces of variables, tlIeir illlpacts ou [lIese 
first differences are st.ationary and c1ie-out after a fe\\' periods. 95% conficlence intervals 
Hround impulse responses are calculHteci by the Kilian (1998) approach of Boot.strap 
after Bootstrap for a 1000 periocls time simulation. 
Figures 1.1 to 1.9 show the impact of permanent shocks, as defined above on the 
variables. The horizont.al axes are t.ime horizons. i.e. quart.ers. The ver ti CCl 1 axes are 
percentage c1eviations from steacly-state values. The mocle! preclicts that a one positive 
percent c1eviation shock into the Fed fund's rat·e (contractionary monetary sbock) has a 
small recessionary impact. at home ancl recluces output by 0.04% (Figure 1.1). Following 
the same shock, the key poliey rate in Canada increases only by 0.14% (Figure 1.2). One 
percent foreign productivity improvement reduces the cast of production and t.he long­
l'un priees by 0.15% (Figure 1.3). This procluctivity improvement leacls to a monetnry 
case or an interest rate decrease of 40 basis poillts (Figure 1.4). Following the same sllOck 
of prod uct ivity, the Canaclian dollnr appreciates (Figure 1.5). Productivity improvcment 
inc:reases Canadian output by 0.4% (Figure 1.6). 
1\lany of the benefits of internat.ional financi<,\1 int.egrat.ion bet"'een the t.\Vo economies 
are tiecl to the holdings of net foreign assets. rather than to capital flows bet.ween the 
t\Vo eountries. This view is consistent with the recent eviclence on illtel'llAtionHI c1i­
versification èlncl intcgration of worlcl capitèll markets. A one perCC'l1t illerease in the 
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exchange rate, decreases the net accumulations of assets by 2% (Figure 1.7), while it 
increases output by 0.1 % (Figure 1.8). The key poliey rate inereases in consequence by 
1% (Figure 1.9). 
These results also eonfirm that monet,ary shoeks have short-l'un effeets on output, 
but permanent effeets on the priee level and exehange rat.e. The long-l'un pat.hs for 
output,s are solely driven by teehnology innovations in the US. 
1.5 Conclusions 
l used post.-war data for Canada and the US to determine the Jynamies of mae1'Oe­
conomie variables between t.hese two eount,ries. This is done t hrough the development. 
of a growth model of a small open eeonolllY and t,he long-l'un reléltions bet,ween domestie 
and foreign variables. The veetor error correct.ion strategy is eombillccl with common 
trends analysis to identify the effect,s of t,ransitory and permanent shoeks between the 
two eeonomies. Four 10ng-t'lJl1 relationships and four eommon trencls arc iclentifieel anel 
testeel \Vith data among eight v8riables of interest.. Those trends determine the impact of 
permanent shocks on the Canadian eeonomy. The simulat.ion result.s reveal that shoeks 
between the two economies are int.errelated. The results explain finaneial integration, 
as weil as eommereiaJ exehange agreements that make t,he two ncighbors closely tied to 
caeh other. This pntticular strategy provicles a new poliey instrument for t,he study of 
sma.1J open economies in t.he face of globalization. 
APPENDIX A 
TABLES 
Table 1.1 List of Variables and their Descript.ions 
Variables Int.ernational Financial Definition 
Statistics References 
b"{ 1563l...NZF Net foreign assets in Ci\nada 
YI 15698BNCZF Na.t. ural log of l'eal GDP pel' capita 
(divided by population series 99Z... Zr) 
y7 11199BCZF Natul'al log of real GDP pel' capita 
(divicled by population series 99Z.. Zr) 
TI 15660... ZF Ba nk rate (end of period) 
T"/. 1160...BZF Federal funds rate 
PI 15699BIRZF Natural log of GDP deflatol' in Canada 
(2000=100) 
p~ 11199BIRZF Natural log of GDP defiator in the State 
(2000=100) 
SI 156NECZF Natural log of eeffect.ive exchange rflte for the Canacliéln dollar 
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Table 1.2 Unit Root Tests 
(a) Variables in levels \Vith constants 
Variables Constants 
Tests ADF pp DFGLS KPSS 
95% cv. -2.87 -2.87 -1.94 0.46 
Yl -1.83 -2.16 0.74 1.53 
Yl -1.37 -1.15 1.08 ] .5,5 
Tl -2.32 -2.117 -1.177 0443 
r*1 -2.21 -1.94 -1.34 0.4 
Pl -2.83 -0.94 0.47 1.57 
pZ -1.72 -1.03 0.78 1.53 
SI. -1.16 -0.98 0.056 1.:32 
b*1 -1.64 -0.41 0.74 1.2 
(b) Variables in levels \Vith constants and trends 
Variables Constant and nenc]s 
Tests ADF DFGLS KPSSpp 
95% cv. -3.43 -3.43 -2.96 0.146 
-2.49 -2.76 -0.7:3 0.27 
-3.38 -2.24 -1.842 0.177 
YI 
Yi 
TI -2.48 -2.12 -1.32 0.33 
1'* 
-2.33 -1.91 -1.6 0.291 
PI 0.52 -0.6 -1.39 0.28 
p~ -0.36 -0.66 -1.46 0.31 
SI 0.01 -2.16 -1.91 0.134 
b*1 -1.47 -1.43 -1.45 0.21 
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Table 1.3 Unit Root Tests 
(a) Variables in first differences with constants 
Variables Constants 
Tests ADF pp DFGLS KPSS 
95% cv. -2.107 -2.87 -1.94 0.46 
6.YI -4.7 -8.63 -1.14 0.42 
6.y; -4.56 -9.12 -1.37 0.31 
6.r,. -6.4 -12.24 -1.84 0.14 
6.r i -4.31 -9.24 -4.29 0.16 
6.PI -2.73 -5.45 -2.09 0.3 
6.pi -2.18 -6.877 -0.81 0.28 
6.8, -3.84 -12.9 -0.65 0.059 
6. bl -2.9 -13.7 -1.52 0.134 
(b)	 Variables in first dirTerences with constants and 
trends 
Variables Constant and Trends 
Test.s ADF DFGLS KPSSpp 
95% cv. -3.43	 -3.43 -2.96 0.146 
6.Yt -4.9	 -8.87 -2.98 0.12 
6. * -4.65	 -9.27 -3.96 0.07YI 
6. r l -6.47	 -12.3 -2.% 0.029 
6. ri -4.36 -9.25 -3.9 0.03 
6.PI -2.86 -5.53 -2.48 0.22 
6.PÎ -3.26 -691 -1.42 0.189 
6.8 l -3.85 -12.8ï -2.97 0.05 
6.bi -2.91 -13.67 -2.54 0.106 
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Table 1.4 Cointegrat.ion Rank Tests 
Hypot,hesis IVlax-Eigenvalue Trace
 
HO Hl Statistics 95% cv. 90% cv. Statistics 95% cv. 90% cv.
 
r = 0 r = 1 82,25 x 51.3 48,23 264.76 x 158.16 152.33
 
r ::; 1 l' = 2 70 94 x 45.45 42,72 182.5 x 125.86 120.11
 
r::;2 1'=3 40.54 x 39.76 36,93 111.55 x 96.79 91.9
 
T ::; 3 T = 4 31.35 x 33.14 30,70 71.01 69.87 66.14
 
r ::; 4 l' = fi 18.19 27.27 2484 3965 4956 45.95
 
r ::; 5 r = 6 11 ,55 21.16 18,96 21.46 32.16 2908
 
l' ::; 6 r = 7 7.83 14.79 12.83 9.91 17.79 15.83
 
l' ::; 7 T = 8 207 8.13 6.49 2.07 8.1:3 649
 
Note: The underlying VAR model is of order 2 and contains llnrestricted intercepts <lnd restrict.ed trend 
coefficients. The statistics are compllted using 18'J observations for the periocl 1961ql-2007q3. f\Jax ;:lnd 
Trace represent Johansen's log-likelihood-basecl trace and maximum eigenvalue stntistics. respect.ively. 
;:lnel cv stauds for critiç,11 value of the tests, genenoted by the soft.ware J'vlicrofit4. and which are obtained 
from PeSilr<ln, Shin ilnd Smith bootstrap v<llues (1997). Sign X indicat.es significance at, al. leasl. 1070 
signiJiç;'Ince level. 
Table 1.5 Residual-Bilscd Test of the Null of Cointegn'ltion Against the Alternative of 
No Coitltegration 
ReJationships Ll\l-sté'ltistic 5% level 
con talll 
p7 + SI - Pt 0.087 0.46 
rI - Tl 0,22 046 
YI - y; 0.35 046 
b7 - YI 0.40 046 
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Table 1.6 VAR Lag Lengt.h Selection Crit.eria 
Lag LogL LR FPE AIC SC HQ 
0 983.3396 NA 3.85E-17 -12.25584 -12.08213 -12.18530 
2829.153 3459.450 8.81E-27' -34.45476 -32.71764' -33.7493:J* 
2 2910.882 143.9247 8.80E-27 -34.46392' -31.16340 -33.12362 
3 2974.861 105.4248' 1.12E-26 -34.2498:3 -29.38590 -32.27464 
4 3033.7D4 90.39232 1.54E-26 -33.97188 -27.54455 -31.36181 
5 3092.540 83.54301 2.20E-26 -33.69233 -25.70160 -30.44738 
'" indicates lag order select.ed by t.he crit.erion LogL: Log Iikelihood function 
Ln: Sequentiel] modified LR test statistic (each test (lt 5% level) 
FPE: Final prediction error 
AIC: Akaike information criterion 
SC: Schwartz information crit.erion 
HQ: Hannan-Quinn informat.ion crit.erion 
Table 1. 7 Test of WCi'lk Exogeneity 
Variables ;,-:2(5) p-v"j lies 
T'1 10.9 0053 
y! 25.71 0.051 
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Table 1.8 Errol' Correction Specification of t.he 1\lodel Economy 
Equation !::>b7 !::>Yt !::>Pt !::>rt !::>St !::>y; !::>p7 !::>r7 
çu -0.06 -0.01 -0.22 -1.62 0.06 0.01 0.005 -1.5 
1004] 10.17] 10.97) 10.061 [03J [0051 [0.02] [0.001] 
6>1 1.18 -0.0 -0.0 -0.48 0.04 0.006 0.005 -0.9 [0.90] [0171 [0.761 [0.3] 100] 10.071 [0.0171 10.0071 
6,1 4.6 -0.35 -0.7 -0.08 0.0 0.33 0.33 -0.05 [0.0]] [0.35] [0.07] [0.04[ 10.4] [0.003] [0.009] [0.003] 
Ç4,1 3.12 -0.01 0.14 -25 0.03 001 0.01 1.05 [0.009] 10.051 [o.OoJ 10.2] 10.4] 10.02J 10.031 1-2.9] 
!::>b7_1 -0.19 -0.03 0.02 0.9 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 2.5 
[0. 01 1 [0.85J [0.02] 1006] [0.5] [0.12] [a 12] [0.03) 
!::>Yt-I 33.28 0.04 0.13 2.6 -0.01 0.01 0.06 8.2 
1084] 10.091 10003) 10.08] 10.821 10"11 10.41 [0.081 
!::>Pt-I 23.70 0.1 0.3 0.06 0.01 0.00 0.01 3.5 
10.62] 10,09] [0.07[ 1008] 10.66) 10.6] [0.661 10,001 
!::>rt-I -0.66 -0.001 0.0 -0.77 0.06 0.06 0.0 0.17 
l°tJ2] [0.1 ]5] [033[ [0.83] 1007] [0.31 [U"l] 10,86J 
!::>St-] -2.24 -0.002 -0.7 0.85 0 1.74 1.5 0.6 
10,88J
4.__ 
10.05] 10071 10.01] 1°·751 10. 121 10.3] 10.5) 
-43.08 0.04 0.3 0.46 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.74!::>Y7-1 [035) [DO] [O.OIJ [006J [0.4] 10.4] 1°,41 10,08] 
!::>p7-1 -102.5 0.001 0.7 -2 0.43 0.43 0.06 1.6 
1°·341 1035] 10.07J 10.87J 1°·3] 10.3J 10.3J 10.11 
!::>r7_1 0.99 0.004 0.47 -0.16 0.16 0.0 0.0 0.17 
1°·731 jO,5] 10.07] [0.05J [0.871 10.:3[ [0,31 108] 
R2 O.GS 0.25 0.47 0.22 0.16 0.3 0.82 0.3 
x~c [4] 10.25 6.4 24.2 7.8 2.87 12.3 9.7 35.13 
10.031 10, 171 10.00) [0.11 10.58J [0.02J 10.04J 10J 
X}F [1] 29.55 0.45 7.5 0.17 3.33 0.07 6.02 8.09 [0,0] [0,5] _ JO.O] [0.7J [0,07] jO,6] jO.OI JOOI] 
x~ [2] 122.8 49 107 49 200 100 11.4 1.9 
[0.01 10021 10.00J [0.00] [0.021 1°. 60) 10.00) 1°··1] 
x~ [1] 14.96 0.06 4.46 5.97 8.8 0.04 Il.98 1.99 [0.0] 108) 1°,03) [0.17] jO.22] [0,;;1 [000] [0,03[ 
Notes: The p-vaJues are given in brackets for the cliôgnostic: tests. The c:onesponcling 
degree of freedom are given \Vith the chi-squared stntistic:. The diagnostics are: 1) La­
grange multiplier test of no seriaI correlation of residual %;,.. 2) Ramsev's RESET'V 
test using the square of t,he fitted values for the functional fonn %f.-r' :3) Normality'V 
in resicluElJs. basecJ on a test of Ske\\ï1E'SS and kurtosis of residUids 'V %~. and 4) Ho­




B.l First Order Conditions 
This appendix provides é\ derivat.ion of the long-l'un relatiollships from t.he theo­
ret.ical model. Long-l'un relat.ionships have been derivE'd frorn the st.eady-state solutions. 
AH variables should first be transformed to sUIt ionarv ones. This is done by dividing 
ail real variables by the level of t.echnical progress A, t·o produce iL stationary economy. 
This is equal to a steady-st.at.e growt,h under certrlÎnty as in King, Plosser and RebeJo 
(1988). The necessary conditions for the existence of a balanced growth pat.h are t,hen 
i) the additive separabilit.y of the ut.iJity function in consumption anel Jeisure. 8ucl ii) 
labor-augmenting t.echnicaJ process. Both ôssumptions haYE' (llreôdy been introeluced in 
the present.a t.ion of the theoret.ical mode!. 
, {C,} : Uc, = À( (ru) 
(B.2) 
{Bt+d: À( = f3E,(l + I"/+I)ÀI+ 1 (B.3) 





Combining these equations gives the following Euler equations ancl parities: 
(B.7) 





The non-Ponzi games for bond holding explain that debts cannot incrense expo­
nentially and yield long-l'un solvency conditions as follows: 
(B.12) 
(B.13) 
. -1'hm (1 + r-d Bt+1'+1 = 0 (B.14)
1'->00 
(B.15) 




And from t.he production function: 
Yi = F(K1: exp(AdNd = exp(At)NtF( (~'): : 1) = exp(AdN,f(k,) (B. If)) 
exp ,J'VI 
Since the equilibrium cannot be soJved anal.vtically. a linearized system nrollnd the 
steacly-st.nt.e values is considerecl. Log-Ievels of st.ntionary vnriablrs arc Ilot nccE'ssMily 
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st.ationary. However, economic theory suggests t.hat sorne of their linear combinat.ions 
become st.at.ionary. The long-nm log-linear relationships t.o be t.estecl by data are as 
follows: 
10gYt = At + log Nt + log(f (k l )) (B.20) 
log~' = A; + log Nt + log(f (kn) (B.21) 
Taking the dilference bet.ween t.hese equat.ions gives us t.he technological dilferences 
between home and abroad: 
(log Yi - log Nt) - (log Y/ - log Nt) = At - A; + log(f (kd) - log(.f (k;)) (B.22) 
Log-deviat.ions of the t.ransl'ormed variables are writ.ten in small cases. YI and y;' are 
the real per-capita out.put.s. 
Yt = (log Yt - log Nd (B.23) 
y; = (log ~* - log Nt) (B.24) 
(B.25) 
This equation gives t.he long-rull relations belween product ion nt home and ablOacl. 
B.2 Derivation of Long-run Relations 
The t.echnology output gap is given by: 
YI - y; '" J(O) (13.26) 
In the goods market, absent. natural or government.-imposeu t.rade bnrriers, a commoclity 
should sell for the same priee everywhere, at home or in il foreign country. \vhen priees 
,He mensured in a cam mon nunwraire. This irnplies tlJP following purchasing po\\'er 
pé\rity ppp or market clearing condition in the long-l'un. 
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log et = log St + log Pt - log Pt (B.27) 
Defining qt as the log of the real exehange rate: et t.he real exehange rate it.selL St the 
log of the nominal exehange rate St: Pt the log of the home priee level, and P; the log of 
the foreign priee level. Under fully flexible priees in the long-run: t.he equilibrium real 
exehange rate will be: 
ql = SI + p7 - PI ~ 1(0) (8.28) 
From the FOCs of holding domestie or foreign real bonds, the Uneovered Int.erest Parity 
equation is result.ed: 
(8.29) 
UP to a first-order Taylor expa.nsion: 
(B.30) 
and l ean write for the int.erest. rate differentinl as foJJolVs: 
TI+1 - T7+1 ~ 1(0) (8.31) 
Then finaJly. from t.he net. foreign é\.sset condition or cUITent a.ccount: 
Yi - Ct - If = cl(Bt+1 - Bn + CIT; Bt (8.32) 
Yi _ CI _ ~ = et (B"Z-r l (Yi+I) _ Et) + eiTi B; (B.33)
Yt YI Yt Yt+ 1 Yi YI YI 
On the left hand side of the eguation are the greilt. ratios in the spirit of KPSW (1991) 
which turn out in empirical analysis to be stationary. Consumption and output are 
C'ointegratt'd. and investment and out.put are C'ointegratrd. This means that the ratios 
of the I<'vels are 1(0). 
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The right hand side of t.he equat.ion is the change in the debt-l'atio col'l'ected for 
the l'eal growth rate of the economy. Given the fact t.hat ppp holds and el is stationary, 
and t.hat there is a l'eJat.ionship bet.ween fol'eign intel'est. rate and l'eal exchange rat.e, 
t.he test. of st.at.ionarit.y can be reduced to a debt-rat.io ~. The foJlowing log equation 
is t.est.ed with dat.a: 
b7 - Yt rv 1(0) (B.34) 
APPENDIX C 
FIGURES 
Figure 1.1 Impulse response function of one percent deviation shock to foreign interest 
rMe on output 
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Figure 1.2 Impulse response function of one percent devia.t.ion shock to foreign interest 
rate on interest rate 
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Figure 1.3 Impulse response function of one percent deviation shock to foreign output 
on priees 
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Figure 1.4 Impulse response function of one percent deviation shock to forcign output 
on interest rate 
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Figure 1.5 Impulse response function of one percent deviat.ion shocl< t·o foreign output 
on exchange rate 
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0.6 
Figure 1.6 Impulse response function of one percent deviation shock 1.0 foreign output 
on output 
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Figure 1.7 Impulse response function of one percent. deviation shock to exchange rate 
on net. accumulat.ion of Rssets 
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Figure 1.8 Impulse response funct.ion of one percent deviation shock to exchange rat.e 
on out.put 
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Figure i.9 Impulse response function of one percent deviat.ion shock to exchange n1t.e 
on int.erest rat.e 
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CHAPTER II
 
TECHNICAL CHANGE, WAGE AND PRICE DISPERSION, AND
 
THE OPTIMAL RATE OF INFLATION
 
Abstract 
This essay derives the optimal rate of priee inflation by adcling Jong­

l'un real out.put growth t.o a standard New Keynesian mocieL The
 
results revive the old palëldigm of monetary eeonomies assoeiated
 
with Friedman (1969): mikl deflation is the optimal poliey. Bowever,
 
in this essay, optimal c1eflat.ion resu]ts from t.he presence of growt.h
 
in the steady-state tha t leads to a wedge between priee infln tion and
 
wage inflation. ln this situat.ion, the stendy-st.ate of t.he mocieJ is
 
eharacterized by four distortions: priee dispersion, wage dispersion,
 
and monopolistic mark-ups of priee and of wage setters. Optimal
 
inflation is t.he one t.hat balHnces t.hese dist.ortions at t.he rnargin. ln
 
a stochastie version of the modeL the meéln of variables is affeeted
 
by shocks. As n l'l'suIt, monet.ary poliey ean stabilizc wages when
 
targeting a smaJ] priee deflation rate. 
Keywords: Priee Inflation, \Vage Inflat.ion, Real Output. Growth, 
Stilggerecl Contracts. \VeJfare EVilJuat.ion. 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapt.er st.udies the consequence of real out.put. gro",t.h on t.he c1esign of 
monetary poliey. lt brings Ile"" ekments to revive the oJd mondaI'\' economies paradigm 
of the Friedman l'ra (1969) which eonsiderecl c1eflat.ion as t he optimal monetary poliey. 
This it does by aclcling Jong-run rC"al out.put growt.h to a simple New Keynesian modeJ, 
with bath priee and wage rigidities. The long-l'un real output growth ereates a weclge 
between priee and wage inflations and leads t.o a slightly negMive priee inflation rate 
being opt ill1aJ. 
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EmpirieaJ observation reveals that real output growth and inflation have not been 
zero (higher for developing as opposed to cleveloped eeonomies) for the post-Wi:U era. 
The relat.ionship between these two variables is an inverse one. AIso, whiJe many central 
banks have opted for explicit. inflation targets during the last clecade ancl as a result 
have reducecl both infh1t.ion and out.put variabilit.y in their economies, t.he choicc of the 
level of inflat.ion target remains at the heart of debates. 
l derive the steady-state rate of inflation in a calibratecl mode! to US uata, from 
a welfare point of view. This rate that lat.er becomes the target level of the monetary 
policy is negative, i.e. deflation. The results reveal that real output growth slightly 
increases the welfare cost of inflat.ion. A sensitivity analysis highlights how the optimal 
inflélt.ion rate varies with specific st.ruet·ure and parameter values of the economy. Finally. 
the impact of real output. growth on the stélbiliz,üion policies of a cent.ral bank faced 
with shocks is briefly discusscd. 
Since the aim of t.his paper is not to explore what leads to real output. growt.h, 
an exogenous persistent process for technology is consirlered. The time-series liten1.t-ure 
highlights that. autocorrclat.ion of out.put growt.ll in the US is posit.ive. l follow the 
Cogley and Nason (1995) argument in this regard and design an autoregressive model 
for real output growth. 
The main results are as folJows. Higher real out·put. growt h in the steady-stat.e 
leads to a larger weuge betweeu priee inflation and wélge inflation. For a range of 
parameter values, t.his exercisc leads ta an optimal rélte of priee inflêllion that turns out 
to be slightly negative. Sensit.ivity ani:1lysis confinns i:)11 inverse reli:1t.ionship bet.ween 
the opt.imi:11 rélte of prie<" inf!éltion and elasticitil"s of subst itlltion bet-ween different. types 
of labor ancl proclucts. The gain from moving from zero infla tion to the optimal price 
c!efléltion rat.e of 0.72% 011 i:1n élnnual basis is equal ta 0.1 %of non-stochast.ic st.enuy-state 
consumpt.ion. 
The int.lIitions thi:1t explail1 the results folIo\\'. ln a New l<eynesian PIlVironment 
\Vith bot.h good and labor markets (i.e. imperfect markets élncl st.aggered contracts). 
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there exist.s four types of distortions. These are distortions caused by the st,aggered na­
ture of priee and wage contracts and the monopolistic nature of (intermediate) good and 
labor markets. St.aggered priee set.t.ing by firms dist.orts relat.ive priees across different 
cohort.s of firms, and leads to an inefficient. use of resources. The same argument i'lpplies 
for t.he labor market. Furt.hermore, due t.o t.he monopolisticaJly competit.ive nat.ure of 
goods and labor markets, priees and wages do not refiect. marginal cost.s. In such an 
environment, real out.put. growt.h creil tes il wedge between st.eady-st.ate priee and wage 
inflations. 
The optimal infla.t.ion rate balances t.hese cost·s at the margin: priee dispersion 
across diff'erent, t.ypes of goods, wage clispC'l'sion across different. t.ypes of labor, t.he 
average mark-up of priees over marginill cost.s. and t.he average mark-up of wages over 
t.he opportunity cost. of foregone leisure. In consequence, priee and wage distort.ions 
cannot, simult.aneously be eliminated at. il stei'ldy-stat.e wit.h il zero rM.e of t.heir respect.ive 
inflat.ions. Furt.hermore, due to t.he presence of l110nopolist.ic firms, a slight.ly positive 
Jevel of priee inflation is optimal t·o rC'duce t.he lTImk-up of priees over mmginal costs. 
This is also t.he case for 111onopolistic households: a slightly posit.ive wagC' inAat.ion is 
optimal to reduce t.he markups of labor over the marginill cost. of leisure. Ali other 
t.hings being equal, real out.put. growt.h lowers t.he rat.(> of priee inflat.ion t.hilt minil11izes 
the distort.ions due t.o nominal wage distort.ion and households' 111élrk-llp of nominal 
wages over t.he marginill cost. of foregonC' leisure. 
The monetary polie.)' follows a Taylor type of interest. rate rule for its key policy 
rat·e. and will choose the opt.il11al cJeAat.ion rate CîS its target. level. It is to lx' notecl 
thM. the kind of deflation thM is examinE'd h"rC' is not. necessarily harmfuJ for the 
economy. Following l\Iishkin and Télka toshi (2006). \\Then cleHation is a result of Cî 
favorable product.ivit.y shock, it cloes not lwcessarily Jeéld to negat.ive consequences. The 
paper then discusses t.he dYllal11ic of the (>(;ononl\' under shocks to this nominal illterest 
rate rule élncJ real out.put groll'th. The presence of inflation at t.he steacly-stilt(> ilffects 
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the mean of variables after shocks.! The analysis shows that. when long-l'un cleflation 
is consiclered as the target level of inflation, on average the wage inflat.ion rate will get. 
very close to zero and monet.ary policy can stabilize wages. This is an important finding, 
as wage inflation in this model turns out to be more cost.ly t.han priee inflat.ion. The 
analysis of the cyclical behavior of variables also confirms t.hat the model does quit.e weil 
to match the true behavior of data aJter a monet.ary and a technoJogy growth shock. 
The det.erminat.ion of the t.arget. Jevel of inflation has been considerecl by a. number 
of authors. Friedman (1969) argued that. inflat.ion should be negative in order t.o equalize 
the real rate of ret.urn of money with that of bonds. However, there is a vast litcrature 
on why deflat.ion might. not be t.he optimal policy. For example, Boiley (1956) argueù, 
based on public finance, t·hat. an inflation tax should be used <1S one HDlong a number 
of different distortionary t·axes t.o balance dist.ortions in the economy at the margîn. 
Akerlof, Dickens and Perry (2000) explain t.hat nominal wages resist negat.ive changes 
following deflat.ion Buiter and Panagirzoglou (2003) explain that deflation rnight lead 
the econorny into a Iiquidity t.rap. However, as i\lishkin et al. (2006) explain. one shouJd 
consider recent. observations in China (1997-2003) and in the US (in 90s) to conclude 
t.hat. deflation is not always negative for the economy. Favorable suppl)' shocks can 
increase the productivity and lead to deflation. Defleltion c<Hlsed by this l11ech<-lnism 
woulcl be accompanied by faster growt.h of output.. 
This paper is <-Ilso related to previous stlldies of the l11elCTOeconomie impact of 
nominal eontraets in New Keynesic1n models. The technolog.\' sho('k and the we]fmc 
cost of monet.ary policy. t.he ot.her t.opies c1ealt wit.h in this paper, haYe been the subject 
of many debates during the bst decacle. However. mueh of the literiltmc implernents the 
perspect.ive of priee rigidities to study the topie of the optimal rate of infiMion. King 
and \\101I11iln (1996), for exarnple. fincl thilt the averilge mark-up of priees over l1largim11 
cost varies with the inflation rate. Following this ideeL Wolman (2001). \Vith only price 
staggering, clerives il sJightly positive level for optimal inflation in the steacly-stilte. 
ISee Amano el al (200ï). 
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Bakhshi, Lombart, Khan, and Rudolf (2003) highlight t.he welfare cost.s of priee disper­
sion. Khan, King and \VoJman (2003) and Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2004) analyze t.he 
t.rade-off a,mong the different. costs and benefit.s of inflat.ion in models with nominal priee 
rigidity. \Volman (2005) deveJops a t,wo-sect,or model with priee dispersions, and finds 
that deflat.ion is optimal as prices adjust less frequently in the sector wit,h an increasing 
relative priee. Recent papers in the field such as those by Aseari (2004), and Amano, 
Ambler, and Rebei (2007) show how nonlinearit.y may play an import,ant l'ole in New 
Keynesian models. Ambler, Guay and Phaneuf (2004) and Christ.iano, Eichenbaum nnc! 
Evans (2001), among a few others, highlight. t.he import,ance of rea.l wage rigidit.ips to 
explain the sluggish behavior of infléltion. 
However. relatively few st.udies have done welfare analysis in models with more 
t.han one type of nominal rigidit.y. One of t.he few exceptions is Ereeg. Hendersoll. <-1nd 
Levin (heneeforth referred to as EHL (2000)), who develop <-1 model \Vith both wagE' <-1ncl 
price rigidit.y. They show t.hat. opt.im<-11 poliey should t.arget an appropriately ehosen 
weight.ed average of priee and wa.ge inflation. Basecl on EHL (2000), a recent workillg 
pa.per of the Bank of Canada by Amano, r-doran, l\lurchison, and Renisson (2007) studies 
t.he welfare eosts of inflat.ion in a model close in spirit to the model developed in t his 
paper. These authors also find t.hat. opt.iméll long-l'un inflation is negative ancl explain 
that, labor market frictions are responsible for thpir result.s. 
\;I,'hile my paper is c10sest to Amano et al. (2007) and EHL (2000), it differs 
l'rom t.heil's in severa! ways. First., in the design of the real out,put growth. a st.ochast.ic 
proeess \Vith persistent drift,. based on reeent. observations on the Solow rcsiclunls l'rom 
the experience of inc!ust.rial countries, is uscd. Furthermore, physiuli célpital is not 
part. of the modeling. This is due t.o the fact t.hat the m,lin purpose of the paper is thl' 
determinat.ion of long-run inflation. \;I,Thiie macroeeonomic mocleJs reveal t.he importance 
of physical capital for t.he study of t.he short-l'un, the long-l'un propert,y of the l1Jodels 
are not c1ffeeted by this variable. Third, my analysis is not solely statie. EHL (2000) 
linearized their moclel c1l'ound zero steady-stcltc inflat.ion, but this pfll>er ilecounts fOl' 
the impact of seconcl-orcler approximations on the equilibriul11 conclitions "rter shü<:k~. 
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Furthermore, my paper abstracts from output. subsidies to keep the model as simple as 
possible for the stucly of the other costs of inflation, i.e. priees and wages staggering 
and mark-up dispersion distortions in presence of real output. growth. 
The paper is organi:œd as foJJows. Sect.ion 2 presents the model and its equilibrium 
conditions. Sect.ion 3 studies the steady-stat.e inflation. Section 4 analyzes the c1ynamic 
model. Section 5 concludes. 
2.2 The Model 
The economy is a st.andard New Keynesian moclel, populated by dynast.ic house­
holcls and firms. In every periocl two competit.ive markets open; fol' final consumpt.ion 
goocls and for final labor services. There are also t.wo intermediat.e market.s: householcls 
sell differentiatecllabor services and act as monopolist.ic competit.ors in t.he Ic1bor market. 
and monopolistically competitive finns produce different.intecl intermediate goocJs using 
labor as their input.. Following Taylor (1980), households and firms arc divided into 
t.wo cohorts based on the timing of their wage and price set.ting decisions. Households 
are priee takers in the goods market. and monopolistic competitors in t,he labor market. 
Firms are wage takers in the labor nl<ll'ket ancl monopoJistic competitors in the goods 
market. The ehoice of Taylor versus Calvo pricing (1983) is cl ue to the faet. t.hat fneecl by 
small inflation rates, Taylor contraets do not. suffer l'rom relntive price distortions that 
may even prevent. t.he exist,ence of a weil defined steady-st.at.e as explainccJ by Dakhshi 
et al. (2003). 
There is no government spencling here to be finaneecl via distortionary tclxes: 
as that would create a motive for t.he st.abilization of t.he l'cal c1istortions n(',üed DY 
monopolistic competition through nn out.put subsidy channel. The moclel also nbslracts 
from the opportunity cost of holding money. c1l1c1 hns no capit.al in its design. There 
is also no money in the economy ns in the cashless models of \Voodford (2003). No 
indexation in wages is consiclered as ail firms in each period have identical marginal 
costs. Finallv. the mocle! abstracts [rom the shoe leat.her cost of inflation. caiculateci DY 
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the area uncler the money demand function. The monet,ary models explain this cost as 
t.he one that individuaJs incur as a t.ime cost in response to an increase in the inflation 
rate. Wo]man (1997) explains why considering the area under the money demand eurve 
may lead to a mistake in the welfare cost of inflation, as this does not measure agents' 
preferences. By abstracting from this cos(., the foeus of the paper is solely on the costs 
that arise from staggered eontracts in monopolistie markets with real output growth. 
2.2.1 Households: Intermediate Labor Market 
Households have inst,antaneous and separable ut.ilit.y funct.ions in consumpt.ion and 
hours worked. They maximize their ut.iJit.y subject to a sequence of budget const.raints. 
They supply labor to firms and set. nominal wages for two periods. Labor supply is 
divided into t\Vo cohorts: differing in the time of wage set.ting. 
The representative household:s problem is: 
(2.1 ) 
where Ct+T is COllsumption. nt.+T is hours worked, W?+T is the wage rate of the current 
period, 0 < /3 < 1 is t.he subjective discount rate, and u and .t/J a.re posit.ive pa.ramet.ers, 
reflecting the disutility of working. The period t budget constraint is writ.t.en as: 
BI n C 0 0 1 1 D B
') +ri L=wlnt +wtnt + t + 1-1 (2.2)(1 + 2{ 
where n? denotes hours supplied at the wage rate fixed in the current periocl given by 
w?; and n/ denotes hours supplied at. the wage rate fixed in the preceding period; given 
by wl. Households hold nominal one-period bonds B,. The net nominal interest rate 
is given by il' The priee of the consumption basket is given by Pt. DI denot.es nominal 
profits distributed by firms to househoJcls. 
The consumption index is a Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) index of unit. measure <lnd 
aggregates t.oget.her \Vith the c:onsumpt.ion of goocls produccd by firms that. set their 
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priees in two diJferent periods: 
3L 
1 
1 (O~ 1:..2..::.2.) '9­Ct =2- 1-'g Ct '9 +C '9 (2.3)1 
where Cp is the quantity of goods supplied by firms that fix their priees in the current 
period, cl- is the quantity of goods supplied by firms that fix their priee in the preceding 
period, E9 > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between diJferentiated goods produced 
1 
by firms, and t,he constant t,erm 2-G is a normalizat.ion that eliminates "economies 
of specialization" meaning that. a great,er division of labor may increase product,ivity 
(Ambler and Cardia (1998) and Devereux; Head and Lapham (1996)). 
The first order conditions for the householcJ's problem leacJ to the following equa­
tion for \vage seHing (see Appendix B for cleUlils): 
w? (El) ( n, +BE1(-7r;'~J)(lnl+l ) (2,4) 
W/ =)0( El - l .\:p;-nl + E1À'+1 ~::: (JrG-l)"-'nt+J 
where w/ is the aggregate wage index, wp is the wage rate revised this periocl, n, ,Ienotes 
ilggregate labor services t,hat is also defil1PcI below, Jr:~J denotes t,he rate of change of 
t,he exact wage index bet,ween periods t and t + 1, and À, is t,he marginal ut,ility of 
consumption. 
This is the equat,ion of relative wage set,ting. It states that the wage is set based 
on an 8ven'lge mark-up during the life of the w8ge contract and is inversely related to 
the opportunity cost of foregone leisllle for the household. 
2.2.2 Labar Brakel' 
There is a labor broker who hires diffcrent types of labor, aggregat.es them to­
gether, <'Incl t,hen seUs the labor services to the intermediate goods firms, Each interl11e­
diate finn then dpmancls aggregate labor. 
The problem of the labO!' broker is to minimize t,he cos t, of proclucing an amount 
of labo!"' gi\'en the lAbor c1cl1Iancl. This is \\Titt,en (lS: 
(2.5) 
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subject. to the following aggregat.ed demand function: 
(2.6) 
where El > 1 is the elasticit.y of substitut.ion between different. labor skills. The factor 
1 
of normalizat.ion 2 -"l"="<ï enables us to abst.ract. l'rom economies of specialization, where 
a greater division of labor increases productivit.y. 
The Iabor demands are givpn as follows. These are the demands for t.hose who 
revise their wage in t.he period n? and for those who did 130 n{ in the last. period: 
(2.7) 
( l)-q1 nt 'W tni =-2 (2.8) Wt 
These equations st.ipulate that t.he demand for each type of labor is a decreasing funct.ion 
of relative wages and an increasing function of the employment level. The labor broker 
sells each unit. of labor to t.he final firm al t.heir unit. cost. of 'WI.· This êlverage wage index 
is given by: 
(2.9) 
The rehüionship bet.ween wages is given by the fact t.hat. \-vage inflat.ion erodes t.he wages 




Dispersion in relat.ive wages across cohorts leacls t·o a dist.ort.ion in t.he lise of labor 
input.s. The wnge dispersion index si measures t.his loss in two periods: 
(2.11 ) 
Becausc there are decreasing marginal retUITIS to cach type of labor in the aggregated 
demand funct.ion. and because diffcrent labor t.vpes enter synlmetric-allv into this func­
tion. the dispersion inuex is minimized when wages of bot.h types of labor are the sa me. 
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In ot.her words, t.he dispersion index reaches its minimum value of one when gross wage 
inflation rate is equal to one. Hence, t.he relative wage dispersion is eliminated. 
2.2.3 Technology 
Technology follows a stochastic trend. As suggested by Cogley and Nason (1995), 
among others, real output. growth follows a persistent process. This is compatible with 
empirical observat.ions of US dat·a that show Solo\V resid uals are not the appropl'iate 
measure of technology shocks. In this case, the output growth gL f01l0w5 a persistent 
autoregressive process. The shock ET has constant. vari,tnce and a mean of zero. The 




where D is the non-zero renl outpllt growth Rt the steady-stat.e. and p is t.he measure of 
persistence of real output growth: calibrated to match the autocorrelation function of 
the real output growth for US data. 
2.2.4 Intermediate Goods Firms 
Intermediate goods firllls producc output. \Vith linear technology in labor and arc 
subject to random variations in productivit.y growth 91 tha.t arc C01111110n across aIl firms. 
The output roI' the firm i (i Îndicates the timing for the priee sett.ing) \Vith i = 0: 
1 is given by: 
(2.14) 
There are two cqual cohorts of firl1ls thRt set their priees in staggerccl fashion roI' two 
periods. Half of the firms adjust t.heir priees in any period. \\'hen firms adjust their 
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priees, they choose a priee that will maximize their present discounted profits over 
the two periods [or which the priee is fixed. Then, any firm adjusting its priee will 
do so opt.imally. In the spirit. o[ Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987), every producer faces 
a downward-sloping demand curve in the market [or intermecliate goocls. Constant 
elasticity of substitution between d ifferentiated goods is in the eJastic part o[ the demancl 
curve and is in consequence, greater than one (Eg > 1). The labor input nt is a composite 
o[ two labor types. 
The firm that· resets its priee Pp, maximizes t.he discounted sum o[ expectecl [uture 
real profits over the two periods that its priee will remain fixed. The m3ximizat.ion is 
subject t·o the firm's production [unct.ion as follows: 
(2.15) 
O 
À t+ 1 (Pt 0 Wt+l 0 0 0).r3EI~ -p1';+1 - ~nl+J - \Ili/(Yt +1 - A1+1nt+ 1) 
~t t+l FI+J 
W here (JEt ~c is the expected intertemporal rat.e of substitution of consumption of 
households <lnd À1 represents households' marginal utility o[ consumption. 
The first order condition with respect to 11.7 gives the foJJowing equation [or 10110 
real \\Tage: 
(2.1 6) 
Since wi\ges <lnd priees are t·he same and t.he tedmology is equal for ail firms, Ilia can 
be rep1<lcecl by \III, This implies thnt the marginal costs are the same [or ail finns. 
Fir::;l. orclE'r conditions wit.1I respect to labor clemnll(Js ancl priees give the eqll<ltion 
[or optimnl pric:ing as [ollows (see Appendix B [or detailecl derivntions): 
p? = ~ (1li1CI + 3EI~1~IliI+JCI+J7T~~I) (2.17)r. E9 C1'\ ./ (9- 1 - 1 "'E .:l'+J C'I+J7T1+J1 1---;:; ­
Ail v<lrinbles in this equation have alreacly been defined. 
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The optimal pricing equation states that the marginal product of good exceeds 
the marginal payments due to the monopolistic power of the firms; ég > 1. An é1djusting 
firm sets il relative price that is a weighted average of the real marginal cost over the next· 
two periods, corrected by expected inflation. During the Iife of any pricing contract, 
firms reset.t.ing prices ail behave identically. Then, an adjust.ing firm sets a relative 
priee that is a weighted average of the real marginal cost over the next two periods, 
corrected by expected inflation. This implies that when inflation is higher, the firm sets 
a price which is higher, knowing t.hat the relat,ive priee is going to be eroded in the 
second period clue to inAation. Only if priees are flexible will the mark-up of priees over 
marginal cost be constant.. 
2.2.5 Final Goods Firm 
ln cilch pcriod the final good is produceel by a perfectly competit.ive finn which 
combines the input.s producecl by t\Vo types of firms in ,an intermediilte market.. Given 
the prices, this firJn chooses the CJuantities of intermee!iate goods t hat l11aximize its profit 
a t each periocl: 
max {PI YI - p?Y,o - P/Y/} (2.18)
Y,o.Y/ 
The mélximization is subject to a constant ret·urn to scale technology function given by: 
(2.19) 
where 0 indicates the cUITent perioe! ;-me! 1 is for the preeeding pt'I'iod. Cg gives the 
constant eJasticity of substitution between elifl'erent. types of goods ill production of 
the fi n<-11 goocl, and is irnposed to [w ill the elastic part of t.lw demand CUI'VC é > 1. 
9 
1 
The term 2- 1-'9 implies thM there Hrc :'ec:onomies of spec:ialization" in the production. 
Profit maximization of the broker leaels to the following conditionaJ e1emand fUllctions 
for intennediate goods: 
o 1 (PP) -'9 ~ =- - CI (2.20)
1 2 P, . 
~I = ~ (P/)-(O C (2.21 )
1 2 PI ( 
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The out.put. is sold at its nominal price index Pt to t.he households. This price index is 
given by: 
1 1Pt = 2- 1 -'g (pt-,g + p/,-,g) ï=<g (2.22) 
pt (\Vit.h i = 0,1). is t.he nominal priee at. t.ime t of any good whose priee was set. i 
periods ago. Variat.ions in the priees of each period compared t.o the average priee index 
are known as relative prices. This variation leads t.o a gap bet.ween t.he maximum level 
of product.ion From a given t.echnology and labor slIpply, <wd act.IH'IJ prodlIction. TIIp. 
following priee dispersion index (Sr), aeeount·s for this gap as follows: 
(2.23) 
To the ext.ent that t.he dispersion index is concave and symmetrie, it.s maximum is 
attained \V hen eqwd quantit.ies of each of t.he goocis are considered. However. the re1<.­
t.ionship betwcen priees is given by: 
(2.24) 
This equation states that. inflation erodes the prices that have been set. last. pcriod. In 
consequence, the inflation induces more dispersion in l'elat.ive priees. Equal quant.it.ies 
of each good will be chosen if thel'e is no variation in relative prices. This means t.hat 
when there is no inflation. i.e. gross inflat.ion is one, the relat.ive priee distort.ion St is 
cqual to one. 
2.2.6 Monetary Policy 
I\]onetary polie)' targets a long-l'un inflation rate t.hat. is constant and equal to 
the optimal steady-st<'lte level of inflation. 1r. This monetarv poliey is implement.ed by 
an interest rate targeting rule à la Taylor. The choiee of the interest rate rule versus 
the money growth rule, is Împlied by t.he \Voodfordian nature of this economy where no 
rolr is res<:'rvcd for monev balances. \Yoodford (2003) describ<:,s a popular class of New 
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Wicksellian models in which monetary policy is characterized by an interest rate rule, 
and the money market. and financial institutions are typically not. modeled. Cont.rary 
to the optimization behavior of consumers and producers, the central bank follows this 
inst.rumental rule for the determination of the interest rat,e. This rule relat.es the rate 
of interest. t.o the output. gap and t.o t.he inflation gap. 
Orphanides (2000) argues that a Taylor rule t.hat reacts to out. put, grmvt.h milY be 
more st.abilizing t.han a rule t.hat responds to the out.put. gap. Inclusion of the out.put 
growt.h variable instead of the output gap can explain the hypothesis that mispelceiving 
the growt.h during the productivity slowdown in industrializecl cou nt ries might have 
caused much of t.he inflat.ion of t,he past decades, Ot.her models, inc1uding Gall and 
R"banal (2004). Liu and Phaneuf (2007). and Smets and Wout.ers (2007) also eonsider 
Taylor Iules with output growth rat.e as a better measure for t,he eoncluet, of monetary 
policy. EHL (2000) show that as long as wages are rigicl, monetary policy shoulJ 
t.arget an appropriat.ely ehosen weighted average of priee and wage infl<1tion in the 
determination of optimal policies. An equally important observé\tion from the data is 
the seriill correlat,ion in t·he int·erest· rat·e for the US data, The Federal Reserve shows 
a tendency to smooth interest, l'Rte to capture the seri<ll correlat.ion presenteel in t.he 
dat.é\. J\'lishkin et aL (2006) explé\in that the target. level of inflat.ion ean also be a milel 
cleflation, as long as the deflation occurs as n rcsu\t. of productivit.y improvernent,. 
l eonsider the following Taylor rule. capturing ail tlIe above mentioned far.t.ors, 
namely out,put. growt h insteacl of out.put ga p: bot,1I priee and wage t<lrgeting. "nel 
smoot.hing elfeet: 
(2.25) 
where vé\riables without, time subseripts c1enote deterministie steaely-state values: t,lrget 
priee infl".tion 1ï. long-l'un wage inflé\tion Ti"'. and st,eady-state long-Hm output growth. 
g. PT.' Pli" Pg· ,He respective coefficients of IllE' priee inflation: wage inflation, and output 
growt h. Theil' respective v(ll ues stress their importance for stabilizé\t.ion clspects of the 
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monetary policy. Pr is the coefficient of smoot.hing effect. for the int.erest. rat.e and é; is 
a whit.e noise shock wit.h const.ant variance a} and zero me(\n. AU calibration is given 
in Appendix A; Table 2.1. 
2.2.7 Equilibrium 
The equilibrium consist.s of allocations and priees where households, labor bro­
ker, int.ermediate firms and final goods finn are aU optimizing, t.he monet.ary polie}' 
rule is sat.isfied, and ail market.s c1ear. The aggregat.e resource constraints t.hat imply 
that consumpt.ion cannot exceed product.ion in t.he economy are given in t.he following 
equations: 
C' < Y,i. (2.26)t - 1 
i 
Y,'; = CI (Pt ) -<9 (2.27)
1 2 Pt 
As t.echnology is common t.o aIl firms: 
1 J 
LY/ = AtL n; (2.28) 
;=0 i.=0 
and t.he aggregation gives t.he t.ota] product.ion function of t.he econom}', ('vrH if out.put.s 
are imperfect. subst.itutes: 
(2.29) 
The relationship betwcen labor supply nf and cmployment ni is giVl'n by: 
s ~ i III ((w?)-<i + (Wt )-<i)n, = Ln, =-2 (230) 
1=0 -u~, w, 
If wages for bot.h types of agent are the same. the relative wage distortion is elimi­
nat,ccL and in consequence the labor suppl}' élnd employment will be equal. Howl"'er 
t.he presence or inft<1l-ion ind uces a \\'('dge bet.\\'een labor supply and (,lTlployment. 
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2.3 Steady-State Analysis 
The starting point. to derive t.he opt,imal rat.e of inflat.ion is t.he optimal inflat.ion 
rat.e at t.he steady-st.ate of the model. This inflat.ion rate is easy t·o compute analyti ­
caUy and minimizes t.he st.eady-stat.e dist.ort,ions in t.he economy (see Appendix B.:3 for 
det.aiJed st.eady-st.ate derivat.ions). 
The t.echnology and preferenees are restricted in such a \Vay that a steacly-stnte 
path exists and t.hat is consist.ent. wit.h the private agent.s' efficiency condit.ions (see Ap­
pendix B,l for the equilibrium condit.ions of t.he economy). The variables are normalized 
by the priee level. The resulting variables are in real terms. Sti1tionélrity is then incJuced 
by dividing aU real variables by the out.put, growt.h. 
In the steady-stat.e, aU normalizeel real vnriables are constant ;\Del nominal vari­
ables are growing at, a constant rat.e, t.hat of the steady-state rate of inflation. Even jf 
Pareto optimality is not. attainable, monetnry policy. by affecting t.he rate of inflation, 
has an impact on the distortions, and leaels the economy as close ns possible ta its op­
t.imal allocation of resources. Given il convex welfare cost. of t.he cJist.ortions in inflation 
rat.es of priees and wages, t.he opt.imal inflat.ion rate balances t.hese costs at. the margin. 
The presence of real out.put, growth t.ums out to increflse t.he weHnre cost of inflation. 
2.3.1 Steady-State Distortions 
l describe the st.eady-stat.e distortions in this e('onomy. as a function of steadv­
st.ate inflation. The dist.ortions are summarizeci in four equations which me functions 
of infli::üion as follol',,"s: relative wage and price dispersion distortions ;1lld price nncl wage 
mark-up distortions. 
Relative Priee Dispersion Distortion 
The staggerecl nature of the priee contrncls lends ta price clispC'l'sion ancl rnakes the 
economy operr1t.e inside its prod uction possibility front ier. Due to the presence of t'rend 
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infiRtion in the steady-stRte, t.his distortion is not eliminated. Inflation even increi\.Ses 
priee dispersion and generates strong distortions in the economy, Jeading to a deviat ion 
l'rom the equality of consumption and employment. This steady-state distortion is 
denoted by S: 
An (1) ';~J ( 1+ rr-€g ) (2.31)
S == C ="2 (1 + rr 1-€g)2f;" 
The priee dispersion is a convex cost function in the Jevel of inflation. \\ihen inflation 
is zero (i.e. gross inflation is one), the distort.ion index is equal to one and the relative 
priee distortion is eliminated. 
Priee Mark-Up Distortion 
The second distortion is associated with the imperfect. compet.itive natme of the 
market. for goods. "Vith monopoly power, firms set priees ôbove m<lrgil'léll costs. Fur­
t.hermore, infiRtion incre<lSes the wcdge bet.ween t.he priee and the marginôl cost of 
product.ion. The marginal cost value varies with t.he level of inflRt.ion. It reflects real 
unit. labor cost·s and real wages. Thus, the priee 111('1]'k-up is sirnpJy the inverse of re,I! 
marginôl cost <IS follows: 
1 
/19 =_ E9 ) ( 2 ) <9~ 1 ( 1 + (3rr(9 ) (2.32)t'" - w (
AP E9 -1 1 + 1i"g-1 1+ (3rr'g-1 
This equation stat.es t.hat tbe mark-u]) is affected by the level of inflation. The minimum 
level of mark-up is equa] to..!:L and is onlv attained when the infli\tion is zero. However. 
t9- 1 " 
as t.he clernands are elastic, i.e. tg > 1, t his minimum value <llw<lYs ex('eeds unit.\·. 
Wit.h steady-state trend inflation, t.he average mark-u]) is larger Rnd the monopolistic 
distortion inc:reases. However, the final effect of inf!Rtion on the mark-up depends on 
the effect of inflation on the mark-ups cJwrged by the t,wo types of firms. Those who 
reset their priees tbis period will set higher priees rebtive to their C:lIlTC'nt ITwrginaJ 
costs to offset the erosion of relat.ive priees th,l( trend inflation might crcatr. On the 
other h'1l1d. higher trend infiRtion erodes the relative priees that \Vere set by firms in 
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past periods. The relat.ive strength of these two count.ervailing effects determines the 
margina.! impact of trend inflation on mark-up and monopolistic power of firms 2 Any 
increase in the level of mark-up would decrease the steady-state out.put. 
Relative Wage Dispersion Distortion 
The staggered nature of the labor market leads to relative wage dispersion distor­
tion. This distortion arises because different cohorts of households set different wages 
in different periods. Each cohort. set.s the wage at the beginning of each two periods, 
and does not revise it. before the end of t.he cont.ract. The dispersion index is given by: 
(2.33) 
This relative wage dispersion Si is at its minimllm Ip.vp.] if wage inAl1t.ion is zero, ie. its 
gross value is equal to one. 
Wage Mark-Up Distortion 
The last dist.ortion is due t.o the mark-up of wages over rnargiMd cost.s in the 
labor market. Households, when they adjust their wages, set a lIigher mark-Ill' to 
prot.ect. t.hemselves l'rom t.he real wage erosion caused by inAat.ion. The wage mark-up 
varies with wage inflation in the steady-stat.e and is given by: 
(2.34) 
Even with wage inflation eqmd to zero, t.his distortion would not be eliminated. Fur­
thermore, this distortion would exceecl unit.y because labor clemand is elastic, €/ > 1. 
and the disutility of working, x, has a positive VR] ue. 
2Ascari (2005) finds that trend inOation affects I.he average mark-llp nonline,Hh' 
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2.3.2 Calibration 
l calibrate the parameters of the mocleL in a realistic range taken from the existing 
literature, to match certain features of the US economy. The numerical values usecl to 
conduct simulations are summarizecl in Table 2.1, Appenclix A. The time periocl is 
considered as being a quarter. The subjective discount factor is equal to 0.995, as in 
King, Plosser ancl Rebelo (1988). This value implies an annual real interest l(üe of 2% 
in line with the US interest. rate experience of the last clecade. Quarterly recd out.put 
growth rate pel' ca.pita is consiclel'ed to be equa.! to 0.5%. This value gives an annual 
l'eal output. growth rate of 2% and reflects the experience of inclustrial eountries c1uring 
t.he last clecade for t.he level of pel' capita output growt.h. The elasticity of substitution 
in goocls markets tg is equal to 8. This implies a gross level of mark-up equal to 1.142 
ancl implies that priees will be 11.42% higher than marginal costs. Basu (1994) (lIHI 
Huang, Liu ancl Phaneuf (2004) provide microeconomic eviclenee for this value of mark­
up in the goods markets. Basu and Fernalcl (2002) ancl I<ing, KhAn ancl Wolman (200:3) 
suggest that t.his mark-up is about 1.12, implying an elnsticit.y of subst.itution ('quai 
to 10. However Hall (1988) argues that. elasticit.y of substit.ution is lower, equal to 7, 
inclucing Cl, higher level for mark-up. Rothenberg ancl WoodforcJ (1997) consicler a value 
of 7.8 for t.he demancl elasticity in goods market.s. Thus, t.he assigned value of 8 for the 
clemancl elasticity in this paper is in t.he range consiclerecl by the literature. 
For t.he labor market., l calibrat·e the value of t.he elasticity of substit.ut.ion bct"'een 
different t.ypes of labor skills equal to 6, tl based on previous st.udies (Ambler, Guay and 
Phpl11eur (2003)). This value gives a level of mark-up equa.! to 1.2, menning that priees 
shoulcl be 12% higher t.han marginal costs. The parameter X. measuring the weight 
on lcisure in the utility funet.ion, is such thAt t.he representative householcJ devot.es 
a pproximntely one thircl of it.s time to work in the st.eacly-stnte. The result.ing V(1lue for 
X is 2.1875. This value gives the tracle-off between the <1Clclit.ionaJ amount.s of inc:ome and 
utility loss in leisure. if households decide to marginnlly increôse their labor suppliC's. 
The coefficients of the T8ylor rule are édl within the rnuge of empiriea.! est.illmtes 
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(Galî and Clarida et al. (1999)). The following values are assigned to t.his rule: p" = 
1.5, Pg = 0.5, p",w = 2, and pT = 0.5 for t.he smoothing effed of the interest rat.e. 
Furt.hermore, t.he Taylor principle holds, meaning that. t.he central bank increases its 
int.erest rat.e more than one for one with higher inflat.ion; P1r > 1. FoJlowing EHL 
(2000): as wage inflation is more important than priee inflation, a higher weight on its 
coefficient P1rw should be eonsidered. 
2.3.3 Results 
1 begin t,he analysis of the st.eady-st.at.e opt.imal rat.e of inflation in a bnscline 
mode! t.hat. abst.raet.s from real output growt.h. This model is considered as moclel (i): 
\Vith t.he assigned values for the elast.icities of subst.itution: El = 6: Eg = 8. This mode! 
allows me t.o compare my results wit.h those [rom previous studies in the lit,crnture on 
slaggered cOllt.rads. 
Then, in model (ii) 1 add the quarter/y real output gl'O'wth o[ (} = 0.5% into the 
base!ine model t.o st.udy t,he opt.imal rate of inflation with the same values of elast,icit.y. 
Figure 2.1 describes model (i), where Figure 2.2 describes model (ii) with clifferent. values 
for elastieit.ies. The horizontal axes are t.he quart.erly inflation rate ému the vertical axes 
derive the st.eady-st.ate values for wage and price dispersion dist.ortions. 
The mnin results follow. T\lodel (i) finds that il slight.ly posit.ive quarterly inflat.ion 
rate of 0.025% is t.he opt.imal rate. This is in line \Vith tllE' previous finclings of optimal 
inAntion rat.f' wit.h st.aggerf'd eontnlCt.s: Ct slightly posit.ive infli1tion rate reduces the 
mnrk-ups of priees over the marginill costs. (\\1olmiln (2001). King et al. (2003): c1lld 
Amilno et al. (2007)). 
In mode! (ii): the l'eal out.put growth leads to il \Vedge between price and wage 
inflations. Any changes in the priee le\'el lead to il relative price distortion. Priee 
dispersion distortion is then eJiminated at the zero steacly-stiÜe (net) priee inflation 
l'Mc. This is intuitive as zero priee inflntion in<iuces ail nominal priees to be cqual. 
Howe\'er, zero priee inflat.ion will not eliminate the wnge dispersion dist.ortion. This is 
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due to t,he faet, that wage infh\t.ion is inereasinp; with real output, growth as given by t.he 
!inear reJationship bet.ween two inflations: 
log 1f;u = log 1ft + log g, 
Wage dispersion distortion is eliminated at zero \Vage inflation rate. ln terms of priee 
inflation, this is lOquaI to a priee deflation rate of 2% on an annuaJ basis to eompensate 
for the effeet of real output growth in this eeonomy, 
With stilggered priee-sett.ing ilS weil ilS monopolistic competition, the priee mark­
up exeeeds unity. The minimum priee mark-up distortion in model (ii) is lOquaI to 1.14 , 
This distortion is ealeuJated by eonsidering the ealibr<1tecJ elasl'ieities in the Iabor market 
lOquaI to 6 (fi = 6), and in the goods market equill to 8 (fg = 8). The minimum priee 
mark-up is attè1Îned with a slightly positive quarterl)' inflation rate equal of O.2R% (sel" 
Table 2.3). This is lOquaI to an ilnnual priee inflation rate of 1.12%, i,e, a milcJ level of 
priee inflil.t.ion decreases the mark-up of prices over the marginill eosts. 
The minimum value for the wage milrk-up distortion in model (ii) is lOquai to 
1.21. This value is aUilined wit.h a slightly positive annual wilge inflation, However, due 
to the weclge between priee and wage inflations: t,he priee inflat.ion that minimizes the 
wage mark-up distortion turns out t.o be slightly negative, \Vit.h a quarterly measure 01 
-0,16% or an an nuaI value of -0,64% (see Table 2.4). 
The results indicate tl1ilt there is no single inflation rate that eliminates simul­
taneously ail distort.ions in t.his environment.. The rnonetilry policy ehooses a level of 
inflation t.o trade-off these distortions il.t. the margin, For the sallle length of priee ilml 
wage eontracts of t\Vo periocJs: t.he ]<lbor market is more distorted, i.e, its minimum 
mark-up is 6% higher than that of the goocls market. ln this case. the optimal level of 
inflation is closer to the inflation rilte that. reduces the lübor market c1istort.ions. 
This result is close in spirit to thM founel by EHL (2000) in il dynilmic model. 
where t,he objective of monetmy policy is to reclucE' 1'1](' greMest elistortion of the econ­
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omy, i.e. wage distort.ion. In a statie model also close in spirit to this paper, Amano 
et al. (2007) report that the optimal priee inflation rate is the one that reduees the 
mark-up dist.ort.ion in t.he labor market. 
The next section derives the optimal rate of priee inflation in the steady-sta t.e of 
the mode!. The intuition for this optimal rat.e of priee inflat.ion is the one that does a 
trade-off between (i) a zero priee infl,ü.ion rate to eliminate the priee dispersion, (ii) a 
positive priee inflation rate to reduee the priee mark-up distortion, (iii) a negative priee 
inflation rate to reduee the wage mark-up distortion (a slightly positive wage inflation 
rate), and (iv) a negative priee inflation rate equal to the rate of output growth that 
eJirninat.es the wage dispersion distortion in t.he economy (or zero wage inflation rate). 
The optimal rate of inflation t.hat reduces the four above-mentioned distortion 
appears to be slightly negative. This result argues in favor of a Friedman type of rule 
with a value originating from the eombination of imperfeet. markets, nominal staggered 
eontract.s, and t.he rea.1 output growt.h in the st.eady-st.ate of t,his eeonomy, It is t.o be 
not.ed that the model abstra.cts from the money demand funct,ion t.hat, led Friedman 
(1969) to conclude on the optimality of the deflation n1te. 
2.3.4 Steady-State Welfare 
What ilVerage level of inflation should a centrn! bnnk target? In order to answer 
this question one must. study steady-state welfare as a function of inflat.ion. 
max U(c8S (1f),lS8 (7T)) (2,35) 
11 
where CSS(Ti), {58 (7T) are the st.eady-state levels of consul11ption and leisure. Using these 
expressions for st.eady-state consumpt.ion and Jeisure, one can analytieaHy characterize 
the optimal steady-state inflation r«te. 
The optimal steady-state rat·e of inflation in model (ii) is negative and equal t.o 
-0,18% on a CIU(1)terly basis. This deflntion rnte is sll1c,1Jer thnn the one th,1l minimizes 
solely the wnge mark-up distortion and is equal to -0.16% (sel.' Table 2.4) on a quarterly 
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basis. However: t.his rate is bigger than t.he one t.hat. eliminates t.he wage dispersion and 
is equal t.o -0.5% on il. quarterly basis. The deflation rate derived from Friedman's 
rule in this environment is calculated to be -0.82% on a quart.erly basis. The optimal 
deflat.ion is also bigger (or less negative) than Friedman's ru le deflat.ion rate. These 
results indicat.e t.hat. monetary policy cannot eliminat.e ail distort.ions wit.h t.he same 
inflation rate. The optimal rate of inflation trade-offs t.he cost.s of price and wage 
dispersions wit.h market imperfect.ions in the economy and reveélls t.o be closer to t.he 
rat.e that reduces t.he mark-up frict.ion in the la bol' market.. This indicates that. in t.his 
model, labor market real frict.ions in t.he form of monopolistic compet.it.ions are more 
important. than the nominal frictions due t.o t.he st.aggered nat.ure of wage contract.s. For 
t.he same lengt.h of the staggered cont.racts: t.he labor market. is more dist.ort.ed t.han t.he 
goods market, e.g. in the baseline model mark-up dist.ortion is higher than in the goods 
market. (see Tables 2.3 and 2.4). Table 2.2 report.s different. values for welfare functions 
at different. rates of inflat.ion, corresponding t.o different. values of elasticities. 
The net quart.erly real interest rate in model (i) is equal to 0.5%, and in model 
(ii) is equal to 0.82%. In bot.h cases: t.he ability of t.he central bélnk to use the nomi­
nal int.erest. rate for stabilization purposes is not. const.rained. ilncJ t.he zero bonnds on 
nomil1éd interest. rat.e are respected. The welfare cost.s of t.rend inflation and real output. 
growth are then cillculat.ed by means of the compensation vilriat..ions. Coing from opti ­
mal 0.18% quarter!y deflation to zero inflation and t.o 0.5% quart.erly inflat.ion reduces 
t.he steady-st.at.e consumpt.ion by 1.014%. Somewhat. surprisinglv. real out.put. growt.h 
increases the welfare cost. of inflation. The 10ss in the ntility clue to infbt.ion (going l'rom 
o to 0.5% quart.erly inflation) ilppeé\rS t.o be 9% higher in the gro\Ving economy of model 
(ii) thiln in mode] (i) wit.bout gro\Vth. This result. is explainec! through tllf' impr)(:t of 
growt.h in creilting an ext.ra friction in both market.s, due to t.he wedge between price ilnd 
wage infléltions. In the growing economy. real wages are not. only ôffected by inflation. 
but also by the rea) out.put. growt.h of t.he economy. In this case. \Vage seU.ers choose 
a higher markup when tbey have t.he opportunity to revise the reliltive wages for the 
cl urMion of their contracts. The higher markuj) in thé' labO!' I11nrket increnses the value 
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of wage inflation to reduce this distortion. The cost of inflation in t.his environment. 
with growth increases as a consequence. The loss of utility is then translated in a con­
sumption equivalent measure of welfare loss. This means that. the percentage changes in 
consumption make households ind ifferent bet.ween the economy with zero inflation and 
that with 2% inflation. The consumption loss due to inflation in the growing economy 
is 0.119% of the steady-state consumption, whde in moclel (i) this loss is only 0.1099% 
of the steady-state consumption. 
Figure 2.3 shows the welfare as function of steady-state inflation rate. The in­
flation rate is considered as the gross quarterly rate on the horizontal axis, where the 
distortions are on t.he vertical axis and are measured in steacly-stat.e values. 
2.3.5 Sensitivity Analysis 
Given the uncert.aint.y around parameter valuf's, J examine the sensitivit.y of my 
result.s to alternative calibrations and Vcuious structural feMures of t.he moclel. These 
are changes in the e1asticities or monopoly powers on the optimal rate of inflation. These 
results are presented in Tables 2.2, 2.3, and 2.4. 
First, 1 consider the effects of an increase in eJasticity of c1emand in the goods 
market.. J assign the value suggest.ed by King, Khan and Wolman (2003) for this clastic­
ity, Eg = 10. The mark-up is reduced from the baseJine moclel from 1.14 to 1.11. As the 
mark-up is reduced, the optimal priee inflation that rninimizes this mark-up distortion 
is also red uced J'rom 0.28% to 0.2% on a quarterly basis. \Vhen the clernand elasticity 
clecreases from 8 to 6. the value of elast.icit.y suggestccl by Hall (1988), mark-up of priees 
over the mnrginal cost is higher t.h<ln in the bnscline moclt>J nncl its vaine is eqU<il to 1.33 
(see Tahle 2.3). 
The wnge mark-up clistortion is not. affectccl by the ch(\nges in the goods mnrkcts' 
elasticity. AIso, changes in the labor elasticities cio not affect t he priee mmk-u p d istor­
tions. The more elastic t.he Inbor market is. the less distortecl by wage mnrk-up it Ivill 
be, and the lowcr the value of the optimal c1eflnhon rnte to minimize the distortions. 
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It can be seen that when elasticity in the labor market increases from 4 t.o 6, the wage 
m<uk-up dist.ortion diminishes by 9%. An increase in t.he elast.icity of t.he labor market. 
from 6 t.o 8 decreases the distort.ion by 5.7%. Looking at the optimal deflation rate, 
it shows that. this rat.e decreases from -0.14% to -0.17% bet.ween elasticities of 4 to 8 
(see Table 2.4). 
It. can be seen from Table 2.2 t.hat the steady-state welfare function is also affected 
by the dem,1nd elasticities. The more elast.ic markets are, t.he less distorted they will 
be by real and nominal frict.ions. In consequence, t.hese markets cali for a smaller (in 
absolute value) infl()tion rate t.o reduce t.heir distort.ions. 
2.4 Dynamic Economy 
The dynamics of the model under t.\Vo sources of aggreg<1t.e uncertainty is brieRy 
discussed. These 8re real output. growth and eont.ract.ionary monetary poliey shocks. 
The moclel is solved numerically up to a second-order approximation of t.he equilibrium 
conditions around its det.erministic st.eady-st<lt.e. l use the program DYNARE (Juil ­
lard (2004)) for a simulat.ion t.hat allo\Vs the shocks to affect. t.he first. <Incl t.he second 
unconditional moments of vari8bles. The shocks are given in equations 2.13 and 2.25. 
2.4.1 Results 
Figures 2.4 <ll1d 2.5 sho\\' t.he impulse responses of endogenous 'variables after 
monetary and real shocks. A cont.ract.ionary monct.ary polie)' shock causes a monet ar~' 
t.ightening t.hat. dccreélses demand and priœ and wage inflat.ions. As a rcsult of (I.n 
increflse in the int.erest rate, real out.put growth. real wage growth. the \Vage dispersion 
index <Hld the utility function ail decrease. HowC\"er. the priee dispersion index increases 
on impact by a very small amount and t.he effect fades out after a period. A positive 
real output. growth shock (a permanent productivity shock) improves the cconomic 
environn1Pnt. ,1nd Icacls to an increase in the intl:'rest rate, 18bor c1emcllld. out.put. and 
wages. The priee inf!M.ion, however. decreases nfler tJtis shock. Agnin. the growth l'Me 
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of real variables such as consumpt.ion, output., and real wage, are ail determined in the 
long-l'un by t.he growt.h rate of the economy, i.e. real out.put. growt.h. 
The simulation result.s reveal that a central bank t.hat. t.argets a small priee de­
flat.ion rat,e or t.he opt.imal st,eady-sta.t.e priee deflation, can achieve t.he goal of wage 
stabilit.y. This is an important finding as wage inflat.ion combined wit.h growt.h is costly 
for the economy. The mean of variables is affected by shocks. vVhen t.he target. level 
of inflation is the opt.imal st.eady-state rate of inflation, in the calibrated mocle!, t.he 
mean of wage inflation get.s close to zero and monet.ary policy can st.abiJize wages. The 
stochastic mean of variables in model (i) without growt.h and in model (ii) with growth 
are given in Tables 2.5 to 2.9. 'l'lIe period utility (t.he welfnre measure here) is still 
higher in a model \Vith both opt.imal deflation and growth. 
Two simple exercises (Ire then considered. The first one shows Hlat. the opt.imal 
value of infiation depends on t.he size of t.he shocks. The second one stuclies how the 
optimallevel of infi<ltion depends on the Taylor ruJe coefficients. The simulation result.s 
indicate that (i) when the size of shocks increases, or ii) when monelary policy is less 
aggressive and the Taylor rule coefficient.s are smaller, the optimal inflation rclte that 
gives the same level of period ut.iJit.y as before these changes is more negative or smaller. 
However. t.he monet.ary polie)' cannot. reeluce the deflation rnte more t.han the limit on 
the zero bound of nominal interest. rate. This means t.hnt the ability of t.he monetary 
policy to respond to shocks is limited in this mode!. ln this exercise, the folJowing values 
for t.he coefficients are consiclered: p" = 1.2, p"u, = 1.5, and Pu - 0.2. 
2.5 Conclusion 
This charter studiec! the inlparl' of real output growth in a New I\eynesian model 
anel derived the optimal rat·e of inflat.ion in t.his economy. Uneler a \Vide range of pn.ram­
eter values, a slTlaIJ priee e1eflation rate turns up to be the optimal rate. the one that 
Illinirnizes c1istort.ions of this econom~'. Four t,ypes or distortions ,He present.ecl as <:aused 
by priee <Inel "'age rigiclities <Incl the imperfcct nnture of nwrkets. ln consequence. the 
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Paret.o optimc:d level of out.put is not. att.ainable. The opt.imal deftat.ion rat.e is closer 
t.o the deftntion t.hat minimizes the real distortions of t.he labor markets. The optimal 
deftation depends on the structure of the economy, i.e. the demand elast.icit.ies. \\Then 
the labor market. is more elast.ic, t.he opt.imal deftation that. reduces these dist.ort.ions 
is smaller or more negative. However, the l(lbor market elast.icit.ies do not affect the 
behavior of priee setters. The priee setters are sensitive to t.he elast.icity of substit.ut.ion 
in the goods market.s. Then, when t.he goods market is more eI3st.ic, t.he opt.imal defta­
t.ion t.hat. reduces dist.ortions is smaller or more negative. In t.he smne vein, t.he goous 
market's elast.icities do not. affect. t.he behavior of wnge sett.ers. 
The results reveal t.hat the labor m3rket is more clist.OIted t.han the goods market.. 
This gives ineentive to the monetary polie}' t.o put more emphasis on redllcing the 
dist.ortions of t.his market. One suggestion made in this paper is t.o do so t.hrough the 
stflbilization of \\Tage inflation. In the clynamie I)(lrt. this is done t.hrollgh t.arget.ing t.he 
opt.imal priee deflation rate. The mean of v"riables is ",ffed.ecl by shoeks and on average, 
t.he menn of wage inflntion is very close to zero and the eent.r",1 bank ean st.abilize \\Tage 
infl(ltion. 
Tbe impulse response analysis affirms tbat after perma.nent t.eehnoJogy improve­
ment: (i) the interest. rate inereases, (ii) priee inflat.ion f3l1s, (iii) wnge inflation inereases, 
(iv) out.put and renJ wage growtb, as weIl as priee and wage dispersion index ail increase 
on impact. Furthermore, the eont rnet.ionary monetary poliey leads to (i) a deere(lse in 
priee ane! wage inflations. (ii) a decrease in output (lnd wage growtb. (iii) a deerci1se in 
wnge dispersion inuex and period utiJity and (iv) an incrense in priee dispersion index. 
Tbe impulse responses are robust. to a wide rnnge of vnlues for polie)' parallleters nncl 
calibration values. The resuJts favor the olel vic\\' in the monetary poliey literat.ure that 
a slight level of deflat.ion is opt.imal. Y\'eJfélre analysis éliso finds that adding real output 
growth inereases the welfnre costs of inflation. 
In future (1nalysis. the optimal rules or tbc optimal cocfficicnt.s of t.be Taylor rule 
to any changes ill infiCltioll nlld out.put gro\\'th should 1)(:' ùeriv('ù. It. would Iw illt.eresting 
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to back up the t.heoreticaJ model with empirical evidence of opt.imal monetary policy in 
industrialized versus developing countries. Finally: considering a non-allocative labor 
market is a promising path for forther invest.igations. 
APPENDIX A 
TABLES 










l'ime period 1/4 




p:	 pen;ist('J1(;e of t.echnoJogy 0.5 
pl": smoothing effect. 0.5 
Stochnst.ic Processes 
a é ,: monetnry shocl< 0.01 
af:y : t.(>rhnoJogy shork 0.01 
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Table 2.2 Sensitivity Analysis of Steady-State \iVelfare to St.eady-State Quart.erly In­
flation 
Paramet.ers lOI = 4,ég = 6 él = 6,ég = 8 El = 8,ég = 10 
WeIfare 0.3097 0.3597 0.3783 
Opt.imal Inflation -0.15% -0.18% -0.2% 
Table 2.3 Sensitivity Analysis of Priee Markup Dist.ort.ion to St.eady-State Qum·terly 
Inflat.ion 
Parameters él=6,ég =6 é{=6,ég =8 él=6,ég =10 
Dist.ort.ions 1.33 1.14 1.11 
Optimal Inflation 04% 0.28% 0.2% 
Table 2.4 Sensit.ivity Analysis of \\Tage l\Jarkup Distortion t.o Steady-St<1t.e QU<l\·terly 
Inflat.ion 
Paramet.ers El = 4,ég = é/=6,ég =8 EI=8,Eg =8 
Dist.ortions 1.33 1.21 1.14
 
Optimal Inflat.ion -0.14% -0.16% -0.17%
 
Table 2.5 Stoehast.ie ]\'leans based on QU<Hterly Calibration in !\Iodel (i) 
71' = 1.00 . .Il = 1.00 









Table 2.6 Stochastic Means based on Quarterly Calibration in Model (i) 









Table 2.7 Stochast,ic l\,leans based on Quarterly Calibration in l\loclel (ii) 










Table 2.8 Stochastic j\/leans based on Quarterly Calibration in Model (ii) 








Table 2.9 Stochastic Means based on Quarterly Calibnüion in j\,lodel (ii) 











B.l The First Order Conditions of Households: 
(Cr) : 
1 1 
-C = ,8(1 +rt}EI - (B,l)C/ '+1 
For t,he household t.hat can choose it.s wage at time t, (lUf): 
anP+J np+J 'Ill? anP+J
-,8XE1~ + /JE(À/+ J -po + (3ErÀt+ J-po ~ = 0 
ulUI I+J 1+1 UlU/ 
with El as the elast.icit.y of subst.it.ut.ion between differentiat,ed labor skill, great,er than 
ol1e; 
this implies: 
lU? 11'/ ) (1l'?) -CI 
( XE{ + À/-'--(l - E{) - n,lUI PI 11', 
w(0 lUI WI+I ) (0 lUt,1C, ) -CI 
- (JE/ (XE{ + ÀI+ 1-----(1 - El) -- n(,+1 = 0 
'W/ Wi+1 PI+J lUI 11'/+1 
this gives: 
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W 0t Wi. WI+) ) ( Wt ) -"{f3E I ( XEl + ÀI+J----p, (1- El) -.- nt+l = 0 (B.2) WI Wt+l 1+1 Wt+l 





B.2	 Key Equations 
Let gather the complete syst.em of eight. equations that characterizes the model's 
wO 5. !3~ !i 11 b 1 1 1	 es: CI:~: P,: P,: nt,equi i rium cane itions in eig 1t un mown stationary varia bl 11', 
nf, 1T~'. The conditions are: 
I	 I 





1 (Pl / P,) c1enotes relative priees fol' 1hose firl1ls who revise their priees in the pas! periocl. 
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_Ct ((P?),g (Pl ),g)A-tnt-- - +- (B.ll) 
. 2 Pt Pt 
nz = nt (( w? )-~I + (wt )-q) (B.12)
2 Wt lOt 
7r~ = 7rt9 (B.13) 
B.3 Steady-State Derivations 
The system ean be solved -analytieally. \Vith zero infl<üion rate and no reaJ growth, 
t.he st.eady-state is given by: 
l get. the following three equat.ions: 
(B.14)( ~) = (_€I) (~) X AP €, - 1 A 
€y ) ( W ) (B.15)1 = ( €y _ l AP 
n= (~) (B.IG) 
Then: 
2 = (~O) (I-<g) + (;:) (Hg) 
so: 
(PO) ( 2 )G (Rl7)p = 1 + 7r«g-l) 
As inAat.ion is higl1E'r. firms set n priee which is higher \Vith respect to the overnll priee 
JeveJ, knowing that. their relative priee is going to be erodet! in the second periocl duc to 
inAation. This is caHeci the front end loading effects in this literMure (Wolman, (2001)). 
Given ( ~). the ilvernge real wage is: 
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and: 
2 = (:0) (J-e,) + (::W )(l-eiJ 
(B.18) 
Again, this equation should be an increasing function of wage inflation KW. Wage setters 
set. a high initial value for 'Nages since they know t.hat their real values will be eroded 
by wage inflation in the following period. 
The entire simplified system of equation, at the steady-state, is given by the 









Figure 2.1 J'l'lodel (i): zero growt.h 
1:[;: =a rC:J
0.995 1 1.005 S 0.995 1 1 005 
Priee Inflation Priee Inflation 
1:[;: :a rC:J
0.995 1 1.005 s 0.995 1 1.005 





-365.57 '----­ ------J 
0.995 1 1.005 
Priee Inflation 
84 
Figure 2.2 Model (ii): 0.5% quarterly growth, and diffel'ent values for elast.i<.:ity in the 
labol' a.nd goods markets 
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Figure 2.3 Priees and wages mark-up distortions 
epsg=8. epsl=6 
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Figure 2.4 One percent contractionary monetary poJicy shoc1<, Ta.ylor rule wit,h priee 
and wage inflations. output growth and smoothing effect 
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Figure 2.5 One percent. posit.ive out.put. growt.h shock 
Growth x 10-3 Interest Rate Inflation 
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CHAPTER III 
TO FIX OR TO FLOAT? A THEORETICAL ASSESSlVlENT 
Abstract 
This essay takes a new look at choice of optimal exchange regime for 
developing countries. Il does so t.hrough t.he development of a small 
open economy mode] with nominal flexibility and real rigidity. i.e. 
int.ernational financial market segmentat.ion. This kind of real rigid­
it)', because it leads to heterogeneity among agents, has important. 
implications for the choice of exchange regime in t.hese economies. 
The simulation exercises reveal that. agent.s who are excludcd from 
the foreign exchange market (non-traders) marginally prefer Aexible 
exchange rates, while t.hose who have C\ceess to the foreign cxehC\nge 
market (traders) are better off with fixed rates. Flexible rates yicld ('\ 
potential Pareto improvement if traders represent a very small frac­
tion of the total population. Plausible weights on the two groups in a 
ut.ilitarian social welfarc function give a higher level of social welfare 
under fixed rates. 
Keywords: Exchange Rate Regime. j\lonetary Poliey. 
3.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, l address the issue of optimal exehC\nge l'Me regimes for emergillg 
market. economies in an environ ment with flexible priees C\nd real rigidities. Agents are 
divided int.o two groups in tenns of t.heir aeeess to internat.ional financial nwrkets: i.e. 
traders versus non-traders. l find l' hat t his kind of real rigidity, bC\cked by C'nlpiriu)1 
observations in emerging economies where financial markets (Ire not weIl developed. has 
important implications for the choice of t.he exchange rate regime for these cconomies. 
j\lv finclings reveal that as long as the wpight of non-traders is not more than 90% 
of the total population, financiaJ J1)C\rket segmentC\tion f;:\\:ors CI fixe(1 regiJ11C' for ['J](,$(-, 
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economies. This is obtained by considering a weighted average welfare function in 
consumpt.ion of bot h groups. The result stands even if bot.h types of agent.s élre not. 
individuaJly better off under a fixed regime. The optimal exchange rate choiee is the one 
chosen by traders. \-\1hen shocks are monetary, traders who have access ta internat.ional 
financial markets accommodat.e these shocks easily. Non-traders who do not have access 
ta the financial market cannat. benefit from this exchange regime. For this group, a 
flexible exchange rate can st.abilize real money balances, t.hanks ta an increase in the 
priee level caused by a posit.ive monet.ary shock. As nominal balélnces élnd priees bath 
increase, real balances are left less affected and this leads ta a reduced vélri«bilit.y of 
consumption for this group. 
These results confirm that in an environment. of priee f1exibility in which agents 
are dividecl by t.heir borrowing capacit.ies and hence cannat smooth t.heir consurnption, 
an optimal exchange rat·e offsets t.heir incapacity ta react. optimally to the shocks. The 
gain for t.raclers of being in a fixed regime is higher than the loss for non-traders of being 
in such a regime. This is the case no matter t.he nélt.ure of shocks, as long as the whole 
populat.ion is not. non-trader. 
The results in this paper are related to the debat.e on the choice of an optimal 
exchange regime in emerging markets. Developing countries face (\ combinat.ion of 1110n­
etary and real shocks that. makes it c1ifficult. ta determine the real source of shocks. The 
financial st.ruct.ures of these econornies are also weak and this h,\s an important impli­
cation for the study of their exchange regimes. The r<ltio of bauking deposits ta GDP. 
as a measure of financial c1epth, is much less in t.hese countries th<ln it is in indllstria! 
ones (20 - 40%).1 
The model is explélinecl as follows. Householcls are heterogenous in tenns of their 
access ta internationcil financia! markets. They are dividecl iuto two cohorts (t.raders 
and non-t.ra.ders) and have c1ifferent spending rates: non-traders who élre bOlTowing 
constrainecl in each period consume less élncl have fe\\'er possibilities of conslIll1ption 
)See Lahjri. Singh. el Vegh (2007). 
90 
smoothing, More specificaily. only a fraction of agents - traders - IJS~S t.he financial 
market. The bond, denominat.ed in dollars, is circulating in the market and acts ftS an 
insurance t,o smooth traders' consumption over time. Due to missing insurance market,s 
and lack of access to the financial market for non-traders, in addition to the possibility 
of being borrowing constrained in future periocls, there is a possibility of heterogeneity 
among agents of this group, The paper eliminates this possibility by considering t,ha t, 
households in this cohort have the same distribution of wealth, do not save, and are 
only subject to aggregate shocks, i,e. real and monetary. 
The focus of this work is on t,he welfare implications of t,wo regimes under shocks, 
flexible versus fixed. 1 calibrate the model to reproduce the high level of interest rates in 
Argentina during the last t hree decades, l t,ry to understand how incJ usion of internn­
tional financial market frictions affects t,he choice of the exchange regime for a borrowing 
const.railled ecollomy, The second order approximation of t,he unconditional utility and 
then conclitional welfare of agents under the above-mentioned shocks provides insights 
about, welfare under the two exchange regimes. 
j\ly results are related to the findillgs of Lahiri, Singh: and Vegh (2007), In 
a recent, paper, t,hese authors show analyticcdJy how types of friction might, alter the 
choice of the optimal exchange regime. They concJucle that the type of friction is as 
important, as the type of shock in the determinMion of the optimal exchangc regirnc. 
While my paper is closest in spirit to Lahiri et al. (2007) for market segmentation. l 
use simulation method to choose the optimal exchange regime. The issue of the optimal 
exchnnge nüe regime is an old question in int,ernational finance, fllore t,han hall' Cl 
centm)' after l\lilton Friedman's (1953) case for a flexible exchange nüe, the e1ebntc 
on optimal exchange rClte regimes is st,iil controversial. Friedman argued t hat \\hen 
prices are sticky, a AoiÜing rate leads to an adjustment in relative priees Clncl is Cl I)(>ttcr 
inslilMion mechanism l'rom foreign shocks. However. Mlindell (1961) mgued that in a 
worlel \\'ith cnpitnl mobilit,y, the optim"l choice of exch,ll1ge regime depends on the t,\')X' 
of shocks: real shocks cail for n f10ating exchange l'Me. whereas 1110net,-1l'\' shocks (';,11 
for il fixeel exchange rate regime. Helpm<,n and Razin (1979) arglled that optimality of 
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an exchange regime requires a utility-maximizing framework analysis. They concluded 
that there is a welfare equivalenee between a fixed and a flexible exchange rate for 
an economy with perfect capital mobility where agents are subject ta cash-in-advanee 
constraints. 
1'vlore recently, Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995) bring microfoundation analysis to the­
oretical studies of international macroeconomics under the New Open Economy i\lacroe­
conomics (NOEM). Devereux and Engcl (2003) reexamine the case for opt.imal exchange 
rates in a stick)' priee moclel and show that. resuJts are sensitive to whether priees are 
denominated in the producer's or consumer's cllrrency. Edwards and Yeyati (2005) fincl 
t.hat. count.ries wit.h flexible exchange rate regimes grow faster than countries with fixcd 
exchange rates. In the same vein. Edwards and l'vlagendzo (2006) confirm that volatilit.y 
of variables is significantly higher in dollarized - a kind of fixed exclmnge r<lte regime ­
than in non-dollarized economies. 
Hovvever, those in favor of fixecl regimes such as Dornbllsch (2001), emphasize that. 
t.he effects of fixed exchange rates on the real activities of emerging nl<1rkets operate 
t.hrough t.wo channels: investment. and trade. First., fixed regimes, because of Jower 
interest l'Mes, encourage investment. Second, fixed regimes, by elimimlting currency 
risks. encourage t.rade. Calvo and Reinhart (2002) explain that clI1ergillg countries 
which say they allow t.heir excbange rate to float, most.ly do not. These aut.hors cali this 
observation "fear of flbating". Calvo (2005) expJains that c1ollarization is the only viable 
exchange regime choice for Latin America. His argument is basecl on the \Venk stl'llct.ure 
of financial market.s in these cconomies. The cxchange-rate based stahilizMioll litel.lture 
a1so stresses that exchilnge-rnte anrhors are credibilit.y enhancers for thos(·' pconomies. 
Arell<1no and Heathcote (2007) clevelop <1 model of credibilit.y in which doll"rizatioll 
recluccs the Iikelihood of default and increases the ability to <1ccess intcl'Ililt.ional finilncial 
markets. Ambler (2006) construct.s a model wit.h nominal wage rigidit.jes which confirms 
the superiorit.y of t.he fixed rcgil11E', when rnonelc·,ry shocks dorninate 1'(><11 ones. 
Historicn! evidcllcC suggests il gCllera! c.yclicaJ pattern for t!Je cilOice of Olle rcgime 
92 
rather than anot her since the end of World War II. The first period is that, of the gold 
standard or BreHon Woods era (1945 -1973), during which the US was obliged to P[lY 
gold at 35 dollars an ounce to its official foreign credit,ors, and which saw ot.her countries 
peg their currencies to the dollar. The gold system collapsed due to its rigidity aller 
t.he oil shock of 1973. 
The early 1990s witnessed, again, a period of super-fixed regime (e.g. cllrrency 
board or clollarization) revivaJ. This switch was mot.ivated by evidence that, nxed regimes 
were accompanied by a reduction in inflat.ion variability, at least in emerging economies. 2 
Some economists believe that the early twent.y first. centur)' is experiencing a renewal of 
the Bret.t.on \Voods era (Bretton \Voocls II). Ail t,lletie empirical observat"ions !end one to 
conclucle t.hat. the choice of an exchange regime depends on mncroeconomic priorities. 
According t,o t,he International Monet.ar)' Fund (2003), cOllntries Me now grollped into 
four t.ypes of exchange rat,e an'angements: peg, limited f1exibility. ll1aJlagcel f10ating 
and, freely-floating. While the Il\IF explains that. count.ril's should opt for more flexible 
regimes, classified [lS hybrid systems (e.g. crawling pegs. ('rawJing bands, fixcd but 
adjustabJe regimes with frequent sterilized interventions of central banks), the Hoating 
countries [Ire still "flo8t.ing with li fe-jackets" . 
The l'est of the chapter is orgé\l1ized as folJows. The ncxt. section sets out. the 
moclel economy. The t-tlird section c1iscusses its calibration [Incl the solution met,hod. 
The fourth section c1iscusses the results. The fifth section concludes. 
3.2 Model Economy 
The mode! is a simplc sm<'lll open endowment cconoJl]Y in the spirit of Alva]'(~;I,. 
Lucas. and \\'eber (2001). The asymmetry of endowment \\'ith the l'est of the world 
gives an incentive to tr;1(J(~. PlIl'chasing power parity holds \Vithin t.he gooels market 
and the econom}' is perfrctly integrated \Vith worlel goods markets. TIH:' \VOl' lei ClIITency 
2P,1lwma <Incl El Sa""ldor dollmizcd. w!lereas Argel\t ina had il I1.,(·d syst pm of ('I\ITCI\CY board. 
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price of t.he consumption good is fixed at one. 
There are t,wo types of agents: those who do not. have access to int.ernat.ional fi­
nancial markets in each period, non-traders, and those who have access to these markets 
and can buy one-period foreign bonds, traders. On t.he aggregat.e level, foreign b.onds 
become the count.ry's debt to internat.ional financia! markets. Individuals are either 
trader or non-trader and remain so forever. 
Each agent. receives a random endowment. of the consumpt.ion good in e(lch period. 
The tot(ll endowment Yt is an independently (lnd ident.ically distribut.ed rane!OlTl variable. 
Posit.ive endowment. shocks are an abstn'\.Ction for t.echnological improvernent. 
i\loney is introduced into t.he model via a cash-ill-advance (CIA) const.rilint.. Both 
t.ypes of agent.s cMry cash From one periocl to (lnother for their purchasing needs. fi ­
nancial market.s open and close before goods markets and only cash accumulated in 
the last period can be used for consumption purposes. Then, following Alv<1rez et 0./. 
(2001), a proport.ion of t.he current. period 's sales reccipt.s, i.e. dl, is also consllmed in 
each period in addit.ion t.o the cash carried over l'rom t.he last. period M ,- l · dl. is an 
independent.ly and identically distribllted random variable that. can be illterprcted as 
the veJocity of money.3 Alvarez et al. (2001) explaill that. uncertaint.y regRrding d, is 
similar to thM rcgarcling the total volume of sales at the t.ime t.hM the 8gents acct'ss 
cash. They suggest. that one can also consider dl ilS a lI1ix of célsh or credit. trallsaction 
t.hat fluctuat.es across periods. 
The assumption of H\lldom v<ll"iability of dl is the same ,1S the random variability 
of velocity of money that is (\. contribution of Swnsson (1985) to thC' bnsic cash-in­
advanct' macle! of Lucas FII1e! Stockey (1987). Svenssoll (1985) nssumes t.lrat (;onSU!11t'!'s 
have to choose how mllch cash t.o holù bE'fore t.hl? currellt s(.(üe of the \Varie! is n'vealeel. 
ConSllmcrs then hold mone)' for precautionary purposcs. There is Rn obviollS posit.ivp 
3Lahiri el. al. (2007) explaill that. d, COli Id be illterprctatc·d as t.11f' velocitv or IItOlle.'· ,,~il is lh" 
alllOlIlIl or 58 le" IIsec! roI' the pur pose or conslllllpl iOIl al 1he cllrClI1 p"riou. 
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relat.ionship bet.ween t.he uncert.ainty and t.he amount. of preotlltionary balances. How­
l'ver, consumers have to trade t.he benefits of higher money balances against. t.he costs; 
i.e. loss of int.erest. As a result, the velocity of money holding becomes time-varying 
and int.erest. rat.e dependent.. 
The above mentioned mechanism is reinforced in this paper when only a fraction 
of agents have access t.o internat.ional financial market. to smooth their consumpt.ion 
when faced with shocks. 
The economy is faced by two t.ypes of uncertflÎnty. A real shock th,1.t determines 
t.he endowment Yi in each period and a monetary shock t.hat is t.he fraction of t.he 
proceed from CUITent. sale.'> that. can be carriecl into t.he goods market, dl' 
3.2.1 Households 
Non-traders 
Consicler first t.he problem of non-t.raders. This group hokls money but does not. 
participat.e in internat.ional financial market.s. Non-t.raders use cash accumulat.ed in 
the previous period t.o purc1Hlse goocJs in t.he current· period. They also use a rancJom 
part of their CUITent sales receipt.s dl t.o purchase goods. Preferences arc given by il 
logarithmic utility function. HouseholcJs nre infinitely-lived nnd maxirnize the following 
utilit.y function: 
eN 
Max U (ct"t) = EoL(3/log(CrT ) (3.1 ) 
i=O 





where (3 E (0.1) is the discount factor, CrT is the mnsumption of non-traders, MtT 
is the holding of money for this group, 1 - ex is the share of non-traders l'rom the t,ot,al 
population, PI is the price level, Yt is the total random endowment in each period, Tt is 
the lump-sum tl'ansfer of the government ta this group, and dt is the monetRry shock. 
Given these t,\\'O constraints, the amount of money holding at the end of CUITent period 
ta be used at. the beginning of the next, period is given by: 
Mt
NT
+! = (1 - ex)(l - dl,)PtYt + (1 - alTi (3.4) 
This equat.ion is a variant of the quantit,y t.heOl'Y of money for the non-traders, where 
dt acts as the velocity of money holding. It is also important ta note thnt t,he cash-in­
advance constl'aint binds in equilibrium. 4 This is a standard i\ssurnpt.ion in the literature 
(selO Alvarez, Atkeson, and Kehoe (2002), and Alvarez el al. (2001)). 
Traders 
Traders have access ta international financi,11 mnrlœt.s ancl can bu,)' bonds, In n.ny 
period their asset.s are in the fonn of money balances and bonds cmriecl over t'rom t.he 
previous period. Theil' maximizHt,ion problem is given by: 
oc 
j\;fax U (en = Eo I: e1lo.r;( cT) (3,5) 
(=0 
under the following budget and cash-in-aclvance constrRint·s: 
P CT SI Bt+ 1 \]1' P 5 B' r1'i\] T (:3.6)j 1+1+ 11+ fl*K-, =J I +n IY'+ 1 1 +n 1 
where Cl is their shnre in the total population. cT is tbe conslllnption of t.he tl'neler, 
j\1/ denot,es t.beir money balances, St is t.he nominal pxc!wng<' l'<1IC', Bt is the holeling 
of foreign nominaJ bonds denominated in units of foreign <.:urrenc,Y' R* is tbe exogenous 
anel constant gross nominal forcign interest. rate. 1>:1 is the risk premiul1l that. rcRects 
1Lahiri el ni. (2007) pro\'iuE' proofs lhal this js illcicctl I.ruE' for "II 1 
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clepartures l'rom uncoverecl interest. parit.y, YI. is the tot.al current. revenue, oTI clenotes 
t,he share of nominal lump-sum transfers From the government, i.e. negat.ive t.axes, 
ancl finally OdtPtYI is a part of the sales for consumption pUt'poses of traclers l'rom the 
current sales. Adcling a risk premium term "'1 to the interest. rate p<lrity is crucial 
here t.o confirm the depart.ure l'rom the interest. rate parity on the one hand, and to 
ensure t.hat the economy's steacly st,ate equilibrium isunique on the other. In faet, if 
one cloes not consicler a risk premium t.erm for t.he interest rate, holcling of the traclecl 
int.ern<ltional bond foJJows a unit root. This unit root implies that cieviMions l'rom t.he 
ste<ldy state of the economy, even al'ter small t,emporary shocks, will h<lve permanent. 
eflects on variabIes. 5 
By combining t.hese t.\Vo equations for budget. const.raint. ancl cRsh-in-aciv<lnce. one 
can arrive at t.he folJowing equat.ion that explains t.he amount. of money t,o be usee! <lt 
t,he beginning of the next period by traclers: 
(:3.8) 
It can be easily seen that, the bigger t.he monetary shock in chis periocl. the Jess the 
amount. of money t.hat. is left. for the next period will be. An incrense in t.he sales' 
recci pts will be absorbed ancl consumecl in the samc periocl. 
3.2.2 International Financial Markets 
Traders in the economy can borro\\! froln internation<li financiai mnrkets. For <l 
net borl"Ower emerging market. cconomy. the risk prel1lium is positivcJy rciatecJ 1·0 a sllnre 
of the econoll1Y's net foreign élsset position l'clAt ive to output, i.e. YI' This is 10 sa" th"l 
risk premium increases with the economy's le"cl of ine!ebteclness. Following Senh"dji 
OSee Schlllill-Grohé and Uribe (200.3) who discliss alternative ways of specifvjng motlPls of ;1ll,)11 
open economies in order Lo ilvoid the hysleresi:o pro\Yl~I". 
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(2003) the risk premium ~I can be written as: 
(3.9) 
where 'P is the sensitivity of the risk premium to the debt. The higher the value of 'P 
is, the higher the sensitivity of the interest. rate to foreign debt. 
The following equation gives the relationship between the domestic and foreign 
interest. rate: 
(:3.10) 
The no-Ponzi-game on the holding of foreign bonds ensmes t.hat t.he path of asset. holding 
is not. exploding: 
. (T 1) *hm (3.11)
'T TI/=o R*. Br = 0 
---'00 "'t 
3.2.3 Goods Market 
Pmchasing power pi\rity is assumed to hoId in t.he goods market: 
(3.12) 
and the priee of foreign currency is normalized to one: 
Pt' = 1 (3.13) 
This implies that the priee is also equal to t.he exchange rate: 
(3.14) 
3.2.4 Monetary Policy 
The papel' considers the problem of rnonetary policy in <1 nxed and in a Aexible 
regime separilt.ely. Under a fixed exchange rate regirne, t.he exchange rate is exogenous 
and the money supply is endogcnous. The central bank intervCllcs in the rn,)rket for 
foreign currency to support. the fixed rate. The foreign exchange fl1<1rket intenention 
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is t.hen not. st.erilized. This means t.hat changes in foreign exchange reserves have an 
effeet on the monetary base. The problem of the monetary poliey in t.he fixed regime is 
\vrit.ten as: 
(3.15) 
Vnder a flexible exehange rate regime, t.he exehange market. it.self determines the value 
of the exchange rate. This means that the exchange rate is endogenous and t.hnt the 




The government issues domestic rnoney, and makes lump-sum t.ransfers to t.he 
agents. both t.raders and non-traders. Thus the gov<.>rnment's budget. constraint is given 
by: 
1'111+ J - A], = Ti (3.17) 
where equilibrium in the money market requires that: 
(3.18) 
3.2.6 Current Account 
The economy's CUITent account is gin'Il by aclcling togptiJf'r the budget const.r,1Ïnts 




There are t.wo sources of uncertaint.y in t.his economy, one monetary and one 
real. First, t.he CUITent. period's sales receipt.s: i.e. dt is ranclom and is clefined in a log 
aut.oregressive process: i.e. AR(l) as follows: 
(3.20) 
The second source of uncert.ainty is t.he endowment. shock. A posit.ive endowment. shock 
act.s as a product.ivit.y improvement for t.he cconomy. The log of endowment. follows an 
aut.oregressive process as follows: 
log (YI ) = P:IJ 10g(Yt-J) + Eyl: 0 < py < 1 (3.21) 
The innovat.ions Eclt <-\Dd Eyt are independcnt. white noise shocks. and \Vith constant. 
variances. 
3.3 Calibration and Simulation 
3.3.1 Calibration 
The model is solved numcrically by using a second-order approximation of its 
equilibrium conditions6 As cxpJaincd by Kim ancl Kim (2003). tlw use of second order 
approximat.ions is crucial for we]feue nnalysis: as t hey gi \·e more nccurntc rC'sults ancl 
avoid the possibility of spurious wclfnre rever:;als. 
The calibration used to concluct. stodwstic simillations is SUllllll,'lrizel! in 'L,bic 
1. They are taken from the business cycle lit('rature in emcrging ('conomies. silch as 
the study of the microfoundeltion of the Arg('ntinian econom)' by :'-Jeumeyer ane! Perri 
(2004). as weJI as J<ydland and Zarazaga (1997). and Arellano et al. (2007). However. 
ns t.he mocle! economy is ndmittedly simplistic for its results to he direct.ly relntpcl to 
6The model is soh·ecl \\"ilh the h('lp or Ih(' Dy",,,·,, program (.JlIilJarci. (200'1)). 
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the Argentinian ec:onomy, T produce a benchmark economy with parameters aiming t.o 
match t.hose feMures of the dat.a that. these parameters are most. likely t.o affect.. l then 
conduct a sensit.ivit.y analysis t.o t.est. the robustness of these results to any changes in 
these parameter values. 
The foJJowing paramet.ers of t.he model are calibrated: discount. fact.or, interna­
tional nominal int.erest rates which are also equal t.o the real interest rat.e as t.he world 
inflation is considered t.o be zero, t.he relative sizes and persistence of st.ocha.'3tic pro­
cesses, i.e. endowment and monet.ary shocks. 
Note that. a period in t,he model is assumecl to be a quarter. The calibrat.ions 
aim t.o reproduce t.he high Jevel of l11eRn spread between t.he Argcntinian interest. n1t.e 
wit.h the l'est. of the world. This spread in interest. rat.es bet.\H'en pesos and dollms for 
loans wit.hin Argent.ina and for t.he period of 1983 to 2001: is estil11<\t.cd nround 10% 
(see Neumeyer et aL (2004)). The pRramet.er ,6 or tJJe subject.iv<, disc:ount factor is set 
to 0.9667 t·o give on Rverage an annual interest. mte of 14.0%, as shown by the san](' 
dat.a-base from Neumeyer et al. (2004). The international intl.'rest l'Rte is set equal to an 
annual rRt.e of 2%, as the average of t.he int.erest. rat.e for industrial cconomies durillg t.he 
same period as for Argent.ina (1983-2001). The risk premium 1\1 is thell calculated at the 
steady-st.at.e of the mode] from eq uat ion (3.9). The persistenc<:' of the endowment shock 
Py is t.he same as t.he persistence of t.he productivity process. i.c. the aut.ocorrclnt.ioll 
estimated for an AR(l) technology process. estimated for Argentina by N(~u11leyer et al. 
(2004), Rnd is equal to 0.95. The persistellcc of the velocity shock Pd' cstimated by tlJe 
same <:Iuthors, is t.hen eqll<ll to 0.81. The st.eady-stM.e len'I of dcbt. \\'hich is 8qual to t.he 
holding of foreign assets by tradf:'rs. is set to zero in t.hc baselillc IlIOd<'1. The scnsitivity 
of the risk premillrn to t.he del)t Z( is then c:<dcllinted based on thc vallw for ri,. 
In the baseline mode!. l first simulate the model \Vith sYlll111ctric and smalJ shocks, 
l'vith t.he relative size of standard deviations eql.lfd 1'0 one p('l'ccnL \\'here ad is t.he 
ï AreliRllo et al. (2007) cOllsidpr> e\'(~11 a ,ma]1 dis('()111l1. l'actaI' j = O.'l:,:l llinl ]~'iHh ta" liig]ICI' 
Icye] of interest rate. 
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monetary shock and (Iy is t.he real endowment. shock. Then, t.hrough sensitivity analysis, 
l vary t.he size of shocks. l use data in Neumeyer et al. (2004) and Kydland et al. 
(1997), ta set the st.andard deviations of shocks within a plausible range of value, to 
reflect the dat.a for Argentina. These shocks are equal ta (Id = 11.3%, and (Iy = 4.22%. 
The relative variability of velocities for t.he demand for money M2 in Argentina for the 
period of 1970-1996 is estimated ta be in a range of 7% t.o 16%. l t.hen inverse t.he size 
of these shocks ta see if the optimal choice of exchange regime will vary when t.he l'l'ni 
shocks domina.t.e the monetary shocks. This means t.hat l consider a scenario in which 
(Iy = 11.3%, and (Id = 4.22%. 
3.3.2 Simulation 
Ta simulate t.he model, t.he fi l'st. orcier conditions of bath t.ypes of agents are a{lded 
ta t.he equilibrium conditions of the economy, ta the cUITent. account, t.o the rnonetmy 
policy, t.o t.he budget constraints, and finally t.o the c<lsh-in-ilC!vance constrnint.s. In 
t.he fixed regime, the exchange rate is fixed and acts as an exogenous variClble. In Hw 
flexible modeL t.he path of t.he money supply is fixecl and consiùereù as an exogenous 
variable. The model is then simulat.ed with a fixcd and a flexible regime. under shocks 
t.o endowment.s Yt, i.e. real, and to the current period sales receipts dl, i.e. nominal 
monetary shock. The complet.e set of first-ordcr equatiolls an(1 t~quilibriuln conclitions 
is given in Appendix A. The steady-st.è1t.e solution of tlJP mode] is in Appendix B. 
3.4 Results 
In orcier ta assess the raIe of financièll InarkC't frictions for t.he choice of the op­
t.ima! exchange regime, different. analyses me consiclcrcd. The finit is the stc;ldy-stnt'rs 
analysis. Second, t.he baseline resuJt.s are given for a mode! with one percent standard 
deviation symmetric shocks. Third. the impulse responsc funct.ions of tlle model are 
presenter!. Fourth. sensitivity analysis prm'idcs insights for the cl10icc of one regilllP 
over tllE' other. 
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3.4.1 Steady-State Analysis 
Table 2 reports the steady-state results. The steady-state of both regimes is 
equivalent. This is intuitive: absent shocks, both regimes lead to the same allocation of 
resources. 
3.4.2 Baseline Model 
Tables 3.3, 3.4, 3.5, and :3.6 report the results for the baseline model: second 
moments of variables; period utilities, and welfare evaluéltion. 
Non-traders have a greater variability of their consumption in t.he fixed regime, 
relative to traders. This is intuitive, élS these agents cannot access the finallcial market 
to absorb t,he shocks. However, their consumption variability is less IInder the flexible 
regime and even less relative t,o traders; consumption. This is explained by the fact that. 
any ch8nges in t,he exchange rate impacts those who participa te in the financial markets 
more; i.e. traders. Cont.rary t,o the int.ernational nnancial lit.erature. the results here 
are a consequence of the struct.ure of t.he market. ane! do not depend on the shocks. 
\Vhile t,he period utility for non-traders is t.he sarne across the two regi rllcs , equal 
to -0.6932, the period utiJity of traders is higher under a fixed regime. The stochastic 
mean of consumption of non-trélders are also the same across both regillles. ",JJije that 
of traders is higher under a fixed regime. However, the consumpt,ioll 01' tlélders is less 
vol{\tile under il nxed regime and that of non-traders is less vol<1tiJe ullder a flexible 
exchange regime. These results connrm tha t, for the small symmetrical shocks. t \)(' non­
traclers are indifferent between both regime. while tl18 traders unanlbiguo\Jsh' prefer the 
fixed regimc. 
1'0 unclerstancl the intuition behilld these results. it is helpful to nol'(" that \l'hile 
both types of agents face the same small and symmetricaJ shocks, their abilit\' to absorb 
t.hem is ()symmetric. In particulHr, t,rnding households have an extra instrurllcnt - foreign 
bonds - which allows them to srnooth I·.heir consumption in respons<' to shoc1<s. Non­
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traders do not participate in the financial market. and ownot. smoot.h their consumption 
after shocks. This is reflected in t.heir higher variabilit.ies of consumption compared to 
traders, certainly in t.he fixed regime. They consume their endowments, cert.ain!y when 
it. is not for the presence of cash-in-advance constraint. Whenever they receive higher 
endowment and/or an increase in access t.o t.he sales' receipt l'rom the current period 's 
sale, they increase their consumptions. The velocity shock changes t.he nominal balances 
of t.his group t.hat. are available for consumption. \Vhen exchange rat.e is fixed and ppp 
holds, any changes in nominal balances have a direct. impact on real balances of t hese 
groups. 
A positive real shock increases consumption throllgh two channels. First, an in­
crease in out.put appreciates the cllrrency. Second, an increase in output raises t.he 
current sales revenue and in consequence t.he cash for eonsumption. \Vhen t.he exehange 
rat.e cali vary, the optimal monetary poliey calls for an expansion in money growt.h 
for these groups. This will c1epreciat.e t.heir currencies ancl leave t.heir l'cal balances 
unchanged. These mechilnisms explain why eonsumption of non-traders is less variable 
under a flexible regime. However, for traders who aecess the finaneial market., eonsump­
tion and l'eal balances are less variable under a fixed regime. The present simulat.ion 
exercise eoncludes t.hat. faceel with symmetrical shocks, financial market. segmentation 
favors t.he consumption stabilization of those participating in the financial rrwrket, i.e. 
traclers. 
Later on in this paper, l analyze the effects of asymmetrical shocks on tll(' choice 
of the optimal exchange regime. 
3.4.3 Impulse Response Analysis 
1'0 qualitatively comp,He the dynamics of t.his model with existing Jit.erat.ure on 
optimal exchange policies, l look at. the impulse responses al'ter real and monet.ary 
shocks. The real shock is ft shock to endowmenL whereas monet.ary shock is an increase 
in the receipt l'rom the current. sal<>s. Figures 3.1 to 3.4 illustrate tll(' rcsponse of ag­
104 
gregat,es: consumption, real money balances, weighted period utilities and conditional 
welfare in both regimes and under both shocks, The y-intercepts in these figures in­
clicat.e the level deviations of variables from their steady state values. Due to the fact 
that. shocks are written in logs, the deviation can also be treatecl as the percentage of 
changes from the steacly-state values, 
Two main observations can be summarized as follows. First, financial market 
segmentation aJone accounts for the persist.ence of real variables, Second, variables are 
not persistent aft.er monetary shocks. 
The consequence of a positive endowment shock in the fixed regime is traced in 
Figure 3,1. Consumpt.ion for bot,h groups increases after a positive real shock, However, 
the impact. is more persist.ent for t,raders, since thanks t,o their access to financial mnrket.s 
they have an extra instrument for consumption smoothing, 
Figure 3,3 shows the impact of a, posit,ive endowrnent shock in a A<:,xible regime. 
A posit.ive endowment shock increases t,he consumpt,iou of bot,h groups, but t,he con­
sumption increase t,ums out to be persistent for traclers, 
Figures 3.2 ancl 3.4 show t.he impact of fi positive rnonetary shock, i,e, an increase 
in sales' receipt for fi. fixed and a flexible regime. An increase in the cUITent sales' receipts 
boosts the CUITent c:onsumption for both groups. From equations (3.4) and (~1.8), it can 
be seen t,hat t,he higher the monet.nry shock. the grent.er the consumpt,ion and t,he less 
money Idt at the end of the periocl, \Vheu all increascs in receipt.s are consumed <lt. the 
current, period. the money holding will decrease, 
1 tl1('n look at some of t,he qllantitativC' frilturC's of the simulnted mode!. The 
objective of t,he computntional experiment in this !Jéllwr is to evalw1t.e the l'Ole played 
by financial market segmentation fol' the choice of Ml optimal excbange rat.e in emerging 
market,s. However. the simuJated model should beh,we in the range of plausible values 
for the business cycle properties of the cnlilmltecl E'C:OllOl1lY, To this end, 1 look nt somE' 
of the re1<'\t.ivc voJatiiity statistics and comovellwnts of the variables in tl1f' simulatecl 
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model and compare them \Vith t.he data. They are presented in Table 3.6 for both 
regimes. 
In the baseline model, t.he relative volatilit.y of consumpt.ion (average for both 
groups) to output for the fixed regime is 1.0001. For the flexible regime, this is even less 
and is equal to 0.999. These values are about half of t.hose found in data for Argentina 
for the past decacles. 8 The relative variability of consumption for non-traders is highcr 
in the fixed regime than it. is for traders. Consumption is procyclical in both regimes. 
However, the cross-correlation of output and t.ot.al consumpt.ion is smaller than t.hat 
in dat.a, for bot.h exchange regimes. These cross-correlations are higher in t.he fixed 
regime, 0.73, versus t.he flexible one, U.68. Anot.her result. that. is confirmeci by empirical 
observat.ions for emerging markets is t.he countercyclicalit.y of the interest. nüe in both 
regimes (see Table 3.6)9 
3.4.4 Welfare Analysis 
Unconditional Welfare 
1 compare t.he unconditional weHare funct.ion W of bot.h regimes \Vit.h each other, 
where 0' is the share of traders in the total population. This fllnction is givell by: 
W = E ~ (3tU(ct T cf) = ~/3E((l - Ct)U(C('iT) + (lU(CT)) (3.22)L... 1-. 
t=O 
J first posit that t.his share is 0.5. meaning that. a.n equal \Vcight from t.he t.otal popu­
lat.ion for bot.h t.ypes of agents is consiciered. The reslllt·s are givcn in Table 3.5. The 
unconditional welfare in t.his case is the same across bot.h regimes. i.e. -U.0236. How­
ever, t.he period ut.ility is higllE'r in a fixed regime. i.e. 0.6931 versus 0.6940. The average 
perioci utiJity is also Jess volatile in a fixed regime, 0.0233 versus 0.040. These results 
exp]ain that the gain for t.he toracJers of being in <ln opt.imal fixed regime outweighed 
"SC8 Kydlancl el al (1997). 
9See Neumeyer el al. (2004). 
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the loss for the non-traders of being in a sub-optimal fixed exchange regime. 1 t.rans­
late this utility gain or loss into a measure of consumption units for both groups. In 
other words, the welfare gain is the amount of consumpt.ion that should be added to 
t.he steacly-state consumpt.ion of non-traders in t.he fixed regime to Jeave t.hem as weil 
off as if they were in the flexible regime. For this group, this amount is 0.08% of their 
steady-state consumption. 
Then in the sensitivity analysis 1 study t.he impact. of different. values for Ct on the 
chaice of the optimal exchange regime. 
Conditional Welfare Analysis 
In this section, 1 compare the condit.ional welfare or the life-time weightcd utility 
of agents under shocks, for bath regimes and with ci'lch ot.her. This can be written as 
maximizing the foJlowing lifetime utility function as foJlows: 
QC cc 
W( = Et Lfiu(ctTCT) = Et Ll1' ((1 - o:)U(C;VT) + o:U(CT)) (3.23) 
t=O t=O 
The results in Table 3.5 indicate that the condit.ional welfare is 0.13% higher 
under the fixed regime. 
3.4.5 Sensitivity Analysis 
Throughout the paper, t.he response of the varii'lbles ta smaJl and symmct.ricilJ 
shocks has been considered. However, emerging economies are volat.ile and cmpirical 
observat.ions confinn tlwt. t.he variability of nominal shocks mostly dominat.es tJH1t. of 
the real shocks. For t.his rcason, 1 first l'un a sensit.ivity aU<11ysis by cJlOosing more 
reaJistic values fol' shocks <1$ in Neumeyer et al. (2004), whcrc the stilndilrd deviation of 
monetary shock dominHtes thM of reil] shock, i.e. ad = 11.3%. a Y = 4.2%. The results 
are given in Tables 3.7,3.8 and 3.9. 
These result.s rc\"eal that. wit.h an equal shcue for bolh types of agcnts l'rom t.\w 
t.otal POpul8tion. the optimc11 exchange rate is stiJl Ihe fixed rcgime. Non-traders gain 
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a Jittle bit from the flexible regime; -0.6987 versus -0.7002. but t,he traders unam­
biguously prefer the fixed exchange regime and their preference domina tes the weighted 
utilit.y function. The intuit.ion for this result. is as follows. With price flexibility, non­
traders prefer a flexible regime in presence of monetary shocks. The exchange rate 
change act.s as a mechanism to absorb the fluctuat.ion in their real money balances after 
a monetary shock. However, traders prefer the fixed regime as ft form of insunmce in 
the financial market. 
1 then consider what. would happen to the opt.imal choice of an exchange rat.e 
regime if the real shock dominates the monetary shock. For the sake of simulation, 1 
inverse t,he size of the shocks from t,he previous exercise, i.e. a Y = 11.3%, ad = 4.2%. 
The simulation resl.llts are given in Tables 3.10, 3.11, and 3.12. In this case, both 
groups prefer the Fixed exchange regime, even if the gain for traders is great.er than 
for non-traders. The intuit,ion is as follows. As the economy is ail emlowmcnt one, 
any changes in the total endowment have a direct. impact. on t,he consumption of bot.h 
groups. In presence of real shocks, the abilit,y to cope with shocks through the exchange 
rate itseJf is reduced and the fixed exchange rate offers a security to both groups. The 
consumption of both groups is less volat.ile under the Fixed regime. The stochast ic mean 
of consumption for non-traders is higher in the flexible regime. However, once the shoc:ks 
are considered, t.he period utility of t.his group is higher under t.he fixed regime, where 
the volatilities are less. 
In the third stage, 1 l'un a sensitjvity analysis to sec what happens if the sharc of 
non-traders from the t.otal population incrc,)ses. For t.his purposc, 1 increasc t Il(' share 
of non-traders to 90%, i.e. ex = 0.1. The results are given in Tables 3.13. 3.14. ami 3.15 
Clnd confirl11 t hat. the choice of the optimal exchange rClte. when the wcight<:,c1 (1W1'(lge 
utili ty is considered. is the Fixed regime. 
Howevcr, \\'hen almost ail of the population arc non-traders, i.e, when their 
sharc increascs to more t.han 90% or Q < 0.1, t.he preference of nOIl-traùers dOlllinate 
the oven'lll \\"elfare criterion. The results arc given in T<)blcs J.1b. 3.17. Clnu J.HL In 
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t.his case, t.he weight.ed average utilit.y funct,ion favors a flexible regime. The result. is 
intuitive as a small fract.ion of the population cannot help maint,ain t.he fixit.y of the 
exchange rate for the whole economy by accept.ing ail t.he monet.ary changes in the 
financial market. This result is independent l'rom the nat.ure and t.he size of the shocks; 
t.he flexible exchange regime is the optimal regime. 
3.5 Conclusion 
In this paper, l compared t.he welfare implications of fixecl versus flexible exchange 
regimes. The analysis was conducted wit.hin a simple small open economy model of en­
dowment., wit.h a cash-in-advance const.raint., flexible priees, and rCill rigiclit.y in t.erms 
of limit.ecl aceess to the int.ernational financial market. The model is t.hen calibrated to 
t.he Argentinean economy and is driven by t.wo positive shocks: one l'cal and one mon­
elnry. The simulat.ed model does relat.ively well in t,erms of business cycle propert.ies of 
variables. Different. experirnents are eonsidered to choose t.he opt.imal exehange regiine. 
The results reveill t.hat in an environrnent. of priee flexibilit.y and real rigidit.y, i.e. 
financialmarket segment.at.ion, the fixed exchange regime wei l'are dominat.es the choice 
of regime. This is t,rue whet.her t.he shoc1(s are real or monet.ary. as long as t,he non­
t.raders are not. t.he whole populat.ion and this group hélS il rcalistic share of the toud 
populat.ion as in the data. 
On an individuallevel. f"ced \Vith monetary shocks. traders ptder thr fixed regime 
ilncl non-t.raders prefer t.he flexible regime. The effect.$ of monetary instability are bet.ter 
absorbed uncler fixed excJwnge nües. Howcver, eonfrontnl \Vith rc,l] positive shoc1(s, 
the fixecl regirne leads to <1n increase in eonsumption and in the sales' r<'ccipts of the 
CUITent. perioci, and becomes the optimal choiœ for bot.h groups. \Vhen al1l10st ail 
the populat.ion is eomposed of non-tr"ders. i.e. more thc1l1 90% or the population, their 
choiee dominat.es t.he whole econom)' and the flexible regime becomes the optim,11 choire. 
These results bave an important implicnt.ion for policymakers in emerging mnrkets. An 
optimal monetary policy should. in order 1'0 incrC"Hse thc <1vC"r,lge 1('\'c1 of welfare in the 
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economy, target the stabilization of those not part.icipat.ing in the financial market.. 
There are several directions in which this study can be extended. First, one could 
include a production structure to the model and see t.he implicat.ion for policy analysis. 
Second, one can add nominal frictions t.o the model, i.e. priee and wage staggered 
cont.racts. One way of adding nominal friction is to depart from purchasing power 
parity and priee flexibility through a local cunency pricing for exported goods. Finally, 
another extension would be to add two sect.ors to the model, trad able and non-tradable. 
thereby introducing a role for inflation stabilization in t.he design of monetary policy. 
APPENDIX A 
TABLES 
Table 3.1 }\.1odel Calibration 
Parameter Definition ValuE' 
(3 Subjective discount factor 0.966 
Pd Pt'rsistent. of velocity shock 081 
Py Persistent of enclowrnent 095 
shock 
Standard c1eviation of ve­ ] % 
locity shock in the baseline 
model 
Standetrcl c1eviation of real 1% 
shock 
St<)nd,1r<1 devial.ion of veloC'­ 11.3% 
ity shock 
StDndard dC'viatjon of l'cal 4.22% 
shock 
Al Long l'un 1ll01lC'Y supply 1 
R" Gross Foreign intcrest l'Me 1005 
Timt' horizon ]/4 
III 
Table 3.2 St,eady-State Values 
Variables
 
Fixed Regime Flexible Regime
 
Determinist,ic Steady-St.ate Deterministic Steady-State 




















C, is the consumption index of the representative agent. 
1 and 3) From Kyd1<md et Zarazaga (1997) 
2) From Neunwver and Perri (2004) 
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Table 3.3 Second l\iloments for Symmetric Shocks in Baseline l\'lodel 
Variables Symmetric Shocks: 
a-=0.5, ay-Jo/(,. ad=J'7c 
Fixed Regime Flexible Regime 
Standard Deviation 
IJ"C["T 0.0126 0.0] 23 




IJ"MT 0.0138 0.0143 
Stochastic l'vleans 
C NT t 0.5001 05001 
cT 0.5003 0.4994 
Table 3.4 Period Utilities for Symmctric Shocks in Baseline rdodel 
Variables Symmetric Shocks: 
0=0.5. ay=}/{, (Yrt=lS{ 
Fixed Regime Flexible Regime 
EU(C!VT) -06932 -0.6932 
EU(CT) -0.693] -06947 
Table 3.5 \Velfare Evaluation for Syrnnwtric Shocks in Délselin8 l\loclel 
Variables Weighted Avenlge Utility 
n=O.fi. Œy=l'ii ad=l'/; 
Fixed Regime Flexible Regime 
(lue 00233 0.0233 
EUe -06931 -0.6940 




Table 3.6 Business Cycles io the Baseline j\'lodel 
Variables Simulat.ed j\tlodel for 
a=0.5.Gy=1~.Gd=1% 




p(Tt, ytJ -0.42 -0.34 -0.632 
C NT a(~) 1.016 0.840 NA 
t 
p(Ct , YI) 0.739 0.683 096J 
Table 3.7 Second i\-Ioment.s for Asymmetric Shocks, Dominance of i\!onetary Shock 
Variables Asymmetric Shocks: 
n=0.5, Gy=4.22%'. Gd-I1.3%' 
Fixed Regime Flexible Regime 
St.andard Deviation 
ae["T 00766 0.0764 






CfVT 0.5023 0.5031 
cT 05049 0.4589 
'" These values me based 00 Neul11f'yer et aL (2004). And <llso baspd on Lahiri et 
al. (2007). 
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Table 3.8 Period Utilities; Dominallce of l'vlonetary Shock 
Variables Asymmetric Shocks: 
0=0.5, <7y=4.22%, <7d=11.3% 
Fixed Regime Flexible Regime 
EU(C{'T) -0.7002 -0.6987 
EU(C[) -0.6949 -0.7916 
Table 3.9 Welfare Evaluation, Dominance of Monetary Shock 
Variables \Veighted Average Ut ility: 
a=0.5, <7 y=.1.22'7r. <7d-II.:3'1. 
Fixed Regime Flexible Regime 
Standard Deviation 
EUe -0.6976 -0.7451 
W -0.0237 -0.0253 
-20.5163 -21.9511 
Table 3.10 Second Moments for Asymmetric Shocks, Dominance of Real Shock 
Variables Asymmetric Shocks: 
0=0.5. <7y=11.3%. <7</=4.22'7. 











1 0.5168 0.5171 
CT 0.5338 0.45551 
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Table 3.11 Period Utilities, Dominance of Real Shock 
Variables Asymmet.ric Shocks: 
0=0.5. CTy=l 1.3%. CTd=4.22% 
Fixed Regime Flexible Regime 
EU(C{"T) -0.6941 -06954 
EU(CT) -0.6590 -0.8267 
Table 3.12 \Velfare Evaluation; Dominance of Real Shock 
Variables \Veightecl Average Utility: 
a=0.5, CTy-1J.3%. O"d=4.22% 
Fixed Regime Flexible Regime 
auÇ 02395 0.2416 
EUe -0.6776 -0.7611 
W -0.0250 -0.023 
Wt -19.8987 -22.3851 
Table 3.13 Pprioci Utilities, Symmetric Shocks with Different Sh,)re of NOl1-tl"<)d<.>rs 
from Total Population 
Variables Weighted AVel"<lge Utility: 
0=0.1, ay=ICX.. (Tc/=ll){ 




Table 3.14 Period Utilities, Dominance of Monetary Shock wit,h Different Share of 
Non-traders from Tot,al Population 
Variables Weighted Average Utility: 
a=O.I, ay=4,22%, ad=11.3% 
Fixed Regime Flexible Regime 
0.1527 0.1439 
-0.3299 -0.3472 
Table 3.15 Period Utilities, Dominance of Real Shock with Different Share of Non-
traders from Total Population 
Variables Weighted Average Ut.ility: 
a=O.J. a ll =.IL3%, ari",,4.22% 
Fixed Regime Flexible Regime 
0.2595 0.2560 
-0,3135 -0.4076 
Table 3.16 Period Utilities. Symmetric Shocks with Different Sbare of Non-trRders 
from Total Population 
Variables Weigbteu Average Ut.ility: 
11=0.01. a v=!'/(" ari=l% 




Table 3.17 Period Ut.ilit.ies, Dominance of îvlonet.ary Shock wit.h Different. Share of 
Non-t.raders from Total Populat.ion 
Variables Weighted Average Ut.ilit.y: 
a=O.OI, uy=4.22%, ud=IJ.3% 
Fixed Regime Flexible Regime 
0.1651 0.1527 
-0.3299 0.5357 
Table 3.18 Perioc! Ut.i1it.ies, Dominance of Real Shock Dominance wit.h Different. Share 
of Non-traders from Total Population 
Variables Weighted Average Utility: 
a=O.OI. u y =1J.3'!c.. Url=·1.22'7, 
Fixed Regime Flexible Regime 
a"c 0.2595 02757 
EUe -0.3135 O.25Gl 
APPENDIX B 
EQUILIBRIUM CONDITIONS 
B.l First Order Conditions 
Non-traders choose the pat.h of consumpt.ion and real balances to ll1aximize t.heir 
ut.ilit.ies uncler budget and cash-in-advance const.raint.s: 
(B.l) 
(B.2) 





B.Z The System of Equations 
Berc. l give the complete syst.em of equ(lt.Îons uscd to sirnubte t.he mode!. The 
moders equilibrium can he calclIlatedllsing the folJowing eqllations. In thE' fixed re'gimE'. 
exchangc rat.e is fixed and exogenolls iHld money balance is cnciogcnous: i.e'. 5'1 = s. 
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e
Priees are equal t.o exchange rat.es, and by PPP assumpt.ion, t.he inflation tax is t.hen 
equal to the devaluation rate e which is const.ant and exogenous. The set. of endogenous 
NT U Fixed W Fixedvana. bl' as oows: t , CT{,lV"1'1' NT ,,,1' ,1vl{, B* \" t, 1.' ,es IS f JI ,1Vl{ '1' \ R t"',{,/lt,f{,/I{,f{,"'t, 
TI, w F i1:ed, dt, Yr· 
In case of Cl flexible exchange rat.e regime, the exchange rat.e is endogenous and t.he 
money balances are exogenous; j'vI,. = M. The set. of endogenous variables is as foJJows: 
e NT CT '1'NT 1";[1' B* \ ~ \' , . R uFlexible Uf Flexible 1,1; Flexible ]' d Sl , r, lVj l "l' {, /Ir, YI, /Ir' fi , "'"r, t, r , VI l , YY , l, ./, YI, r, 
As long as PPP holds and the foreign prices are normalizecl 1.0 one, St = Pt; the 
gross inflat.ion t·ax is equal t.o t.he gross devaluat.ion rat.e, el = 7f1' '1'0 induce stat.ionarity 
in variables, aJJ nominal variables are normalized by the priee level: 7fr = Pt/?t-J, 
bZ = Bi/Pr, mr = Mt/Pr: m;VT = MfT/PI, m[ = MT/PI' tt , = Tt/Pt, SI = St/PI' 
The foJJowing system of equations in st.ationary variables characterize the model's 
equilibrium and is considered for simulation for each regirnc in presence of monetary 




CT = (À I + 1'1.) (D.8) 
1 
À, = .f3(E, ÀI+ J + E"'+i )/7fI+1 (B.9) 
(B.IO) 







rntT = _C{'T + mr:-~ 17ft + (1 - 0: )Yt + (1 - 0: )ttt (B.l7) 
Stb;_1 T NT Stb; 
-- = Ct + CI + -R - Yt (B.18) 
7ft 1 
T NT
ml. =mt +7111 (B.19) 
7111-1ttt =711/ -- ­ (B.20) 
7["/. 
uFlexib/e = (1 - 0:) 10g(C["T) + 0: 10g(Cf) (B.21) 
U FixerJ = (1 - 0:) log( C["T) + 0: log(cf) (B.22) 
lvFlexible = _l_uFlexi1Jle (B.2:3)1- {:J 
VVFired = _l_UFiJ"/.d (B.24)
1 - .3 
vv{ïexible = LCG liuFlerible = uFlF.riblF +. j)vV/;rrû)le (B.25) 
i=O 
!,tVruer! = L00 ,eiuF1Xed = UFiJ"tr/ + r:iw{~\"ted (B.26) 
i=O 
log YI = pY log YI- 1 + Er (B.27) 
100' d = pd 100' d _\_ :rIo 1 0 {-I -{ (B.28) 
B.3 Deterministic Steady-State 
In t.he st.eady-state, ail variables are writt<:'n without time subscript.s. Tim<:' is 
considered to be a quarter. À anel X are respectively the marginé1J utilit.y of consllmpt.iolJ 
for t.raders <lnd non-tré1ders. ",hile Î' and "/ are t.he eash-in-advnnee shaclow values. () is 
t.he weight of t.ré1ders from t.ot.al population. At. the st'('<ldy-st.ate. the l'cal monC'}' st.oel< is 
const·i1nt. Thcrcfore t.he gross rat.e of inflat.ion is equé11 t.o the rat·e of money growth. As 
ppp holds (\Jld the worlel priee is normalized to L the inflation r<1te is also equal to the 
devaillat.ion or c1epl'ecié1tion rate (cl pending on whether t.he cconomy is governecl l.lncler 
a fixed or flexible regimC'). The steacJy-st.cüe vé1lue of exchangc rate Sam] endowl11C'l1t 
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y are normalized to 1. Then, the steady-st.ate equations are calculat.ed recursively and 
the values are the same for both regimes. 
y = l (B.29) 
P* = l (B.30) 
As ppp holds: the domestic price is then equal to nominal exchange rate: 
p=s (B.31) 
The foreign interest. rate is exogenously given by the experience of the industrialized 
economies \Vith an annual net int,erest rate of 2%. The gross quarterly Întert'st rat.e is 
then equal to: 
R* = 1.005 (8.32) 
And the Euler equation for bonds implies immediately that: 
1R=- (8.33)/3 
The value for the discount factor has been chosen to ma.tch the high level of interest 




The equation for the risk premium implies a solution for the sensitivity of risk-premium: 
Jog(n.) (B,35)<p = SV 
y 
'l'hl' long-l'un real money balances is normalized to one: 
Al = 1 (IUG) 
The nMional income identity gives: 
CNT = (1 - o.)y (8,:37) 
from cash-in-advance constraint: 
m NT = CI\[ - (1 - 0)(1 - d)y (8.38) 
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and from aggregate money holding: 
(B.39) 
CT = m T + (1 - a)(l - d)y (BAO) 
The housebold's first order conditions for eonsumpt.ions and money-balanees ean be 
usecl to solve for À, ;', À', l"~ as folJows: 
À=LCT (BAI) 
1 
Î=CT- À (B.42) 
, B 
À = CNT (B.43) 
, 1 
Î = CNT 
, 
- À (B.44) 
APPENDIX C 
FIGURES 
Figure 3.1 One percent positive real shock in a fixecl regime, when NT stands for 
Non-traders, and T stands for Traders 
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Figure 3.2 One percent positive monetary shock in a fixecl regime 
x 10-3 Consumplion - NT x 10-3 Consumplion - T 
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Figure 3.3 One percent, posit.ive real shock in a flexible regime 
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Figure 3.4 One percent. positive monet.ary poliey shock in il flexible regime 
x 10-3Consumplion - NT X 10-3 Consumplion - T 
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CONCLUSION 
Dans cette thèse, je me suis intéressée à travers trois essais à la question de la 
politique monétaire efficace et optimale: efficace en termes de prévisions, et optimnle 
en t.ermes de l'impact sur le bien-être des agents économiques. 
Dans un premier temps, j'ai développé un outil d'analyse conjonct.urel pour les 
petites économies ouvertes. Cet out.il est composé de deux éléments, l'un pour les 
prévisions de court. et J'(lutre pour celles cie long terme, selon que les chocs sont. tem­
poraires ou permanents. Contrairement. aux méthodes empiriques. je développe tout 
d'abord un modèle économique struct urel. 
La méthodologie est novatrice en ce qu'elle permet de combiner les deux approc!K's 
les plus utilisées dans la lit.térature des modèles structurels, celui cie PGLS (2003) et. 
de KPSYV (1991). J'ai ensuite verifié cet. outil dans un but normatif afin d'évaluer les 
politiques économiques canadiennes, dans leurrelat.ion à celles des États-Unis. À raide 
des estimations du modèle développé et l'étude des impulsions conjointes pour les cieux 
économies, je t.rouve que les marchés des biens et les marchés Illonét.aires sont intégrés 
entre les deux pays, ce qui explique que leurs cycles conjonct.mels soient. significative­
ment. inter-reliés. La croissance de long terme pour les deux pavs est 1(' résultat des 
progrès technologiques et l'appréciation du dollar canadien durant. les derllières années 
(1 été (lccompagnée pM' une diminut.ion d',lCtifs net·te au Cmada. PuisquE' la J3anque du 
Canndn suit une politique de cible d'inflation, les résultats renforcent J'idée (pif' les poli­
tiques expansionnist.es doivent être t.rait.ées avec précautions. Les résultats confirment. 
également que la méthodologie mise en œuvre dans ce chapitre semble prometteuse 
comme out.il d'analyse au sein d'une banque cent-rale. 
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Dans un deuxième temps, j'ai dérivé le taux d'infLüion optimal pour la cible 
d'inflution, dans un environnement de croissance non nulle et présentant des rigidités 
de prix et de salaires, comme dans la tradition des modèles néo-Keynesiens. 
Les résultats remettent au goût du jour Ja règle de Friedman (1969), qui veut 
que la déflation soit la politique optimale. En termes de taille de cet.t.e déflation, le 
taux optimal s'avère plus grand (moins négatif) que le taux d'intérêt réel de l'économie, 
comme suggéré dans la thèse de Friedman. Ce taux est aussi plus grand que le taux 
éliminant. la dispersion salariale. Ceci reflèt.e la présence de différentes dist.ort.ions en 
économie et le fait que le taux d'inflation optimal cherche à minimiser les distortions d ûes 
aux dispersions (prix et salaires), ainsi que celles liées aux concurrences monopolistiques 
dans cet. environnement. Le taux optimal s'avère plus proche du taux minimisant les 
frictions réelles sur le marché de travail. Le résultat reste vaJable même en présence d'une 
analyse de sensibilité et des différents paramètres structurels de l'économie, notamment 
l'élasticité des subst.itut.ions entre les t.ypes de travailleurs et entre les types de biens 
différenciés. Le coût d'inflat.ion dans l'environnement avec croissance s'avère plus élevé, 
car J'état.-stat.ionnaire du modèle connaît plus de distortions. 
Ainsi. une banque centrule qui utilise comme instrument le taux d'intérêt par le 
biais d'une règle de Taylor, devrait choisir cette valeur cl 'i nAMion optirnaJe négative 
comme sa cible d'inflation. Les moyennes stochastiques des variables étant affectées par 
les chocs à court-terme. la moyenne de l'inflation salariale se fixera autour de zéro et 
une des distortions nomirwles du modèle sera minirnisée. Une étude récente de 1\lishkin 
et al. (2006) montre qu'une déflation résultant du progrès technique n'a pas d'effets 
néfastes sur l'activité économique. 
Dans lin dernier essai. j'ai étudié le r.hoix de régime de change, pour les économies 
émergentes. 1\les résult.at·s favorisent un régime de change fixe pour ces économies. Ceci 
est conforme aux idées de certains économistes qui trouvent que le seul régime opt.im<1l 
pour ces économies est la dollarisation. j'vies résultats tiennent. compte cie la structure 
réelle et de la faiblesse des institutiolls financières dans ces économies. Les agents. pô!' 
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leur accès aux marchés, sont divisés en deux groupes. Le choix cie régime de change n'est 
pas Je même pour ces deux groupes. Les participants aux marchés cherchent la stabilité 
de change à travers un régime fixe. Quant aux non-participants et en présence de la 
flexibilité des prix, un régime du taux de change flexible absorbe mieux les fluctuations 
des balances réelles. Le régime de change optimal est celui qui équilibre les coûts de 
chaque groupe (participant et non-palticipant) à la marge. Une fonction de bien-être 
social avec un poids raisonable pour les deux types cI'agents, favorise un régime de 
change fixe clans cet.te économie. Ce régime est. moins volat.ile clans ce cas et les gains de 
bien-être pour les part.icipants aux marchés dépassent les pert.es des non-participant.s. 
Les analyses de sensibilités confirment que ces résultats restent valides même 
en présence de pert.urbations asymétriques et. la domination d'un choc sur l'ensemble 
des activités économiques. La seule exception est. quand la part. des pi'\rticipant.s aux 
marchés diminue à moins cie 10% de la popillation t.ot.ale. Dans ce Ci'\S, le régime de 
change opt.imal devient le choix des non-participant.s aux ma.rchés, c'est fi dire le régime 
flexible. Ces résultat.s, indépendants du t.ype de choc, plùident. en fnveur de la mise en 
œuvre d'une polit.ique monét.aire qui, si elle a pour but. d'augmenter le bien-être social, 
doit viser le bien-être des non-part.icipants et. en conséquence sera dist.ortionnairc. 
Cette t.hèse a. fourni J'occasion d'une réflexion nouvelle sur les politiques monét.nires. 
Plusieurs ext.ensions à ce t.ravail sont. envisagei'\bles. La méthodologie proposée en pre­
mier chi'\pitre est aisément adaptable pour t.cnir compte d'aut.res i'\spee:t.s import.ants de 
la conjoncture économique entre Je Canada et. les États-Unis, not.amment. la mise en 
place d'une union monét.nire nord-è)méricaine. L'ét.ude cie l'int.erdépendance des poli­
t.iques fiscales entre les cieux pays, i'\insi que son influence sur les politiques monétaires 
est un autre aspect qui rnériternit. plus de recherches. 
Ensuit.e. une ét.ude empirique de l'efficacité des polit.iques cibles d'inflat.ion dans les 
pays avec des perspectives différentes de croissl\l1ce semble une ext.ension int.éressant.e du 
deuxième chapitre. L'inA uence de la politique hsc<lle sur J'etficRcité de Ja cible d'inflnt.ion 
est une réH<'xion import.ante qui devra être menée dans un travail fut.ur. Un autre 
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exercice pert.inent sera d'inclure la variable du capital dans le choix de modélisation. 
Une extension prometteuse pour le troisième chapitre serait. d'inclure le loisir 
dans la fonction d'utilité des agents, et de voir si cela changerait les clécisions int.er­
t.emporelles de ces derniers, dans un marché financier segmenté et. face aux différents 
chocs. Il pourrait ainsi s'avérer judicieux cie combiner les polit.iques monétaires avec 
les politiques fiscales pour les pays émergents où il y'a une forte dominance de ces 
dernières. L'ét.ude des interactions ent.re les différents t.ypes cie frict,ions, notamment 
celles du marché du t.ravail, semble une autre piste de réflexion. 
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